Section 4, as amended June 18, 1910, makes it unlawful to charge any greater compensa tion for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line or route in the same di rection, the shorter being included within the longer distance, but in special instances on application to the Commission the same may be allowed.
The fact that a railroad company makes an unreasonably low rate does not authorize a rival, extending between the same points, to make greater charges for the shorter haul to intermediate points than it does to the terminal ; In re Chicago, St. P. & K. C. R. Co., 2 I. C. Rep. 137.
Where a road makes the same charge to one point that it does to another which is only from a third to two-thirds of the same distance, the charge to the shorter point is presumptively illegal; In re Chicago, St. P. & K. C. R. Co., 2 I. C. Rep. 137. Actual wa ter competition of controlling force relating to traffic important in amount, may justify a lower charge for a longer distance than for a shorter distance included therein ; Leh mann, Higginson & Co. v. R. Co., 3 I. C. Rep. 80; but disturbance of rates, secret or open, will not ; In re Alleged Violations of the Fourth Section, 7 I. C. Rep. 61; nor will competition between markets or between car riers subject to the act ; Brewer & Hanleiter v. R. Co., 7 I. C. Rep. 224; nor popsible wa ter competition ; San Bernardino Board of Trade v. R. Co., 3 I. C. Rep. 138. Water competition must be such that the freight would go to its destination by water, if the lower rate were not given ; James & Mayer Buggy Co. v. R. Co., 3 I. C. Rep. 682; id., 4 I. C. C. R. 744.
When rail rates are advanced with the disappearance of water competition, no in ference adverse to the railroad can be drawn, but when the old rates had been maintained for several years after such disappearance, there is a presumption, if the rates are rais ed, that the advance is made for other rea sons; Int. Com. Corn. v. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 57 L. Ed. 431.
On the ground that "through failure of crops" the people of long distance localities were without necessary food for themselves and animals, a temporary order was made In In re Application of Fremont, E. & M. V. R. Co., 6 I. C. Rep. 293, authorizing a carrier to charge less for a longer distance than they were authorized to charge for a shorter distance. And the need of additional facil ities for passengers travelling to Chicago during the World's Fair was considered a ground for the same relief; In re Petition of Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co., 6 I. C. Rep. 323.
Under section 4, amended June 18, 1910, the Commission has power to make an order (such as the one there involved) permitting a lower rate for the longer haul, but only on terms stated in the order, establishing zones for the intermediate points and rela tive percentages upon which proportionate zones should be based; Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476, 34 Sup. Ct. 986, 58 L.
An intermediate local rate should never ex ceed the through rate plus the local rate back to the intermediate place ; Martin v. R. Co., 2 I. C. Rep. 1.
The classification of freight is expressly recognized by the act ; Thurber v. R. Co., 2 I. C. Rep. 742. But in classifying freights the carrier must respect the interests of the shipper on the basis of relative equality and justice ; Thurber v. R. Co., 2 I. C. Rep. 742. Common, carriers should be held responsible for the correctness of the weight and classi fication of freight received. The of a commodity rate takes the commodity upon which such rate applies out of the classification, so that all shipments of that commodity moving from and to points be tween which such commodity rate is in ef fect must be charged for on the basis of the commodity rate and carload minimum. In allowing carload rates, the carrier may prop erly stipulate for a minimum carload, the more approved method being to charge a given rate per 100 pounds for any excess, rather than to allow the shipper to load as much as he chooses in the car at a. stated rate per car ; Leonard v. R. Co., 3 I. C. C. 241.
A carload rate and minimum weight spec ified in a lawful tariff hold out a definite of fer to the shipping public to move merchan dise on those terms and Commissioner Har lan stated, in Kaye & Carter Lumber Co. v. R. Co., 17 I. C. C. 209, 211, that there should be a rule in all tariffs to the effect that when a carrier, for its own convenience, supplies a larger car than the one ordered, it will do so on the basis of the published rate and minimum weight applicable to the length of car so ordered by the shipper, in all cases where the shipment actually moved could have been loaded into the car ordered. In one case, the Commission held that, even though the shipper had not ordered a car of a particular size, the carrier could collect only on the actual weight, the car furnished being larger than required for the shipment tendered; Peerless Agencies Co. v.