PARDO N. An act of grace, usually pro ceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the in dividual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment which the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 160, 8 L. Ed. 640; People v. Court of Sessions, 19 N. Y. Supp. 508.
It is a remission of guilt and a declaration of record by the authorized authority that a particular individual is to be relieved from the legal consequences of a particular crime; Territory v. Richardson, 9 Okl. 579, 60 Pac. 244, 49 L. R. A. 440.
Every pardon granted to the guilty is in derogation of the law ; if the pardon be just, the law is bad; for where legislation and the administration of the law are perfect, par dons must be a violation of the law. But, as human actions are necessarily imperfect, the pardoning power must be vested somewhere, in order to prevent injustice when it is as certained that an error has been committed.
An absolute pardon is one which frees the criminal without any condition whatever.
A conditional pardon is one to which a con dition is annexed, performance of which is necessary to the validity of the pardon. Ex pare Hunt, 10 Ark. 284; State v. Fuller, 1 McCord (S. C.) 178.
A general pardon is one which extends to all offenders of the same kind. It may be express, as when a general declaration is made that' all offenders of a certain class shall be pardoned, or implied, as in case of the repeal of a penal statute. Roberts v. State, 2 Over. (Tenn.) 423. See AMNESTY.
The pardoning power is lodged in the ex ecutive of the United States and of the vari- I ous states, and extends to all offences except in cases of impeachment. In some states a concurrence of one of the legislative bodies is required; in other states, boards of par don have been provided, whose recommenda tion of a pardon to the executive is a pre requisite to the exercise of the power. The constitutional power of pardon vested in the executive is not subject to legislative con trol, either to limit the effect of a pardon, or to exclude from its operation any class of offenders; Re Garland, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; State v. Todd, 26 Mo. 175; Diehl v. Rodgers, 169 Pa. 316, 32 Atl. 424,
47 Am. St. Rep. 908. In Pennsylvania, the act of March 31, 1860, provides that when any person convicted of a felony, etc., has endured his punishment, it shall have the same effect as a pardon, and he becomes a competent witness; this is a legislative par don and has the same effect as an executive pardon ; U. S. v. Hall, 53 Fed. 352. The pardoning power is by no means confined to the executive; it was possessed by parlia ment (4 Bla. Com. 401; U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. [U. S.] 162, 8 L. Ed. 640) ; and from the very nature of government, in Pennsylvania it is vested in the legislative branch by the inherent supreme law-making power, and in the executive by constitutional provision ; U. S. v. Hall, 53 Fed. 352.
The power of pardon conferred by the constitution upon the president is unlimited, except in cases of impeachment. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at auy time after its commis sion, either before legal proceedings are tak en, or during their pendency, or after convic tion and judgment. A pardon reaches the punishment prescribed for an offence, and the guilt of the offender. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction from attaching: if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It gives him a new credit and capacity. It blots out his guilt and makes him, in the eye of the law, as innocent as if he had never commit ted the offence. There is only this limitation to its operation ; it does not restore offices forfeited, or property or interests vested in others, in consequence of the conviction and judgment ; Re Garland, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 333, 18 L. Ed. 366. See Cowan v. Prowse, 93 Ky. 156, 19 S. W. 407; Cook v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 26 N. J. L. 326; Territory v. Richardson, 9 Okl. 579, 60 Pac. 244, 49 L. R. A. 440. It may be granted after conviction and before sentence while exceptions are pending; Com. v. Lockwood, 109 Mass. 323, 12 Am. Rep. 699, where there is an extended discussion of the pardoning power by Gray, J., or • before being charged with the crime ; U. S. v. Burdick, 211 Fed. 492.