Where a contract of guaranty is signed by the guarantor without any previous re quest of the other party, and in his absence and for no other consideration between them, except future advances to be made to the principal debtor, there must be an accept ance of the guaranty by the other party in order to complete the contract; Davis Sew ing Machine Co. v. Richards, 115 U. S. 527, 6 Sup. Ct. 173, 29 L. Ed. 480; Barnes Cycle Co. v. Reed, 84 Fed. 605; Gardner v. Lloyd, 110 Pa. 285, 2 Atl. 562; Coe v. Buehler, 110 Pa. 366, 5 Atl. 20.
Construction and extent of obligation. The liability of a surety cannot exceed, in any event, that of the principal, though it may be less. The same rule does not apply to the remedies, which may be greater against the surety. But, whatever may be the liability imposed upon the surety, it is clear that it cannot be extended by impli cation beyond the terms of the contract. His obligation is strictisaimi farts, and cannot be extended beyond the precise terms of the contract; Walsh v. Bailie, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 180; Coughran v. Bigelow, 9 Utah 260, 34 Pac. 51. Sureties are never held responsible beyond the clear and absolute terms and meaning of their undertakings, and pre sumptions and equities are never allowed to enlarge, or in any degree to change, their legal obligations; Leggett v. Humphreys, 21 How. (U. S.) 66, 16 L. ,Ed. 50. And this rule has been repeatedly reaffirmed ; Mc Cluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 598; Kellogg v. Stockton, 29 Pa. 460; Smith v. U. S., 2 Wall. (U. S.) 235, 17 L. Ed. 788. It is quite true, that in one sense, the contract of a surety is strictissimi juris, and it is not to be extended beyond the express terms in which it is expressed. The rule, however, is not a rule of construction of a contract, but a rule of application of the contract after the construction of it has been ascer tained.
The obligation of sureties cannot be ex tended by implication or enlarged construc tion of the terms of the contract entered into; Crane v. Buckley, 203 U. S. 441, 27 Sup. Ct. 56, 51 L. Ed. 260; but the rule is relaxed in the case of a compensated sure ty who is regularly engaged in that business; Keefer v. School Dist., 203 Pa. 337, 52 Atl. 245; Atlantic Trust & Deposit Co. v. Laur inburg, 163 lied. 690, 90 C. C. A. 274.
Where the question is as to the meaning of the language of the contract, there is no difference between the contract of the sure ty and that of anybody else; Gamble v.
Cuneo, 21 App. Div. 413, 47 N. Y. Supp. 548.
The remedies against the surety may be more extensive than those against the prin cipal, and there may be defences open to the principal, but not to the surety,—as, infancy or coverture of the principal,—which must be regarded as a part of the risks of the surety ; St. Albans Bank v. Dillon, 30
Vt. 122, 73 Am. Dec. 295.
The liability of the surety extends to and includes all securities given to him by the principal debtor, the converse of the rule stated below in the case of collateral se curity given to the creditor; Paris v. Hulett, 26 Vt. 308. Thus a creditor is entitled in equity to the benefit of all securities given by the principal debtor for the indemnity of his surety; Haven v. Foley, 18 Mo. 136. If the surety receives money from the principal to discharge the debt he holds it as trustee of the creditor; Green v. Dodge, 6 Ohio 80, 25 Am. Dec. 736.
A creditor is bound to use proper care and intelligence in the management and collec tion of collateral securities; the surety will be released to the extent of the loss occa sioned by his negligence; Bank of Philippi v. Kittle, 69 W. Va. 171, 71 S. E. 109, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 699, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 113.
A payment made by the principal before the claim is barred by the statute of limi tations, keeps the debt alive as to the surety; otherwise, if made after the statute has run; Cross v. Allen, 141 U. S. 528, 12 Sup. Ct. 67, 35 L. Ed. 843.
In the common case of bonds given for the faithful discharge of the duties of an office, the bond covers only the particular term of office for which it is given, and it is not necessary that this should be expressly stated ; nor will the time be extended by a condition to be bound "during all the time A (the principal) continues," if after the expira tion of the time A holds over merely as an acting officer, without a valid appointment; Ward v. Whitney, 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) 403. The circumstances of particular cases may extend the strict rule stated above, as in the case of officers annually appointed. Here, although the bond recites the appointment, if it is conditioned upon his faithful accounting for money received before his appointment, the surety may be held; 9 B. & C. 35; Worcester Bank v. Reed, 9 Mass. 267, 6 Am. Dec. 65. But the intention to extend the time, either by including past or future liabilities, must clearly appear ; 4 B. & P. 175. See Anaheim Water Co. v. Parker, 101 Cal. 483, 35 Pac. 1048. Generally the recital cannot be en larged and extended by the condition ; Theob. Surety 66. And where the recital sets forth an employment for twelve months, this time is not controlled by a condition, "from time to time annually, and at all times thereafter during the continuance of this employment," although the employment is actually contin ued beyond the year ; 2 B. & Ald. 431; Chelmsford Co. v. Demarest, 7 Gray (Mass.) 1.