In England a pardon removes not only the punishment but the legal disabilities con sequent on the crime, wherever the latter are the consequence of the judgment, but where it is declared by act of parliament to be a part of the punishment, as in case of perjury under the 5 Eliz. c. 9, pardon will not make the person competent; 2 Russ. Cr. 975, followed in Houghtaling v. Kelderhouse, 1 Park. Cr. Rep. (N. Y.) 241; Foreman v.. Baldwin, 24 Ill. 298. But this distinction does not obtain here ; Diehl v. Rodgers, 169 Pa. 316, 32 Atl. 424, 47 Am. St. Rep. 908 ; Re Garland, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 333, 18 L. Ed. 366. It has been held in Ohio that a prison er could not be tried on the charge of being a habitual criminal after having been pardon ed by the governor for the previous offence ; 56 Alb. L. J. 5.
When the pardon is general, either by an act of amnesty, or by the repeal of a penal law, it is not necessary to plead it; because the court is bound to take notice of it; Jenk ins v. Collard, 145 U. S. 546, 12 Sup. Ct. 868, 36 L. Ed. 812. A criminal cannot even waive such pardon, because by his admittance no one can give the court power to punish him when it judicially appears there is no law to do it. But when the pardon is special, to avail the criminal it must judicially appear that it has been accepted ; and for this rea son it must be specially pleaded; 4 Bla. Com. 401; U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 150, 8 L. Ed. 640; and if he has obtained a pardon before arraignment, and, instead of pleading it in bar, he pleads the general issue, he shall be deemed to have waived the benefit of it, and cannot afterwards avail himself of it in arrest of judgment ; 1 Rolle 297. See
1 Dy. 34 a; T. Raym. 13; Evans v. Com., 3 Mete. (Mass.) 453.
The power to pardon extends to punish ments for contempt; In re Mullee, 7 Blatchf. 23, Fed. Cas. No. 9,911.
All contracts made for the buying or procuring a pardon for a convict are void.
The governor under his power to gtant re prieves and pardons may grant a conditional pardon in the nature of a parole of the con vict; Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 South. 146, 45 L. R. A. 502, 82 Am. St. Rep. 1. The board of pardons is a branch of the execu tive department of the state government and its powers and prerogatives as such are those of granting clemency to convicted pris oners, but it has no power to increase or ex tend penalties or punishments pronounced by sentence of the court ; In re Prout, 12 Idaho, 494, 86 Pac. 275, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1064, 10 Ann. Cas. 199.
One convicted of fraud In obtaining pat entsto public lands was pardoned on condi tion that he would make restitution of the lands. He filed a relinquishment thereof. Held that no right was wrested from him ; Bradford v. U. S., 228 U. S. 446, 33 Sup. Ct. 576, 57 L. Ed. 912.
A mayor of a city may be vested with power to pardon one convicted of the viola tion of an ordinance. See In re Monroe, 46 Fed. 52.
See AMNESTY; EXECUTIVE POWER.