Now, for the last time in the campaign, the idea of a hammer and anvil battle was again taken up, the "anvil" being Smith's XVIII. Corps, which had come up from the James river to White house on the 3oth; but once more the lure failed because it was not made sufficiently tempting.
The last episode of the campaign centred in Cold Harbor, a village close to the Chickahominy, which Sheridan's cavalry seized on the 31st. Here, contrary to the expectation of the Union staff, a considerable force of Confederate infantry—new arrivals from the James—was met ; and in the hope of bringing on a battle before either side had time to entrench, Grant and Meade ordered Sheridan to hold the village at all costs and directed Wright's (VI.) Corps, from the extreme right wing, and Smith's (XVIII.), from Old Church, to march thither with all possible speed, Wright in the night of May 31 and Smith on the morning of June 1.
Lee had actually ordered his corps commanders to attack, but was too ill to enforce his wishes, and in the evening Wright and Smith themselves assaulted the Confederate front opposite Cold Harbor. The assault, though delivered by tired men, was success ful. The enemy's first or skirmish line was everywhere stormed, and parts of the VI. Corps even penetrated the main line. Grant at once prepared to renew the attack, as at Spottsylvania, with larger forces, bringing Hancock over from the right of the line on the night of the 1st and ordering Hancock, Wright and Smith to assault on the next morning. But Lee had by now moved more forces down, and his line extended from the Totopotomoy to the Chickahominy. Hancock's corps, very greatly fatigued by its night march, did not form up until after midday, and meanwhile Smith, whose corps, originally but io,000 strong, had been severely tried by its hard marching and fighting on the 1st, refused to consider the idea of renewing the attack. The passive resistance thus encountered dominated Grant's fighting instinct for a moment. But after reconsidering the problem he again ordered the attack to be made by Wright, Smith and Hancock at 5 P.M. A last modification was made when, during the afternoon, Lee's far distant left wing attacked Burnside and Warren. This, show ing that Lee had still a considerable force to the northward, and being, not very inaccurately, read to mean that the 6m. of Confederate entrenchments were equally—i.e., equally thinly— guarded at all points, led to the order being given to all five Union corps to attack at 4:3o A.M. on June 3.
The resolution to make this plain, unvarnished frontal assault on entrenchments has been as severely criticized as any action of any commander in the Civil War, and Grant himself subsequently expressed his regret at having formed it. But such criticisms derive all their force from the event, not from the conditions in which, beforehand, the resolution was made. The risks of failure were deliberately accepted, and the battle—if it can be called a battle—was fought as ordered. The assault was made at the time arranged and was repulsed at all points with a loss to the assail ants of about 8,000 men. Thereafter the two armies lay for ten days less than 1 ooyd. apart. There was more or less severe fight ing at times, and an almost ceaseless bickering of skirmishers. Owing to Grant's refusal to sue for permission to remove his dead and wounded in the terms demanded, Lee turned back the Federal ambulance parties, and many wounded were left to "die between the lines. It was only on the 7th that Grant pocketed his feelings and the dead were buried.
This is one of the many incidents of Cold Harbor that must always rouse painful memories—though to blame Lee or Grant supposes that these great generals were infinitely more inhuman here than at any other occasion in their lives and takes no account of the consequences of admitting a defeat at this critical moment, when the causes for which the Union army and people contended were about to be put to the hazard of a presidential election.
The Federal army lost, in this month of almost incessant cam paigning, about 50,000 men, the Confederates about 32,000. Though the aggregate of the Union losses awed both contempo raries and historians of a later generation, proportionately the losses of the South were heavier (46% of the original strength as compared with 41% on the Union side) ; and whereas within a few weeks Grant was able to replace nearly every man he had lost by a new recruit, the Confederate Government was near the end of its resources.
See A. A. Humphreys, The Campaign of Virginia, 1864-65 (New York, 1882) ; Military History Society of Massachusetts, The Wilder ness Campaign; Official Records of the Rebellion, serial numbers 67, 68 and 69 ; and C. F. Atkinson, The Wilderness and Cold Harbor (London, 1908). (C. F. A.; X.)