The next manoeuvre attempted by Grant to bring Lee's army to action "outside works" was of an unusual character, though it had been foreshadowed in the improvised plan of crushing Lee against Burnside's corps on the 9th. Hancock was now (loth) ordered to move off under cover of night to Milford; thence he was to march south-west as far as possible along the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad and to attack whatever force of the en emy he met. It was hoped that this bold stroke by an isolated corps would draw Lee's army upon it, and the rest of the Army of the Potomac would, if this hope were realized, drive down upon Lee's rear while Hancock held him up in front. Supposing, how ever, that Lee did not take the bait, the manoeuvre would resolve itself into a turning movement with the object of compelling Lee to come out of his Spottsylvania lines on pain of being surrounded.
Hancock's corps started on the night of the 2oth-2Ist. The alarm was soon given. At Milford, where he forced the passage of the Mattapony, Hancock found himself in the presence of hos tile infantry from Richmond and heard that more had arrived at Hanover junction. He therefore suspended his advance and en trenched. The main army began to move off, after giving Lee time to turn against Hancock, at io A.M. on the 21st, and marched to Catlett's, a place a few miles south-west of Guinea's bridge, Warren leading, Burnside and Wright following. But no news came in from Hancock until late in the evening, and the develop ment of the manoeuvre was consequently delayed, so that on the night of the 21 st-22nd Lee's army slipped across Warren's front en route for Hanover junction. The other Confederate forces that had opposed Hancock likewise fell back. Grant's manoeuvre had failed. Its principal aim was to induce Lee to attack the IL Corps at Milford, its secondary and alternative purpose was, by dislodging Lee from Spottsylvania, to force on an encounter bat tle in open ground. But he was only offered the bait—not com pelled to take it, as he would have been if Hancock with two corps had been placed directly athwart the road between Spottsylvania and Hanover junction—and, having unimpaired freedom of action, he chose to retreat to the junction. The four Union corps, there fore, could only pursue him to the North Anna, at which river they arrived on the morning of the 23rd, Warren on the right, Hancock on the left, Wright and Burnside being well to the rear in second line. The same afternoon Warren seized Jericho ford, brought over the V. Corps to the south side, and repulsed a very sharp counter-stroke made by one of Lee's corps. Hancock at the
same time stormed a Confederate redoubt which covered the Telegraph Road bridge over the river. Wright and Burnside closed up. It seemed as if a battle was at hand, but in the night reports came in that Lee had fallen back to the South Anna ; and as these were more or less confirmed by the fact that Warren met with no further opposition and by the enemy's retirement from the river bank on Hancock's front, the Union generals gave orders, about midday on the 24th, for what was practically a general pursuit. This led incidentally to an attempt to drive Lee's rearguard away from the point of passage, between War ren's and Hancock's, required for Burnside, and in the course of this it became apparent that Lee's army had not fallen back but was posted in a semicircle to which the North Anna formed a tangent. On the morning of the 25th this position was recon noitred and found to be more formidable than that of Spottsyl vania. Moreover, it divided the two halves of the Union army that had crossed above and below.
Grant gave up the game as drawn and planned a new move. This had as its objects, first, the seizure of a point of passage on the Pamunkey; secondly, the deployment of the Army of the Potomac and of a contingent expected from the Army of the James, and thirdly, the prevention of Lee's further retirement, which was not desired by the Union commanders, owing to the proximity of the Richmond defences and the consequent want of room to manoeuvre. On the 27th Sheridan's cavalry and a light division of infantry passed the Pamunkey at Hanover town, and the two divided wings of the Army of the Potomac were with drawn over the North Anna without mishap—thanks to exactitude in arrangement and punctuality in execution. On the 28th the Army of the Potomac had arrived near Hanover town, while at Hawes's shop, on the road to Richmond, Sheridan had a severe engagement with the enemy's cavalry. Lee was now approaching from Hanover junction via Ashland, and the Army of the Poto mac swung round somewhat to the right so as to face in the pre sumed direction of the impending attack. The Confederate general, however, instead of attacking, swerved south, and planted himself behind the Totopotomoy. Here he was discovered, en trenched as always, on the 29th, and skirmishing all along the line, varied at times by more severe fighting, occupied that day and the 3oth. On the morning of the 31st the Union army was arranged from right to left in the order VI., II., IX. and V. Corps, Sheridan having drawn off to the left rear of the infantry.