Serbia

On the 28th, the military command in Zagreb handed over its authority to the National Council, and next day the Diet pro claimed the independence of Croatia from Hungary and assumed control of Fiume. The arsenals of Pola and Cattaro were already in the hands of the insurgents; and the Emperor Charles, in the hope either of winning the favour of the new regime in Zagreb or throwing an apple of discord between it and the Entente, signed a decree on Oct. 31 making over the whole Austro-Hun garian fleet to the Yugoslav State—a step which was interpreted by the Italian Nationalists as a proof of collusion between Zagreb and Vienna.

On the other hand, the action of the Supreme Council in Paris in prescribing the frontier line of the Secret Treaty of London as the line of occupation under the Austro-Hungarian Armistice was keenly resented by the Yugoslays as a breach with Wilsonian principles. The Allies very properly insisted that the fleet must be surrendered into their hands, but before this could take place a deplorable incident occurred in Pola harbour, the "Viribus Unitis" being blown up by an Italian mine, with a Yugo slav admiral and crew on board. In Italy Baron Sonnino's frankly anti-Slav attitude threw Signor Orlando and the Pact of Rome into the shade; and the Consulta worked hard to prevent Yugo slavia's recognition by the Allies.

Rival Programmes.

That this recognition had not already been accorded before the collapse of the Central Powers began was due to disunion among the Yugoslays themselves. Pagie, free from the restraints of a coalition and from all parliamentary con trol, had reverted to his original Pan-Serb standpoint, and steadily declined to reconstruct his Cabinet on a wider Yugoslav basis. Trumtii6 on his part could not enter a purely Serbian Cabinet without prejudicing that freedom of choice of his compatriots in the Dual Monarchy upon which the moral case of the Yugoslays depended. A series of incidents, such as PagiCs dismissal of the Serbian Ministers in London and Washington for their Yugoslav sentiment, proved the difference of outlook to be not merely per sonal but fundamental. When on Aug. 9 Balfour officially rec ognized the Czechoslovak National Council as "trustees of the future Czechoslovak Government," he was ready to extend a similar recognition to the Yugoslav cause, but as a preliminary condition he very reasonably insisted upon unanimity between those who claimed to represent the rival groups of Yugoslays. But every effort to bring Pagi6 and Trumbie together was unavail ing, and when in the last week of Oct. the rival statesmen moved from London to Paris, all hope of Yugoslav recognition before the Peace Conference had vanished, owing to the stiffening in the attitude of Italy.

To meet the impending danger, the Zagreb Government urgently invited the assistance of the Serbian army, which during the final advance contained a large proportion of Yugoslav volun teers. The first Serbian troops entered Fiume on Nov. 18, and a most dangerous situation arose between them and the Italians in Istria and Dalmatia, which was only very partially mitigated by the dispatch of American military and naval forces to Trieste decision of the Peace Conference.

The Union.

The equivocal attitude of the Entente towards the new State, and Italy's insistence upon a fulfilment of the Treaty of London, naturally hastened the process of union. On Nov. 23 the Zagreb National Council proclaimed the union of the territories under its control with the kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, and invited the prince regent of Serbia to assume the regency of the new State. This decision (passed with only

one dissentient voice, but that, unhappily, Stephen Radie, the peasant leader) took formal effect on Dec. r, when Prince Alex ander, at the formal request of 24 delegates from Zagreb, pro claimed the union. Meanwhile on Nov. 26 a hurriedly convoked National Assembly at Podgorie'a had proclaimed the deposition of King Nicholas and his dynasty and the union of Montenegro with Serbia in the new united State. The first Yugoslav Cabinet was constituted under Proti6 as Premier and Korogec as Vice Premier; Trumbie became Foreign Minister; other portfolios were divided more or less equally between Serbia and the new territories. See also YUGOSLAVIA. (X.) BIBLIOGRAPHY.—General: C. JireEek, Geschichte der Serben (to 1537, 2 vol. 1913 and 1917), and Staat und Gesellschaft im mittelalterlichen Serbien; S. Novakovie, Die Wiedergeburt des serbischen Staates (1912) ; G. Yakshitch, L'Europe et la resurrection de la Serbie (2nd ed., 1919) ; H. W. V. Temperley, History of Serbia (1917) ; Jovan Cvijie, La Peninsule balkanique (1919) ; Slobodan Jovanovie, Defend ers of the Constitution, The Second Reign of Milosi and Michael (1923), The Reign of Prince Milan (1925), King Milan (1927) ; Z. Zivanovie, Political History of Serbia (4 vols. 1923-25) (the five latter in Serbian). On the Balkan Wars see Diplomaticus, Nationalism and War in the Near East (1915); R. W. Seton-Watson, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans (1917) ; Immanuel, Der Balkankrieg (1913) ; H. Barby, Les victoires serbes (1913) and Bregalnitsa (1913). On recent history see Yugoslavia in The Nations of To-Day (ed. J. Buchan 1923) and H. Baerlein, The Birth of Yugoslavia (1923).

On the movement for Jugoslav unity

see R. W. The Southern Slav Question (1911; much enlarged German edition 1913) ; L. von Siidland, Die sirdslawische Frage and der Weltkrieg (1918, Austrophil) ; Hermann Wendel, Der Kampf der Siidslawen um Freiheit und Einheit (1925), an admirable and detailed survey, and Aus dem siidslawischen Risorgimento (192o). On the murder and the Black Hand see R. W. Seton-Watson, Sarajevo (1926) ; S. Stanojevie, Die Ermordung des Erzherzogs (1923) ; B. Jevtie, Sarajevski Atentat (1924) ; Ljuba Jovanovie, The Murder of Sarajevo (1924) ; Tajna Prevratna Organizacija (Salonica 1918, minutes of Black Hand Trial).

For Serbia's relation to the question of war origins see A. F. Pri bram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary 1879-1914 (2 vol., Har vard) ; the post-war collections of Austrian and German diplomatic documents ; R. W. Seton-Watson, Sarajevo (1926) ; H. Kanner, Kaiser liche Katastrophenpolitik (1922) ; M. Bogieevie, Kriegsursachen (1919) ; F. Stieve, Iswolski im Weltkriege (1925) and J. M. Baern reither, Fragmente eines politischen Tagebuches, ed. J. Redlich (1928) of first importance for Austro-Serbian relations. See also 3 articles by Seton-Watson in Slavonic Review ("Italy's Balkan Policy," "Italy and the Secret Treaty of London" and "William IL's Balkan Policy").

For the war period see

The Southern Slav Library (8 pamphlets published by Yugoslav Committee 1915-18) ; V. Kiihne, Ceux dont on ignore le martyre (1917) and Les Bulgares peints par eux-memes (1917) ; F. Barac, Croats and Slovenes Friends of the Entente (Zagreb, 1919, contains important original documents) ; also Milada Paulova, Jugoslovenski Odbor (Zagreb, 1923, an authoritative account of the exiles and their policy) and Seton-Watson, The Making of Yugoslavia (series of articles in Nova Evropa, Zagreb, in Serbian only). See also History of the Peace Conference (ed. H. W. V. Temperley, Vol. 4) .