Where a statute confers power to borrow money and fixes the limit of the amount which can be borrowed, a municipality can not exceed that amount under power confer red by a general provision to borrow money for any purpose within its discretion; Read v. Plattsmouth, 107 U. S. 568, 2 Sup. Ct. 208, 27 L. Ed. 414.
By constitutional provision in several states, the legislature is required to restrict municipal corporations in their power to borrow money, contract debts, or pledge their credit. These provisions vary, but are most commonly in the nature of a restriction of possible indebtedness to a certain percentage of the assessed value of property; see Sener v. Ephrata Borough, 176 Pa. 80, 34 Atl. 954, and for a note collecting authorities on the municipal power to borrow money, see Wells v. Salina, 119 N. Y. 280, 23 N. E. 870, 7 L. It. A. 759.
A creditor who had loaned to a municipal corporation in excess of the amount of the indebtedness authorized by the constitution money which had been used in part for the construction of public works, was not enti tled to a decree in equity for the return of his money, because the municipality had parted with the specific money and it could not be identified, and further because a con stitutional provision forbidding the munici pality to borrow money operated equally to prevent moneys loaned to it in violation of this provision and used in the construction of a public work from becoming a lien upon the works constructed with it ; Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U. S. 190, 5 Sup. Ct. 820, 29 L. Ed. 132.
A municipal corporation can incur no in debtedness for an object not within the pow ers expressed or implied granted by its char ter and a purchaser of its bonds is charge able with notice of its charter powers and limitations when the purpose for which the bonds were issued is fully disclosed in their recitals ; White River S. B. v. Superior, 148 Fed. 1, 78 C. C. A. 169. Constitutional limi tations on state indebtedness apply to the state alone and not to her political or munici pal subdivisions; Prettyman v. Tazewell Co., Sup'rs, 19 III. 406, 71 Ana. Dec. 230; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607. As to both constitu tional and statutory limitations, see Beard v. Hopkinsville, 95 Ky. 239, 24 S. W. 872,
23 L. R. A. 402, 44 Am. St. Rep. 222.
There can be no union of public and pri vate funds or credit, nor of that which is produced such funds or credit ; and a statute authorizing the union of public and private capital or credit in any enterprise whatever is unconstitutional; Taylor v. Ross Co., 23 Ohio St. 78; Wyscaver v. Atkinson, 37 Ohio St. 97; but a joinder of a city with a county in purchasing a building for a city hall has been upheld ; De Witt v. San Fran cisco, 2 Cal. 289, where it was held that they could take as tenants in common.
Such corporations have not the power of taxation, unless such is conferred by the leg islature, and when it is so conferred the statute must be strictly construed; Green v. Ward, 82 Va. 324 ; Hare v. Kennerly, 83 Ala. 608, 3 South. 683; Winston' v. Taylor, 99 N. C. 210, 6 S. E. 114. A grant of the power of taxation by the legislature to a municipal corporation is subject to revocation, modifi cation, and control by the legislature of the state; Williamson v. New Jersey, 130 U. S. 189, 9 Sup. Ct. 453, 32 L. Ed. 915.
While the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of municipalities ex ercising local self-government cannot be held to trench upon that rule ; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141, 9 Sup. Ct. 256, 32 L. Ed. 637. See LEGISLATIVE POWER. So from necessity, these corporations exercise a large measure of police power. A city council may by ordinance authorize police officers to ar rest without warrant persons engaged in a breach of the peace, and an officer who, from the outside of a house, hears a disturbance or disorderly conduct within it, may, acting in good faith under such authority, enter the house and arrest the person guilty thereof as being the inmate of a disorderly house ; Hawkins v. Lutton, 95 Wis. 492, 70 N. W. 483, 60 Am. St. Rep. 131.
The delegation of power to municipal councils to determine between alternative methods for payment of assessments for municipal improvements is authorized by a constitutional provision directing the legis lature to provide for municipal corporations ; Hellman v. Shoulters, 114 Cal. 136, 44 Pac. 915, 45 Pac. 1057.