Interpretation. The act was intended to be an effective means for redressing wrongs resulting from unjust discrimination and un due preference, and this must be so whether persons or places suffer ; Interstate Com merce Commission v. Ry. Co., 218 U. S. 88, 30 Sup. Ct. 651, 54 L. Ed. 959. The words "railway" and "railroad" are completely synonymous ; West End Improvement Club v. Ry. & Bridge Co., 17 I. C. C. 239, 244. Sec tion 15 is the dominating and controlling ex pression' of the real object and meaning of the act. It makes of the Commission a spe cial expert body to deal with rates, and not to supplant the courts ; Joynes v. R. Co., 17 I. C. C. 361, 369. Carriers are left free to initiate their own rates, rules and regula tions ; Traer v. R. Co., 14 I. C. C. 165, 169.
The provisions of the Hepburn Act, as amended by the Carmack Amendment, and the Elkins Act forbidding carriers to evade the collection or payment of fixed tariff rates are not intended to extend the jurisdic tion in matters outside of its province as a common carrier, nor are they intended to limit and prescribe the nse which shall be made of the rates which the carrier puts into effect; California Commercial Ass'n v. Wells Fargo & Co., 14 I. C. C. 422, 428.
The law stands for what it means from the date when it takes effect and not from the date when it is construed by the Com mission. Ordinarily the date of the an nouncement by the Commission of its in terpretation of a particular provision is therefore of little real importance; Liberty Mills v. R. Co., 23 I. C. C. 182, 185.
The act does not apply to the carriage of property by rail or otherwise wholly within a state ; Ex parte Koehler, 30 Fed. 867; when the carrier issues no bills of lading to points beyond its line, receives no freight on through bills of lading, and has no arrange ment with other roads for a conventional division of charges or a common manage ment; Interstate Commerce Commission v. R. Co., 77 Fed. 942; but if a railroad com pany, whose line is entirely within one state, Issues through bills of lading to points in other states, it is within the act; In re An napolis, W. & B. R. Co., 1 I. C. Rep. 315. Receivers of railroad companies are common carriers and subject to the act; Independent Refiners' Ass'n of Titusville, Pa., v. R. Co., 6 I. C. Rep. 379. The appointment of a re ceiver of a part of an interstate road lying within a state does not interfere with inter state commerce; McKinney v. Gas Co., 206
Fed. 772. A carrier subject to the act can not, by leasing its road, free itself from liability for practices illegal under the act, nor after the termination of the lease es cape liability for damages for injuries sus tained during the lease ; Independent Re finers' Ass'n of Titusville, Pa., v. R. Co., 6 I. C. Rep. 378.
The act does not come within the consti tutional prohibition as to impairing the ob ligation of contracts, although its effect may be to prevent the literal enforcement of pre existing contracts ; Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. R. Co., 2 L C. Rep. 102 ; id., 2 I. C. C. R. 162; 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (Mont.) 234. The mere circumstance that there is in a given case a preference does not, of itself, show that such preference is unreasonable; Interstate Commerce Commission v. R. Co., 5 I. C. Rep. 685 (C. C. of A.) ; id., 74 Fed. 715, 21 C. C. A. 51.
One of the most satisfactory tests of the reasonableness of the rates of one carrier is a comparison with the rates of other car riers operating in the same territory under the same general conditions ; Chamber of Commerce of City of Milwaukee .v. R: Co., 15 I. C. C. 460, 466. The rates in different directions on the same line between the same points need not be identical; Wilburine Oil Works v. R. Co., 18 I. C. C. 548. Each case must be decided upon its own merits, and in arriving at a conclusion in respect to the rates here involved, the decisions in another case against carriers operating in a territory under essentially dissimilar circum stances and conditions affords no proper criterion therefor; Chicago Lumber & Coal Co. v. R. Co., 16 I. C. C. 323, 328.
Evidence that the rates on a certain com modity are higher in certain cases than cer tain other rates, and that they produce a large revenue to the carrier, does not make a prima facie case that they are unreason able. The reasonableness must be determin ed by an examination of the whole subject; Howell v. R. Co., 2 I. C. Rep. 162. The fact that a road earns little more than operating expenses is not to be overlooked in fixing rates, but it cannot be made to justify gross ly excessive rates. Wherever there are more roads than the business, at fair rates, will remunerate, they must rely upon future earnings for the return on investments and profits; New Orleans Cotton Exchange v. R. Co., 2 I. C. Rep. 289.