See A. C. Hamlin, The Battle of Chancellorsville (1896) ; G. F. R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson (1902) ; W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds, The Civil War in the United States (19o5) ; Battles and Leaders of the Civil War and Official Records of the War of Secession.
Grant's Campaign of the Wilderness and Cold Harbor.— On the evening of May 3, 1864, after dark, the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Meade and consisting of the II., V. and VI., and Cavalry Corps, left its winter quarters about Culpeper to manoeuvre across the Rapidan with a view to fighting a battle at or near New Hope church and Craig's church. The army and the IX. Corps (Burnside), which was an independent command, were directed by Lieut.-Gen. Grant, the newly appointed commander of the armies of the United States, who accompanied Meade's head quarters. The opposing Army of Northern Virginia under Lee lay in quarters around Orange Court house (A. P. Hill's Corps), Ver diersville (Ewell's Corps) and Gordonsville (Longstreet's Corps). The respective numbers were: Army of the Potomac, 98,000; IX. Corps, 22,000 ; Army of Northern Virginia, rather less than 70,000.
The crossing of the Rapidan was made at Germanna and Ely's fords, out of reach of Lee's interference, and in a few hours the two leading corps had reached their halting-places—V. (Warren), Wilderness tavern; and II. (Hancock), Chancellorsville. The VI. (Sedgwick) followed the V. and halted south of Germanna ford. Two of the three divisions of cavalry preceded the march and scouted to the front and flanks. Controversy has arisen as to whether the early halt of the Union army in the midst of the Wilderness was not a serious error of judgment. The reason assigned was the necessity of protecting an enormous wagon train, carrying 15 days' supplies for the whole army, that was crossing after II. Corps at Ely's ford. Burnside's corps was far to the rear when the advance began, but by making forced marches it was able to reach Germanna ford during May 5. On that day the manoeuvre towards Craig's church was resumed at 5 A.M., cov ered by Wilson's cavalry division, while Gregg's unit moved to wards Fredricksburg.
Grant's intention of avoiding a battle until he was clear of the Wilderness was not achieved, for Confederate infantry appeared on the Orange turnpike east of Mine Run, where on his own initia tive Warren had posted a division of the V. Corps overnight as flank-guard, and some cavalry, judiciously left behind by Wilson at Parker's store, became engaged a little later with hostile forces on the Orange Plank road. This led to the suspension of the whole
manoeuvre—wherein Grant's object was to place himself between Lee and Richmond. The first idea of the Union headquarters was that Lee was falling back to the North Anna, covered by a bold rear guard, which Grant and Meade arranged to cut off and de stroy by a convergent attack of Warren and Sedgwick. But the appearance of infantry on the Plank road as well as the Pike had shown that Lee intended to fight in the Wilderness, and Hancock (II. Corps) was called in from Todd's tavern, while one division (Getty's) of the VI. was hurried to the intersection of the Brock and Plank roads to hold that point until Hancock's arrival. Getty arrived just in time, for Confederate skirmishers were found dead and wounded only 3oyd. from the cross roads. The division then formed up to await Hancock's arrival up the Brock road, practi cally unmolested, for Lee had only two of his corps on the ground (Hill on the Plank road, Ewell on the Pike), and did not desire to force a decision until Longstreet's distant corps should arrive Meanwhile Warren had been slowly forming up his attacking line with great difficulty in the woods. Grant appears to have used bitter words to Meade on the subject of Warren's delays, and Meade passed these on to Warren, who in turn forced his sub ordinates into premature action. The result of the attack by the V. and later the VI. Corps, delivered piecemeal owing to the diffi culties of direction and touch in the woods, on Ewell was com pletely unsatisfactory, and for the rest of the battle these corps were used principally as reservoirs to find supports for the offen sive wing under Hancock, who arrived on the Plank road 2 P.M. Hancock's divisions, as they came up, entrenched themselves along the Brock road. In the afternoon he was ordered to attack whatever force of the enemy was on the Plank road in front of him, but was unwilling to do so until he had his forces well in hand. Finally Getty was ordered to attack "whether Hancock was ready or not." This may have been an attempt to force Hancock's hand by an appeal to his soldierly honour, and as a fact he did not leave Getty unsupported. But the disjointed attacks of the II. Corps on Hill's entrenchments, while forcing the Confederates to the verge of ruin, were not so successful as the preponderance of force on the Union side ought to have ensured. For four hours the two lines of battle were fighting 5oyd. apart, until at nightfall the contest was given up through mutual exhaustion.