The consequences of the victory of Salamanca were the pursuit of the French army ; the occupa tion of Madrid on 12th August by the allies; the abandonment by the French of the works construct ed with vast expence against Cadiz; the evacuation of Andalusia, Granada, and all the south of Spain. But as this loss of territory was not attended by a loss of troops, it became incumbent on Lord Wel lington to prepare against a vigorous attack from forces that were rapidly concentrating. He made repeated attempts to take the castle of Burgos and the military stores collected there, but this fort, de fended by a strong garrison and a vigilant com mander (General Dubreton), baffled all our efforts, and proved the cause of a considerable sacrifice of lives. Meantime, the approach of Soult from the south, and of the army that had fought at Salamanca from the east, obliged Lord Wellington to adopt the alternative of retreat. He began on 20th October, and proceeded westward, in a line nearly parallel to the Douro, taking above three weeks to recross the country to the scene of his victory at Salamanca. There, united with General Hill, and at the head of 50,000 men, he remained on ground lately so pro pitious ; hoping that an opportunity might offer to attack the enemy, though now increased, by the junction of their two armies, to the number of 70,000. But Soult's positions were found too strong for attack, and the interval afforded him by Lord Wellington was diligently employed in pushing forward detachments to cut off our corn • munications with Portugal. Retreat now became indispensable ; and here, amidst hasty marches, and a scarcity of five days, there occurred scenes of insubordination which recalled all the disorders of our march to Corunna, and drew from Lord Wellington a most severe censure in general orders. Fortunately, similar privations on the side of the French prevented them from making many prisoners, and, on 20th November, on the frontier of Portugal, was closed this eventful campaign.
The campaign of 1813 opened in the east of Spain, by an attack on the allied army under Sir John Murray, stationed not far from Alicant ; the ground it occupied was strong, but the length of the position, two miles and a half, made Suchet, who commanded the French, conceive the hope of penetrating it at one or other point. In this, how ever, he was foiled with a loss of from 2000 to 3000. men ; the only check of importance received by that commander in all his campaigns in Spain. Soon after this success, our army was engaged in the bold plan of proceeding by sea to Catalonia and besieging Tarragona. The wind proved favourable ; the main body was landed near Tarragona, and a detachment succeeded, by great exertion, in taking fort St Philip on the mountain called the Colde Ba laguer, which blocked the nearest road for the ar rival of the French from the south. Suchet, how ever, lost no time in marching northwards; and our general, Sir John Murray, considered his force (which was chiefly Spanish) unable to withstand the French ; he therefore embarked and returned to Alicant, a measure which incurred censure, but ap pears fully justified by circumstances, and still more by the conduct of his successors in the command.
Suchet, though successful on this occasion, soon found himself unable to retain his extensive line of occupation. The battle of Vittoria brought a new enemy on his rear, and obliged him to withdraw first from Valencia, and subsequently as far as Bar celona. Our army now advanced by land, and re sumed the siege of Tarragona, with the power of re treating, not as before by sea, but on the country behind; an alternative to which a second advance by Suchet soon compelled our new commander, Lord William Bentinck. The French, however, unable to occupy an extended position, blew up the works of Tarragona and retired. Our army ad vanced anew, but was again checked and obliged to draw back, exhibiting a striking proof of the im practicability of opposing an active enemy with a mixed force, of which the Spaniards formed a large proportion.
We now turn to the western part of the peninsu la, the field of the commander-in-chief, and of the far larger portion of our force. Lord Wellington, averse to open the campaign till every part of his troops was ready to co-operate with efficiency, did not move from quarters till after the middle of May. He knew that he would have much ground to tra verse, retreat being evidently the policy of the French, weakened as they were by the recall of 25,000 veterans, who had been feebly replaced by a body of conscripts. Lord Wellington was now, for the first time, at the head of a superior force, which he wielded with consummate skill. The strength of the enemy lay in the line of the Douro, which they expected to defend with ad vantage, so far at least as to make us purchase dearly its acquisition; but all this was prevented by Lord Wellington making his left division cross the river on the Portuguese territory, and advance along its northern bank ; while he and Sir Row land Hill, at the head of separate corps, march ed, after several feints, in a diagonal direction, so as to support this movement, and effect a junction in an advanced position. The French, threatened with being taken in the rear, evacuated one town after another, and, even at Burgos, declined to fight on ground where late recollections would have been so animating; they continued to retreat, increasing from time to time their numbers by the garrisons of the evacuated towns, until, at last, they took a po sition at Vittoria, a town in Biscay, near the north east frontier of Spain.
The position of the French extended from north to south, and was of great length. Their left rested on heights ; part of their centre was also on heights, and their right was near the town of Vittoria. The Zadora, a stream of considerable size, but crossed by several bridges, ran nearly parallel to their front. Both armies were numerous, particularly that of the allies. It was the first time that nearly 40,000 Bri tish had fought together in Spain. Lord Welling ton acted on the offensive throughout, and began the operations by taking possession of the heights near the extreme left of the enemy. This was easily effected ; but their importance being soon perceived by the French, an attack was made to recover them. An obstinate contest took place, but the British on the heights every assault. Under cover of these heights our right wing advanced, and took a village (Sabijana) in front of the enemy's centre. It was in vain the French attempted to retake this vil. lage. The centre of the allies crossed the river near it, and the centre of the French withdrew front their position, retreating to the town of Vittoria. At first this retreat took place in good order, but an alarming account was soon received from the French right. That part of their position had been defend ed by the river and two ales de pont, but the troops of our left wing had taken, first the heights com manding these forts, and soon after the forts them selves, baffling every effort of the enemy to retake them. The great road leading to the north was thus in possession of the allies ; hence a general alarm and confusion throughout the French army. Their reserve was hastily withdrawn from its position, and pressed, with the whole army, along the only re maining road to the eastward ; abandoning all their artillery, their ammunition, and their baggage. The loss of the battle was imputed by the French to Jourdan, whom Bonaparte, in a luckless hour, had allowed his brother to substitute to Soult ; and who here, as at • Talavera, was too late in discovering the importance of commanding positions. The loss in men was not particularly severe ; that of the allies in killed and wounded was under 4000, and that of the French probably not much greater. The temp tation afforded by the plunder of the baggage pre vented our troops from making many prisoners ; but the spirit of the enemy was shaken, and the loss of their artillery and stores obliged them to retreat across the Pyrenees.