820; even to the extent of requiring be placed underground ; 6 Am. Elec. to (1, ., settled that this power may be 64 by the legislature in the exercise Nedvere .on power of the state; New e York v. Squire, 145 U. S. 175, 12 Sup. Ct. 880, 36 L. Ed. 666 ; People v. Squire, 107 N. Y. 593, 14 N. E. 820, 1 Am. St. Rep. 893) ; so it may make police regulations; Cranston v. Augusta, 61 Ga. 572; offer a reward for the detection of criminals; Crawshaw v. Rox bury, 7 Gray (Mass.) 374 ; Shuey v. U. S., 92 U. S. 73, 23 L. Ed. 697 ; contra, Gale v. South Berwick, 51 Me. 174 ; appropriate public money for a police pension fund; Com. v. Walton, 182 Pa. 373, 38 Atl. 790, 61 Am. St. Rep. 712 ; or, where it will promote the interests of the inhabitants generally, for a survey for a ship canal ; Corn. v. Pittsburg, 183 Pa. 202, 38 Atl. 628, 63 Am. St. Rep. 752; issue bonds in aid of a railway; see BONDS; and it was held that the city of Philadelphia had power to send the Liberty bell, owned by it absolutely, to the Atlanta Expositiott; Morton v. Philadelphia, 4 Pa. Dist. Rep. 523 (where Mr. Hampton L. Carson in his re ported argument imparted to the court much historical information on the history of that famous relic).
Power in municipal corporations is denied : To provide for fireworks on the fourth of July ; Love V. Raleigh, 116 N. C. 296, 21 B. E. 503, 28 L. R. A. 192 ; or to prohibit screens in bar rooms; Steffy v. Monroe City, 130 Ind. 466, 35 N. E. 121, 41 Am. Rep. 436; OT issue commercial paper ; Bordeaux v. Coq uard, 47 Ill. App. 254; Concord v. Robinson, 121 U. S. 165, 7 Sup. Ct. 937, 30 L. Ed. 885. The municipal authorities may provide not only for the immediate, but also for the pros pective, needs of the city, and may make temporary appropriation, as by lease for pri vate use of such public property as is not presently needed; Attorney General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400; The Maggie P., 25 Fed. 202 ; Worden v. New Bedford, 131 Mass. 23, 41 Am. Rep. 185.
A subject of the utmost importance is the power of a municipal corporation with re spect to nuisances. Without legislative au thority it cannot authorize a common nui sance; State v. Luce, 9 Roust. (Del.) 396, 32 Atl. 1076; nor for instance, prohibit the fencing by a railroad of its right of way ; Grossman v. Oakland, 30 Or. 478, 41 Pac. 5, 36 L. R. A. 593, 60 Am. St. Rep. 832 ; but in the exercise of a granted power to sup press nuisances it may invoke the aid of a court of equity ; Huron v. Bank, 8 S. D. 449, 66 N. W. 815, 59 Am. St. Rep. 769. In the Oregon case just cited, the subject was ex amined and the conclusion reached that even authority by charter to declare what shall constitute a nuisance does not authorize a city by ordinance to declare a particular use of property a nuisance, unless such use is such by common law or statute. See 36 L. R. A. 593, and 39 L. R. A. 520, 609, 649, for full annotations covering the entire ground of municipal power in regard to nuisances.
See NUISANCE.
The power to borrow money and issue bonds therefor is not included among the implied powers of a municipal corporation, but when a debt has been lawfully incurred, it is not prohibited from issuing bonds for its payment ; Williamsport v. Com., 84 Pa. 487, 24 Am. Rep. 208 ; but see Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 468, 22 L. Ed. 164; Gause v. Clarksville, 5 Dill. 165, Fed. Cas. No. 5,276.
They possess the incidental or implied power to borrow money and issue bonds therefor in order to carry out their express powers, or any affecting their legitimate ob jects ; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470, 78 Am. Dec. 721. • The power to borrow money or to create a debt should not be implied against the spirit and policy clearly manifested by con temporaneous legislation as well as by the organic law in force when the legislation giving such power was enacted; Waxahachie v. Brown, 67 Tex. 519, 4 S. W. 207. It can only be implied from a special duty imposed, for the discharge of which it is necessary ; the power to raise money does not include the power to borrow ; Wells v. Salina, 119 N. Y. 289, 23 N. E. 870, 7 L. R. A. 759.
It was generally held that where express power is given to borrow money it includes the power to issue negotiable bonds or other securities to the lender ; Galena v. Corwith, 48 Ill. 423, 95 Am. Dec. 557; Evansville, I. R. C. S. L. R. Co. v. Evansville, 15 Ind. 395; Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 654, 18 L. Ed. 79. But, in cases very much discuss ed, it has been held by the United States su preme court that the power conferred upon a municipal corporation to borrow money or to incur indebtedness merely authorized it to issue the usual evidences of indebtedness but not "to issue for sale, in open market, a bond, as a commercial security, with im munity, in the hands of a bona fide holder for value, from equitable, defences ;" Merrill v. Monticellb, 138 U. 6. 673, 11 Sup. Ct. 441, 34 L. Ed. 1069. This case, it is claimed, was plainly at variance with Rogers v. Burling ton, 3 Wall. (T.J. S.) 654, 18 L. Ed. 79, and Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 270, 18 L. Ed. 350, though it did not in terms overrule them. But that they were consider ed overruled by the later cases was express ly stated in Brenham v. Bank, 144 U. S. 173, 12 Sup. Ct. 559, 36 L. Ed. 390, which was re-argued, before eight judges, by reason of the death of Bradley, J., pending its deci sion, and from the final decision in which Harlan, Brewer, and Brown, JJ., dissented. The decision was squarely to the effect that the power to borrow money did not author ize the issue of negotiable bonds, and that "even a bona fide holder of them cannot have a right to recover upon them or their cou pons." See a review of these cases, 5 Harv. L. Rev. 157; 6 id. 53; BONDS ; MUNICIPAL BONDS.