So long as there remained a hope of treating with the Americans, our government had avoided offen sive operations, and kept the command of our Beet in that station in the hands of Sir John Berlase War ren, an officer who joined diplomatic to nautical ha bits. At last, however, it became necessary to re• place him by one whose spirit of enterprise was more conformable to the impatient ardour of our navy. Admiral Cochrane arrived, and lost no time in con certing an attempt on the American capital, by sail ing up the Patuxent, destroying a flotilla in that ri ver, and landing a military force under Major-Ge neral Ross, which attacked the American division posted to defend Washington, drove them from their ground, and entered the capital in the evening. Here private property was respected, but of the public buildings there were destroyed not only the arsenal, the dock-yard, the war-office, but the houses of the senate and representative body, the residence of the president, and the bridge across the Potow mac. Our troops, being few in number, retreated soon after, and, embarking anew, proceeded against Baltimore, where they landed, drove the defending force of the Americans from their position, and ap proached the town. But the entrance to the har bour being closed by a barrier of sunk vessels, co operation on the part of the navy was impracticable, and our troops were re-embarked without any loss of consequence, except that of their commander Ge neral Ross. A better result had been obtained in an expedition against Alexandria, a trading town on the Potowmac, whence a quantity of stores and ship ping was brought away. Success also attended an expedition in a very different quarter ;—in the river Penobscot, at the northern extremity of the United States, adjoining the British province of New Bruns wick. Far 'different was the result of an expedition on a larger scale, directed against New Orleans. Our troops disembarked from the Mississippi, repel led an assault from the Americans, moved forward, and came within six miles of the town, where they found the enemy posted behind a canal, with a breast work in front, and their right flanked by the Missis sippi. After a fortnight passed in mutual prepara tions, a night attack was at last determined on ; but,, unexpected difficulties retarding it till day-light, the fire of the Americans from behind their breast-work was pointed with unerring aim, and proved extremely destructive. In the short space of twenty minutes, our three principal officers, and nearly 2000 privates, were killed or wounded ; and though, on the op posite side of the river, our attack had been success ful, it was determined to relinquish the expedition, and re-embark the troops. This distressing failure was poorlycompensated by the capture of Fort Mo bile, the last land operation of the war. At sea, our final exploit was the capture of the American frigate President, of 54 guns, and 490 men.
The peace was signed at Ghent, on 24th Decem ber 1814, and its terms afforded a curious exemplifi cation of the futility of warlike struggles. The ter ritorial possessions of both countries were, with a very trifling exception, left on the same footing as before the war ; and not the slightest notice was ta. ken of the questions which had most strongly excit ed the spirit of hostility on both sides ;—neither of the impressment of seamen, a point so important to the Americans, nor of the limitation of the rights of neutral traffic, a topic so often urged among us.
The United States, in no respect a manufac turing country, purchased from us merchandise to an extent annually increasing, and which, in 1807, had reached the amount (see our article ENGLAND, p. 134) of L.12,000,000 Sterling. Every addition to their capital, every year that they passed in peace and prosperity, increased their value to us in a com mercial sense, while every blow given to their pro ductive funds necessarily operated in diminution of their purchases and payments. But, far from acting on these impressions, the ministry of 1807 eagerly seized the opening given them by the violence of Bonaparte, to assail the trade of America; and is sued (in November) those Orders which " prohibited all direct intercourse from a neutral port to France, or her tributary states, unless the neutral vessels, in tended for such voyages, touched first at a port in the British dominions, and paid a duty." This sin gular measure was vindicated, not as legal in itself, but as a trespass on neutral rights justified by the previous trespasses of the French government. It would, it was argued, distress the part of the Con , tinent subject to Bonaparte, and excite discontent against his government ; but the real motive was to cramp and control the trade of neutrals. That the Americans would not submit to such humiliating conditions, our Government was well aware ; but it knew also that they had neither army nor navy, and would not, at least for several years, resort to the alternative of war. So far our calculation was cor rect, but the question of national advantage we en tirely misconceived. For what was the practical operation of these restrictive edicts ? The trade of the Americans with the Continent was suspended, and the remittances formerly made to us from the sale of their goods, —remittances not overrated (Baring on Me Orders in Council) at four or five mil lions a year, were made no more. Our bank paper fell, more from that than from any other cause, into a discredit which occasioned a loss of 20, 30, and eventually nearly 40 per cent. on all subsidies and other government expenditure on the Continent. The mercantile insolvencies in America, which fol lowed the Orders in Council, recoiled, in a great de gree, on England, whose exporting merchants were the chief creditors of the bankrupts. Next came the burdens and the havoc of war; and of every million of American capital thus diverted from pro ductive industry, the half at least was lost to the British manufacturer. But this was not all ; the suspended intercourse, and the appeal to arms, in duced the Americans to attempt to manufacture for themselves. This, for several years, excluded our goods, and when, on the return of peace, British merchandise was poured into the United States at, prices so low as to defy competition, the conse quence, particularly in the year 1819, was a scene of general_ insolvency in the States, which once more recoiled with the most distressing effects on the British creditor. All this was the result of a
policy, bad in every point of view, and which neither had nor could have any decisive influence on the grand contest in Europe.
The ratification of the peace with America had not been received from the other shore of the Atlantic, when the return of Bonaparte from Elba raised in Europe a fresh alarm of war. He ventured to land with a force barely sufficient to secure his personal safety in a march, and to supply emissaries for mix ing with the opposite ranks. The French soldiers are fond of glory; and their attachment revived at the sight of their leader. They first refused to op pose, and soon after pressed forward to join him ; and he proceeded in a rapid and unresisted march to the capital. Ought England to participate in the coalition formed to expel this intruder, and to reinstate the Bourbons? On this question there existed, either in parliament or the public, very little difference of opi nion, so great was the enmity inspired by Bonaparte, and such the dread of incessant war under his sway. Our ministry soon took their determination ; our Continental allies were unanimous in the cause, and not a day was lost in preparing for the invasion of France. The Netherlands, it was evident, would be, the first scene of operations; thither the Prussians pressed with all the ardour inspired by recent wrongs; thither were conveyed from England, troops, ammunition, and stores, with all the dispatch afforded by the undisputed command of the sea. By the end of May or beginning of June, the Prussian and British foroe in the Netherlands was superior to any that could be mustered by Bonaparte. It was not till the second week of June that his disposable force, to the number of 115,000 men, was collected is front of the allied line. This was effected with great secrecy and dispatch. He joined the camp on the 14th, and made his troops march early on the 15th, driving insuc cessively the Prussian outposts at Charleroi and Fleu rus. From the beginning of his march to Ligny, the Prussian headquarters, the distance was thirty miles; to Brussels, the head-quarters of Lord Wellington, was nearly twice as far; and all Bonaparte's hope rested on fighting his opponents separate and unsup ported. Intelligence of the first movements of the French reached Lord Wellington in the afternoon of the 15th, and made him forthwith prepare for the march, which, however, he delayed until the arrival of a second courier from the Prussians, and of advices from his own outposts, which should show whether there was any serious attack on other points. In the evening arrived accounts, which left no doubt that the mass of the French army was di rected against the Prussians ; and orders to march were issued that night in all directions, so as to reach even remote stations between three and four in the morning. Our troops began their march from almost every point at day-light, all pointing to Quatre Bras, a spot where four roads meet, and distant seven miles from Ligny. After marching between six and seven hours, several of the divisions stopped to take rest and refreshment; but they were hurried from their unfinished meal by dragoons dispatched to quicken their advance, for Lord Wellington had received by the way intelligence of the rapid approach of the French. Proceeding promptly with his escort, he had time to reach the head-quarters of the Prussians, and to learn from their impatient commander, that, without knowing the numbers of the French, or their plan of attack, he was determined to accept battle on that day, and on the ground he then occupied. Lord Wellington had no controlling power. All he could do was to lessen the pressure on his allies, by pushing, as much as possible, such part of the French as might be opposed to the British. This interview took place between one and two o'clock ; and his lordship, returning forthwith to Quatre Bras, found the French tirailleurs already in possession of the wood, which skirted and commanded the road. Im mediate orders were given to drive them out, a task which devolved on the Highlanders arriving from Brussels, and the Guards from Enghein, each after a march of twenty-five miles. They succeeded in expelling the French ; but the want of artillery and cavalry (neither of which came up till late at night) prevented them from pushing forward with effect. Fresh bodies of the French were now seen advancing; and, on the other hand, regiments of British succes sively reached the ground. The conflict spread, and was maintained with great gallantry on both sides, but with hardly any other plan than that of fighting straight forward. At first the French possessed con siderable advantages, and their cavalry, charging ra pidly through fields of rye, which grows in Flanders to a great height, came unexpectedly on some of our battalions ; the latter suffered greatly, but fairly re pelled their antagonists. As our reinforcements came up, the superiority was progressively acquired by us. The French were driven back, and Ney, who com manded, sent to order up a body of 20,000 men, which had arrived within three miles of Quatre Bras; but the answer was, that they had marched to Ligny by order of Bonaparte. They were soon after or dered back, but were unable to join Ney, until nine at night, when the fighting was over, and the field of action in possession of the British. The force en. gaged on either side did not exceed 25,000 men. Our loss amounted to 5000 ; that of the French (see Souk's Report) appears to have been considerably greater. Both sides fully expected a new battle the next morning. The British, by the arrival of all their divisions, formed, a large army. The French, still strangers to the firmness of our troops, attribut ed their failure to accidental causes, and declared that their cavalry had been repulsed, parce quits n'a vaient pat franchement aborde l'ennemi.