tinental belligerents, and, in particular, to convey to Europe the produce of the French and Spanish West Indies. The depression of our West India trade in 1805, though the unavoidable result of too great a growth of produce for a system of monopoly, was attributed to the successful rivalahip of the Ameri cans in the continental markets. Mr Pitt was as sailed by our ship-owners, and prevailed on to take measures which obliged the Americans to forbear the direct passage across the Atlantic, and to give such cargoes a neutral character by carrying them in the first instance, to their own ports. The Gles . vile ministry maintained what Mr Pitt had done, and went no farther ; but they were succeeded by men actuated by different views. A parliamen tary committee, appointed in June 1807 to in quire into the distress of our West India colonies, received evidence calculated to strengthen an im pression already very general, that a total stop ought to be put to the conveyance of French or Spanish colonial produce in neutral bottoms. No sooner did the successful termination of the Copenhagen expedition give popularity to the " system of vigour," than we issued the Orders in Council of November 1807 ; the object of which, however disguised, was to put a stop to neutral traffic, except when carried on by licence from our government, thus assuming the power of restricting or extending that traffic as we should find beneficial to our interests ; or rather, as we should imagine, to be beneficial, since, in ques tions of commerce, the real is frequently far different from the anticipated result.
In this explanation of these ill-understood Orders, we exclude from the motives of ministers all partici pation in that jealousy of America that actuated so many of our countrymen. We consider them as act ing from conviction, as seeking in this measure only a source of benefit to our •commerce, and of annoy ance to our enemies in Europe ; yet, even with these qualifications, the Orders in Council have contributed more than any other measure in the present age to this distress that now afflicts our country. Their first practical result was a ins. pension of the navigation of the Americans, by a general embargo imposed by their own govern. went: this preliminary measure was, in a few months, succeeded by a non-intercourse act, which continu., ed in operation above a year, during which our ex ports to America were greatly reduced, and our manufacturers distressed to a degree that ought to have served as a warning of the consequences of a farther contest with our best customers. In 1809, in consequence of a temporary arrangement, the in tercourse was resumed, and exports from England to America took place to a great amount. But the offensive part of our system was soon after revived ; the Americans were prevented from trading with France, Italy, or Holland, and the only conciliatory answer given by our government, was a promise to recall our orders whenever the Athericans should obtain from Bonaparte the repeal of his Berlin and Milan decrees. This repeal was in some measure
obtained in 1810, but nothing could wean our mi nistry from their predilection for what they account ed a grand political measure ; and those who inspect the official communications of the two governments,• will see with surprise the expedients devised, and the promises held out to gain time, and to delude the Americans, while, in fact, there never was an intention of recalling the obnoxious decrees. The Americans offered explicitly (Letter from Mr Mon. ro to Mr Foster, 26th July 1811) to recal all hos tile edicts " if we revoked our orders ;" but this not being complied with, their ports were definitively shut against us, and our manufacturers reduced to great distress,--a distress pourtrayed in colours un fortunately too impressive in the parliamentary papers on the Orders in Council, printed in the early part of 1812. But no change could be effected in our measures till the accession of Lord Liverpool to the first ministerial station, when a repeal took place, but unhappily too late, the Americans hav ing declared war before this intelligence could reach them. From this time forward the impartial narrator finds it his duty to transfer the charge of aggression from England to America. We had now a minister aware of the evil tendency of our Orders in Council, and prepared to make reasonable con cessions to the Americans, while they, heated by the contest, and attributing the change to the dread of losing Canada, refused our offers of accommoda tion.
The naval conflicts in the first year of the war were of a nature greatly to surprise the public, accustom ed as it was to our almost uninterrupted triumphs at sea. The Guerriere frigate was captured on 19th August (1812) by the Constitution, Ameri can frigate, and the Macedonian on 25th Octo ber by another American frigate, called the United States. If these losses could, in any degree, be at tributed to the fault of our officers, no such charge could be brought in the case of Captain Lambert of the Java, a most intelligent seaman, who, after a dreadful conflict, was obliged, on 29th December, to strike to the Constitution. In this, as in.the preced ing actions, the real cause of failure lay in the dis proportion of strength, the Guerriere having only 263 men, her antagonist 476; the Macedonian only 300, the United States 478. Even the Java, though a large frigate, had only 367 men, her op ponent 480. The inequality in weight of metal was still greater, each of these American frigates having been originally intended for a ship of the line. No sooner did the two nations meet on an equal footing in the case of the Chesapeake and Shannon (June 1st 1813), than the superiority was found to rest with US.