Declaration of Independence

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.) Weakness of the General Government.—Viewed from one standpoint, the Declaration of Independence was apparently an act of the utmost recklessness. The people were by no means a unit in its support, and in several of the States widespread in difference to it, or active sympathy with the British, prevailed. The United States, as yet, had no international status, and it would seem that that must be secured, if at all, by a series of victories which would ensure independence. But how could these be won against the greatest naval power on the globe, supported by veteran armies of continental and British troops? The Colonies had no money ; the few vessels which, as a collective body, they did send out, were more like privateers than anything else. Their Army was an undisciplined throng of militiamen, serving on short enlistments, without organized commissariat, and for the most part under inexperienced officers. Its numbers, too, were far inferior to those of the British. Taxation by the Continental Congress for the support of the war was not among the possibilities of the case. A strong tendency toward the provision for immediate needs by the issue of bills of credit had been inherited from the period of the French wars, and that device was again resorted to. The battle of Bunker Hill had been immediately followed by an order of Congress for the issue of $2,000,000 in that form of cur rency. Issues followed in rapidly increasing amounts, until by the close of $241,000,000 had been authorized. The States put out nearly as much ($209,000,000). The continental paper money depreciated until it became worthless, as to a large extent did that of the States also. The States decreed it to be legal tender, and dire threats were uttered against those who refused to receive the bills ; but all to no purpose. The Congress also tried to induce the States to tax themselves for the general cause and was forced to rely on requisitions for the purpose. These measures proved as complete a failure as when resorted to by the Crown. The revolution was therefore never financed. It early became necessary to resort to loans and that chiefly from foreign sources. It was therefore an absolute necessity that the Colonies should secure international recognition and status. Then loans were ob tained from the Government of France and Spain and from private bankers in Holland to the amount of about $7,830,000.

The collapse of royal Government left the Colonies in a chaotic state. The old institutions had disappeared and new ones could not be immediately developed to take their place. But the in stitutions of local Government, the town and county systems, were left intact, and upon these as a basis the new fabrics were erected. It was therefore easier to construct the Governments of the States than to define and develop the general Government. At first little else was intended than that the Congress should be the mouth piece of the patriot party. It proceeded mainly by way of recom mendation, and looked to the States, rather than to itself, as the ultimate sources of authority. Upon them it depended for the execution of its measures. As the war proceeded the States grew jealous of the central body and tried to prevent appeals to it from the State courts in prize cases. Under the pressure of war, more over, the enthusiasm, which had been strong at the outset, de clined, and it became increasingly difficult to secure co-operation or sacrifice toward any general enterprise.

Difficulty of Congress.

At the same time, war devolved upon Congress an enormous burden of work. It was forced to devise general policies and provide for their execution, and also to attend to an infinite number of administrative details. Most of the able members were drawn off into the Army, into diplomatic service or official service in the States. Sectional and State jealousies also developed and became intense. As the Congress voted by States the smaller commonwealths were often moved by jealousy of their larger rivals to thwart important measures. But, above all, the conduct of the war and foreign relations oc casioned infinite jealousies and cabals, while many of the most important measures seemed to meet with downright indifference. Washington's correspondence abounds in evidence of these facts, while it is well known that he was the object against whom one of the cabals of the time was directed. Benjamin Franklin was the object of somewhat similar jealousies. But, as time passed, rudimentary executive departments, beginning with the board of war and the postmaster general, were developed, and some advance was made toward a working and permanent system. In 1781 the offices of foreign secretary, superintendent of finance, secretary of war and secretary of marine were created.