Where the surety's undertaking is condi tional on others joining, and this condition is known to the creditor, he is not ordinari ly liable until they do so; 4 B. & Ad. 440; Hunt v. State, 53 lnd. 321; Goff v. Bank ston, 35 Miss. 518; Belleville Say. Bank v. Bornman, 124 Ill. 200, 16 N. E. 210; contra, if the obligee is ignorant of the condition; Millett v. Parker, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 608; Dair v. U. S., 16 Wall. (U. S.) 1, 21 L. Ed. 491; Chase v. Hathorn, 61 Me. 505. So the sure ty is not bound if the signatures of his co sureties are forged, although he has not made his signature expressly conditional on theirs; 2 Am. L. Reg. 349; but see 8 id. N. S. 665. Where a bond to a sheriff ; Police Jury v. Haw, 2 La. 41; and an administra tion bond; State v. Gregory, 119 Ind. 503, 22 N. E. 1; were signed in expectation by the party signing that other sureties would sign, and the bond was delivered without such other signatures, the surety was held liable. If a condition upon which a surety signs be known to the creditor and be not complied with, the surety is not liable; Jones v. Keer, 30 Ga. 93.
Where sureties signed a bond in ignorance of the fact that the principal had not signed, they are not bound; School Dist. No. 80 v. Lapping, 100 Minn. 139, 110 N. W. 849, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1105. A bond executed and delivered to the court clerk, to avoid an in junction, is binding on all the parties not withstanding a collateral condition by one of the sureties that it was not to be used un til an indemnity bond bad been given him ; Hendry v. Cartwright, 14 N. M. 72, 89 Pac. 309. See 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1105, note. Per sons who sign a note as sureties on condition that it shall not become binding unless the signature of a third person is secured as co surety are not liable until such signature is secured; Bank of Benson v. Jones, 147 N. C. 419, 61 S. E. 193, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 343.
The acceptance of the contract by the promisee by words or by acts under it is often made a condition precedent to the at taching of the liability of the surety. The general rule is that where a future guaranty is given, absolute and definite in amount, no notice of acceptance is necessary ; but if it is contingent and indefinite in amount, notice must be given; Norton v. Eastman, 4 Me. (Green') 521; Stafford v. Low, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 67; but the promisee has a reasonable time to give such notice; Paige v. Parker, 8 Gray (Mass.) 211.
Where defendant, at plaintiff's request, wrote him a letter guaranteeing payment for any goods which another might purchase, and goods were subsequently purchased, and the defendant's relations with the purchaser were such as should have kept him inform ed of these transactions, the mere lack of notice of acceptance of the guaranty is no bar to recovery; Drucker v. Heyl-Dia, 52 Misc. 142, 101 N. Y. ,Supp. 796.
A distinction is to be made between a guaranty and an offer to guaranty. No notice of acceptance is requisite when a guaranty is absolute; Bank of La. v. Coster's Ex'rs, 3 N. Y. 212, 53 Am. Dec. 280; Farm ers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Kercheval, 2 Mich. 511; but an offer to guaranty must have notice of acceptance; and till accepted It is revocable; 12 C. B. N. S. 784; 6 Dow. H. L. C. 239 ; Shupe v. Galbraith, 32 Pa. 10; and where acceptance is required, it may be as well implied by acts as by words; as, by receiving the written guaranty from the promisor; Paige v. Parker, 8 Gray (Mass.) 211; or by actual knowledge of the amount of sales under a guaranty of the purchase money; Noyes v. Nichols, 28 Vt. 160.
The rule requiring notice is said to be based upon "the nature and definition of a contract, which requires the assent of a party to whom a proposal is made, to be signified to the party making it, in order to constitute a binding promise. . . . The rule proceeds upon the ground that the case in which it applies Is an offer or proposal on the part of the guarantor, which does not become binding as an obligation until ac cepted by the party to whom it is made; that, until then, it is inchoate and incom plete and may be withdrawn by the pro poser." Davis v.' Wells, Fargo & Co., 104 U. S. 159, 26 L. Ed. 686. When the guaranty is contemporaneous with the principal con tract, notice is unnecessary; Nading v. Mc Gregor, 121 Ind. 465, 23 N. E. 283, 6 a R. A. 686; Lemp v. Armengol, 86 Tex. 690, 26 S. W. 941; so, where there has been a pre cedent request; Hasselman v. Japanese De velopment Co., 2 lnd. App. 180, 27 N. E. 318, 28 N. E. 207; contra, Kay v. Allen, 9 Pa. 320. Notice must be given of an offer to guarantee advances to be made by another to a third party, in order to bind the guar antor; 1 M. & S. 557. Knowledge that a guaranty is being acted upon is sufficient in the case of guaranties of existing debts, or of contemporaneous debts; Davis v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 104 U. S. 159, 26 L. Ed. 686. But in case of guaranties of the repayment of future advances, the cases are in con flict as to whether notice is necessary. That notice is necessary, see Davis v. Wells, Far go & Co., 104 U. S. 159, 26 L. Ed. 686; that it is generally unnecessary, see Union Bank of La. v. Coster's Ex'rs, 3 N. Y. 203, 53 Am. Dec. 280 ; Crittenden v. Fiske, 46 Mich. 70, 8 N. W. 714, 41 Am. Rep. 146; that It is necessary where the amount of the proposed advance is uncertain, but unnecessary where it is certain, see Snyder v. Click, 112 Ind. 293, 13 N. E. 581. See, generally, Huffcut's Ans. Contr. 27. One who, as surety, executes a bond with another, conditioned for the pay ment of the moneys advanced the other, is not entitled to notice of the acceptance of the bond by the obligee; Hall v. Weaver, 34 Fed. 104.