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The secret of the ultimatum was jealously guarded, and the long delay created, as was intended, a false sense of security in some quarters. Its delivery at Belgrade, which took place at 6 P.M. on July 23, was carefully timed for the moment after President Poincare's departure from St. Peters burg after his state visit, the object being to disorganize the diplo macy of the allies. The ultimatum, after reminding the Serbian Government of its formal undertakings of March 31, 1909, charged it with "culpable tolerance" of terrorist propaganda di rected against Austria-Hungary, and accused Serbian officers and functionaries of planning the Sarajevo murders. It therefore demanded that the Narodna Odbrana and any similar society guilty of anti-Austrian propaganda should be dissolved, that objection able passages should be expunged from Serbian educational works, that all officers or officials whom Austria-Hungary might name as guilty of propaganda should be dismissed, and that the Belgrade Government should not merely arrest certain specified persons charged with complicity, but should order the trial of others, allow Austro-Hungarian delegates to take part in the inquiry and accept the collaboration of Austro-Hungarian officials "in the suppression of the subversive movement." The general impression produced by this document upon Euro pean opinion is best summarized in the words of Sir E. Grey, who telegraphed the next day to Sir M. de Bunsen that he "had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character." The fifth demand in particular, that of collaboration, he pointed out, "would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sover eignty." None the less, Serbia in her reply actually consented to "such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure and with good neighbourly relations." Only on one point did she reply definitely in the negative—the share of Austro-Hungarian officials in the actual inquiry would, it was argued, be a violation of the Constitution and the criminal code; but even this could be met by "communications in concrete cases." As a final proof of sincerity, Serbia offered to submit any outstanding points to the decision of The Hague Tribunal or even to the Great Powers which had imposed upon her the declaration of March 31, 1909. Thus Serbia for the third time in six years offered to submit herself to the verdict of The Hague (the two previous occasions being the Bosnian crisis and the Friedjung trial), and each time Austria-Hungary rejected the proposal. Austria-Hungary had left a period of 48 hours for either reply or mediation. The official documents published in Berlin and Vienna since the war make it abundantly clear that the Ballplatz deliberately couched the note in such terms as to be unacceptable. They also reveal that even William II. (to judge from his mar ginal notes) was impressed by the moderation of the Serbs, re garded Vienna's essential wishes as fulfilled and expressed the view that Giesl ought to have remained in Belgrade. His minis ters, however, had failed to support Sir E. Grey's proposal for a prolongation of the time limit, and were thus responsible for bringing Russia into action. On July 27 the tsar replied to a despairing appeal of the prince regent for assistance to Serbia by a telegram strongly urging him to "neglect no step which might lead to a settlement," but conveying the assurance that "Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the fate of Serbia." On July 28 Austria-Hungary formally declared war upon Serbia. Hence forward the Austro-Serbian quarrel is merged in the larger diplo matic conflict between Alliance and Entente; and the reader may be referred to the special articles dealing with that subject.
When Baron Giesl presented the ultimatum, PagiC had been absent electioneering in the provinces; but he at once returned to Belgrade, and on July 25 mobilization was ordered, and the seat of government and the archives were hastily transferred to Nig. In view of so grave a crisis elections became impossible, and as parliamentary sanction was more than ever necessary, the Government was forced to ignore the fact of dissolution and to call the previous Skupgtina once more into existence. At its first meeting in Nig on Aug. 1,
the entire Opposition endorsed the Government's action, and for the moment party life was in abeyance. But after Serbia's early military successes, the enforced evacuation of Belgrade (Nov. 29) brought the latent political crisis to a head. On Dec. 13 the purely Radical cabinet was succeeded by a Coalition Government, in which Pagie remained Premier, but the leaders of all parties save the Liberals received portfolios. It was, however, in this blackest week that the Skupgtina unanimously endorsed the Government's declaration that its foremost war aim was "the liberation and union of all our Serb, Croat and Slovene brethren not yet set free." This was the first public step of Serbia in favour of Yugoslav unity.
The brilliant offensive initiated on Dec. 2 by General MigiC and the I. Army cleared Serbian soil for the third time from invaders, and an enormous booty was captured. But the enemy left deadly infection behind him, and by the early spring of 1915 exhausted Serbia was immobilized by a typhus epidemic which is estimated to have caused about 300,00o deaths among the civil population. Serbia's negative role during 1915 was due not only to exhaustion but to considerations of high policy. Meanwhile the Entente was eagerly working for the intervention of Italy and of Bulgaria, neither of whom could receive adequate satisfaction save at the expense of Serbian aspirations. During the winter pressure was repeatedly brought to bear upon Nig to make territorial con cessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia; but the one and only con dition upon which Serbia could safely have considered this— namely, that the Allies should guarantee Yugoslav unity in the event of victory—was precluded by their parallel negotiations with Italy, whose official policy it was to prevent, not to further Yugoslav unity, and to whom by the Treaty of London, concluded on April 26, 1915, no less than 700,000 Yugoslays were assigned. The fact that the concealment of this treaty from Serbia was made an absolute condition by Rome did not tend to diminish the reserve of Belgrade, which almost immediately learned the essential facts through St. Petersburg. The Serbs were more con scious than ever of the value to them of the Vardar valley, which would form part of any serious concessions to Bulgaria, whom they also believed to be tied to Vienna and Berlin by a secret compact. They were further handicapped by the attitude of Greece, who in the autumn of 1914 exercised her right of veto, under the Serbo-Greek Treaty, upon any cession of territory to Bulgaria and was prepared to demand Monastir as compensation. After the Dardanelles failure Bulgaria leaned increasingly towards Germany, and the concrete proposals addressed to Sofia by the Entente on May 28, over Serbia's head, came two months too late.
On Sept. 6 Bulgaria concluded a secret alliance with the Central Powers. Meanwhile the Serbian Government was unduly optimistic as to Greek and Rumanian intervention, and its disbelief in a German invasion was en couraged by Allied military opinion, which clung obstinately to the illusion that Bulgaria might enter on the Entente side. and therefore vetoed the Serbian general staff's plan for an immediate attack upon Sofia before the Bulgarian army was ready (Sept. 27). Next day Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons an nounced that in the event of Bulgaria's aggression, "our friends in the Balkans" would receive help "without reserve and without qualification." Relying on the fulfilment of this pledge, the Serbs devoted their main effort to checking the Austro-German advance and remained on the defensive towards Bulgaria. The danger was increased by King Constantine's repudiation of Greece's treaty obligations towards Serbia and the overthrow of Venizelos. That statesman, however, had inquired of the Allies as early as Sept. 23 whether, if Bulgaria declared war on Serbia, and if Greece asked Serbia to supply the 150,000 men stipulated by the Serbo Greek Treaty for such a contingency, France and Britain would assume Serbia's obligation for her; and an affirmative answer was received within 48 hours.