In general, if a promissory note is signed or indorsed when made by a stranger to the note he becomes a joint promisor and liable on the note ; Childs v. Wyman, 44 Me. 433, 69 Am. Dec. 111; Riley v. Gerrish, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 104 ; Schneider v. Schiffman, 20 Mo. 571 ; and this will be true if indorsed after delivery to the payee in pursuance of an agreement made before the delivery; Hawkes v. Phillips, 7 Gray (Mass.) 284; but parol ev idence may be introduced to show that he is a surety or guarantor ; Fraser v. McConnell, 23 Ga. 368 ; Eberhart v. Page, 89 111. 550. If the third party indorses after delivery to the payee without any previous agreement, he is merely a second indorser ; Taylor v. M'Cune, 11 Pa. 466 ; Hoffman v. Moore, 82 N. C. 313 ; and he is liable as a maker to an in nocent holder; Page v. Lathrop, 20 Mo. 591. But it was held otherwise where the signa ture was on the face of the note; Sargent v. Robbins, 19 N. H. 572 ; and the same is held where he signs at inception of the note, in pursuance of a custom, leaving a blank for the payee's •signature above his name; Weav er v. Marvel, 12 La. Ann. 517. Such an in dorser is held to guaranty that the note shall be collectible when due; Gillespie v. Wheeler, 46 Conn. 410. The time of signing may be shown by parol evidence ; Bright v. Carpen ter, 9 Ohio 139, 34 Am. Dec. 432.
A payee or subsequent party who executes a guarantee upon a bill or note is not liable as indorser ; Davis v. Campbell, 3 Stew. (Ala.) 319; Springer v. Hutchinson, 19 Me. 359 ; contra, Vanzant v. Arnold, 31 Ga. 210 Partridge v. Davis, 20 Vt. 499.
It has been held that a third person indors ing in blank at the making of the note may show his intention by parol ; Moles v. Bird, 11 Mass. 436. 6 Am. Dec. 179 ; but not if he de scribes himself as guarantor, or if the law fixes a precise liability upon indorsements in blank ; Seabury v. Hungerford, 2 Hill, (N. Y.) 80. But this has been doubted ; 33 E. L. & E. 282. In New York the cases seem to take the broad ground that an indorser in blank, under all circumstances, is an indorser mere ly, and cannot be made a guarantor or sur ety; Spies v. Gilmore, 1 N. Y. 324. See Good v. Martin, 95 U. S. 90, 24 L. Ed. 341.
The consideration to support a parol prom ise to pay the debt of another must be such as would be good relating to the payment of that particular debt or of any other of equal amount; Thomas v. Delphy, 33 Md. 373. It need not necessarily be a consideration dis tinct from that of the principal contract. An executed or past consideration to the princ• pal is not sufficient ; Pratt v. Hedden, 121 Mass. 116; Clopton v. Hall, 51 Miss. 482.
The giving of new credit where a debt already exists has been held a sufficient con sideration to support a guaranty of the old and new debt ; Loomis v. Newhall, 15 Pick.
(Mass.) 159 ; Bargroves v. Cooke, 15 Ga. 321; but the weight of authority would seem to require that there should be some further consideration ; Reed, Stat. Fr. 70; De Wolf v. Rabaud, 1 Pet. ((J. S.) 476, 7 L. Ed. 227; Sears v. Brink, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 211, 3 Am. Dec. 475 ; Elliott v. Giese, 7 Harr. & J. (Md.) 457. A consideration that will take a case out of the statute of frauds must be such a consideration as will make the collateral debt, agreed to be paid, the debt of the prom isor. It must be an original undertaking ; Waterman v. Resseter, 45 Ill. App. 155.
Forbearance to sue the debtor is a good consideration, if definite in time ; Coffin v. Trustees, 92 Ind. 337 ; Dahlman v. Hammel, 45 Wis. 466; or even if of considerable time ; Cro. Jac. 683 ; or reasonable time ; Board of Directors v. Peterson, 4 -Wash. 148, 29 Pac. 995. But there must be an actual forbearance, and the creditor must have had a power of enforcement ; 4 East •65. But the fact that it is doubtful whether such a power exists, does not injure the considera tion ; 5 B. &.Ad. 123. Forbearance has been held sufficient consideration even where there was no well-grounded claim ; 18 L. J. C. P. 222; Kunst Ex'r v. Young, 34 Pa. 60; contra, Cabot v. Haskins, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 83. A short forbearance, or the deferment of a remedy, as postponement of a trial, or postponement of arrest, may be a good consideration ; and perhaps an agreement to defer indefinitely may support a guaranty ; Livingston v. Roosevelt, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 257, 4 Am. Dec. 273 ; Sage v. Wilcox, 6 Conn. 81. A mere agreement not to push an execution is too vague to be a consideration ; McKinney v. Quilter, 4 McCord (S. C.) 409; and a "post ponement of a remedy must be made by agreement as well as in fact; Mecorney v. Stanley, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 85 ; Sage v. Wilcox, 6 Conn. 81; 11 C. B. 172.
The contract of suretyship may be entered into absolutely and without conditions, or its formation may be made to depend on certain conditions precedent. But there are some conditions implied in every contract of this kind, however absolute on its face. In the case of bonds, as in other contracts of surety ship, it is essential that there should be a principal, and a bond executed by the surety is not valid until executed by the principal also. One case, 10 Co. 100 b, sometimes cited to the contrary, is not clear to the point. The argument that the surety is bound by his recital under seal fails, especially in all stat ute bonds, where one important requisite of the statute, that the bond should be executed by the principal, fails ; Wood v. Washburn, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 24; 4 Beay. 383.