Meanwhile, there had been fought at Ligny a bat tle on a larger scale, and with greater preparation. On the slope of a rising ground, which, however, was much exposed, a Prussian army, of no less 80,000 men, awaited the attack of Bonaparte. The fighting began between two and three o'clock, by the French gaining possession of the village of St Amend on the Prussian right. To re-occupy this village, Blucher made repeated efforts ; and it was during one of the most furious of these, that Bonaparte is understood to have ordered round the corps, the ab sence of which was so bitterly regretted by Ney. The battle now raged along the whole line. The masses of Prussian infantry, drawn up on the slope, were much thinned by the French artillery ; but in the village of Ligny, which was repeatedly taken and retaken, the slaughter was nilitually great. Such was the course of the engagement till the evening at half past eight o'clock, when the French reserve, marching forward in columns, obliged the Prussians to leave the long-contested field. Their loss on this dreadful day was not short of 20,000 ; that of the French 10,000.
Next day Bonaparte adopted the plan of detach. ing, under Grouchy, a body of 84,000 men to follow the retiring Prussians, while, with the mass of his force (71,000), he turned against the British, in the hope of fighting a battle at the head of superior numbers. Lord Wellington knew not till morning the retreat of his allies; a similar measure,, on his part, then became indispensable ; but as his army was in the best state, and as the Prussians had just re ceived a reinforcement, retreat was necessary only until reaching a position favourable for fighting, and for awaiting the co-operation of his allies. Water loo, he well knew, presented these advantages ; his march thither met with no annoyance from the French, and the only fighting that took place on the 17th was at Genappe, in a cavalry action begun by our rear-guard. Bonaparte, following with his van, reached the ground opposite to our position, and, in the evening( ordered a partial cannonade, to ewer taM if we occupied the latter with an intention to remain. He concluded in the affirmative, and began arrangements for a battle ; next morning, he con tinued under a similar impression, although in his army there was (see Drouet's Account of the Battle) a general belief that we would not venture to as sail their onset. At ten o'clock, he perceived, by his glass, a corps in march at a great distance, which he immediately concluded to be Prussians ; this ne cessitated his posting a body of above 8000 men on his right to receive them,—a disposition which de prived him of his numerical superiority, and made the battle of Waterloo be fought between equal, or nearly equal forces. It began, towards noon, by an
attack on the post of Hougoumont, a chateau, or country seat, in front of our right, surrounded by an orchard: the possession of this point would have fa voured the approach of the French to our right wing, but though they drove us from the orchard, all their efforts proved ineffectual against our troops (a de tachment of guards) stationed in the building and within the court wall. This attack, though very ob stinate and sanguinary, was, in the eye of either commander, only a prelude to the great onset in the centre. That began towards two o'clock, planned by Bonaparte, and conducted by Ney, whose sta tion, during the action, was in the high road lead ing straight to our centre. Our army made little show, the battalions being formed in squares, and partly hid from view by the sinuosities of the ground : between each square were openings suffi. cient to enable the battalions to deploy into line, as well as to afford our cavalry space to advance and charge. The squares were farther placed en echi quier (like a chess-board), so that the enemy's caval ry, in venturing through an opening, exposed itself to a fire in front from the opposite square, and to a flank fire from that which it had passed. Yet this firm array did not appal the French Cuirassiers, who, confiding in past success and in the protection of their armour, repeatedly tried the deadly experiment of attack. Never was the impetuosity of the French more conspicuous, and never was it more effectually opposed, whether we consider the firmness of our troops, the judgment of our general, or the efficiency of our artillery. The only ground gained by the French, was the central point of La Haye Sainte, and the space immediately in front of our line,—the whole attended, said Ney, " by a carnage the most dreadful I had ever seen." Meanwhile Bonaparte watched anxiously the moment when a partial breach, or disorder, in our line should afford him a favourable opportunity of attacking with his reserve. Ney repeatedly intimated an expectation of great success, but could report no positive advantage, even after the double charge made by the Imperial Horse Guards at five in the afternoon. It became, how ever, indispensable to act, and Bonaparte could hard ly doubt that the long continued conflict must, by this time, have greatly weakened our line. Accord.