As ordinarily constituted, municipal cor porations have a dual character, the one governmental, legislative, or public ; the oth er, proprietary or private. In their .public capacity a responsibility exists in the per formance of acts for the public benefit, and in this respect they are merely a part of the machinery of government of the sovereignty creating them, and the authority of the state is supreme. But in their proprietary or pri vate character their powers are supposed to be conferred not from considerations of state, but for the private advantage of the particular corporation as a distinct legal personality.
"The functions of such municipalities are ob viously two-fold: (1) political, discretionary, and legislative, being such public franchises as are con ferred upon them for the government of their in habitants and the ordering of their public officers, and to be exercised solely for the public good, rather than their special advantage; (2) those min isterial specified duties which are assumed in con sideration of the privileges conferred by their char ter." Richmond v. Long's Adm'rs, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 375, 94 Am. Dec. 461. And it was said by Folger, J., in Maxmilian v. New York, 62 N. Y. 160, 20 Am. Rep. 468: "There are two kinds of duties which are im posed upon a municipal corporation. One is of that kind which arises from the grant of a special power in the exercise of which the municipality is as a legal individual ; the other is of that kind which arises or is Implied from the use oT political rights under the general law, in the exercise of which It Is sovereign. The former power is private and is used for private purposes ; the latter is public and is used for public purposes; the former Is not held by the municipality as one of the political divisions of the state, the latter is." "The distinction is quite clear and well settled and the process of separation practicable. To this end regard should be had, not so much to the nature and character of the various powers conferred, as to the object and purpose of the legislature In conferring them. If granted for public purposes exclusively they belong to cor porate body In Its public, political, or municipal character ; but if the grant was for purposes of pri vate advantage and emolument, though the public may derive a common benefit therefrom, the cor poration quoad hoc is to be regarded as a private company." Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 531, 28 Am. Dec. 669.
The absolute power of the state over mu nicipal corporations has been upheld in Phil adelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 180, and in U. S. v.
R. Co., 17 Wall. (U. S.) 329, 21 L. Ed. 597, where it is said : "A municipal corporation like the city of Baltimore is a representative not only of the state, but is a portion of its governmental power. It is one of its crea tures, made for a specific purpose to exercise within a limited sphere the powers of the state. The state may withdraw these local powers of government at pleasure, and may, through its legislature or other appointed channels, govern the local territory as it gov erns the state at large. It may enlarge or contract its powers or destroy its existence." This doctrine has been followed in other states; Daniel v. Memphis, 11. Humphr. (Tenn.) 582; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 19, 67 Am. Dec. 748; People v. Draper, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 344; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Burch v. Hardwicke, 30 Gratt. (Va.) 24, 32 Am. Rep. 640; Coyle v. Gray, 7 Houst. (Del.) 44, 30 Atl. 728, 40 Am. St. Rep. 109; unless otherwise provided in the constitu tion ; Com. v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 386, 19 N. E. 224, 2 L. R. A. 142, 12 Am. St. Rep. 566; State v. Williams, 68 Conn. 131, 35 Atl. 24, 421, 48 L. R. A. 465; Com. v. Moir, 199 Pa. 543, 49 Atl. 351, 53 L. R. A. 837, 85 Am. St: Rep. 801; Pumphrey v. Baltimore, 47 Md. 145, 28 Am. Rep. 446.
Cooley, J., said in People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 9 Am. Rep. 103: "The state may mould local institutions according to its views of policy or expediency ; but local gov ernment is a matter of absolute right, and the state cannot take it away." Amasa M. Eaton, of Rhode Island, in an able paper (1902, Amer. Bar Assoc. 292) re views at length the history of municipal corporations in England and comes to the conclusion "that towns and cities (or coun ties, etc., in some states) are the units of our system of government and have the right to govern themselves in all matters of local concern, free from the control of the except through general laws, ap le to all such units alike, or through fatticular laws, passed at the request and with the consent of such units, to enable them to do that which otherwise they would be powerless to accomplish." According to some cases towns and cities have certain powers that the legislature can nef'tntirere with, even though the constitu tion be silent on the subject ; People v. Al bertson/. 55 N. Y. 50; People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 21 Am. Rep. 677 ; State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 21 N. E. 252, 4 L. R. A. 79.