The granting of a full and unconditional pardon by the president to a person convict ed of a felony restores his competency as a witness, and this result is net affected by a recital in a pardon that it was granted for the reason, among others, that his testimony was desired by the government in- a cause then pending in a federal court; Boyd v. U. S., 142 U. S. 450, 12 Sup. Ct. 292, 35 L. Ed. 1077; and a pardon granted after the person has served his term of imprisonment has the same effect ;'Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. How ell (Tex.) 30 S. W. 98.
There are several ways (as given by Judge Cooley) in which the pardoning pow er of the president may be exercised : 1. A pardon may be given to a person under conviction by name, and this will take effect from its delivery, unless otherwise provided therein. 2. It may be given to one or more persons named, or to a class of persons, be fore conviction, and even before prosecu tion begun. Such a pardon is rather in the nature of an amnesty. 3. It may be given by proclamation, forgiving all persons who may have been guilty of the specified offence, or offences ; Re Garland, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 380, 18 L. Ed. 366 ; U. S. v. Klein, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 128, 20 L. Ed. 519; and in this case the pardon takes effect from the time the proclamation is signed ; Lapeyre v. U. S., 17 Wall. (U. S.) 191, 21 L. Ed. 606. See infra. 4. It may in any of these ways be made a pardon on conditions to be first performed, in which case it has effect only on perform ance ; or on conditions to be thereafter per formed, in which case a breach of the con dition will place the offender in the position occupied by him before the pardon was is sued ; U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 150, 8 L. Ed. 640; People v. James, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 57; Ex parte Marks, 64 Cal. 29, 28 Pac. 109, 49 Am. Rep. 684.
In Michigan it has been held that a par doned convict charged with having violated the conditions of his release must be arrest ed and tried in the same manner as other offenders against the law ; People v. Moore, 62 Mich. 496, 29 N. W. 80 ; but in South Caro lina a convict who has broken the conditions of his pardon may be remanded to the peni tentiary to serve out the remainder of his sentence, though the time in which he was to serve has expired ; State v. Barnes, 32 S. C. 14, 10 S. E. 611, 6 L. R. A. 743, 17 Am. St. Rep. 832. A power to grant pardons on condition that the person pardoned shall leave the state and not return to it, is not in conflict with a constitutional provision which provides that no one shall be exiled from the state; Ex parte Hawkins, 61 Ark. 321, 33 S.
W. 106, 30 L. It. A. 736, 54 Am. St. Rep. 209.
Conditions attached to a parole or pardon by the board of pardons that are to extend beyond, or be performed after the expiration of, the term of the sentence are illegal ; In re Prout, 12 Idaho, 494, 86 PaC. 275, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1064, 10 Ann. Cas. 199. An uncon ditional pardon is irrevocable ; Ex parte Rice (Tex.) 162 S. W. 891.
It is to be exercised in the discretion of the power with whom it is lodged.
As to promises of pardon to accomplices, see 1 Chitty, Cr. L. 83; 1 Leach 115.
In order to render a pardon valid, it must express with accuracy the crime intended to be forgiven ; 4 Bla. Com. 400 ; State v. Mc Intire, 46 N. C. 1, 59 Am. Dec. 566.
The effect of a pardon is to protect the criminal from punishment for the offence pardoned; Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 766, 18 L. Ed. 882; Osborn v. U. S., 91 U. S. 474, 23 L. Ed. 388 ; but for no other ; State v. McCarty, 1 Bay (S. C.) 334. It seems that the pardon of an assault and battery, which afterwards becomes murder by the death of the person beaten, would not operate as a pardon of the murder ; Corn. v. Roby, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 496, See Plowd. 401; People v. McLeod, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 426, 37 Am. Dec. 328. In general, the effect of, a full pardon is to restore the convict to all his rights ; Diehl v. Rodgers, 169 Pa. 319, 32 Atl. 424, 47 Am. St. Rep. 908 ; even though grant ed after he has served out his sentence, it restores his competency to. testkfy; Boyd. v. U. S., 142 U, S. 450, 12 Sup. Ct., 292, 35. L. Ed. 1077; but to this there are some excep-, tions. First, it does not restore civil capaci ty; Corn. v. Fugate, 2 Leigh (Va.) 724.. See Jones v. Harris, 1 Strobh. (S. C.) 160 ; State v. Blaisdell, 33 N. H. 388. Second, it does not affect a status of other persons which has been altered or a right which has ac crued in consequence of the commission of the crime or its punishment; In re Deming, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 232; State v. Rowe, 2 Bay (S. C.) 565 ; Holliday v. People, 5 Gilm. (Ill.) 214; or third persons who, by the prosecu tion of judicial proceedings, may have ac quired rights to a share in penalties or to property forfeited and actually sold ; Kirk v. Lewis, 9 Fed. 645 ; but see U. S. v. Thom asson, 4 Biss. 336, Fed. Cas. No. 16,479; Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 766, 18 L. Ed. 882 (as to forfeiture to United States).