75. Yet there are cases in which the general rule seems to fail of application in which the immediate consequences are such as benevolence, equally with sel•in terest, seems to reject. In such cases our inquiry should be, what would be the consequence if the conduct became general, which, in my individual case, seems to be so favorable to happiness, social or private. And if we have reason to believe that it would be injurious, our belief, in the beneficial tendency of the in dividual action, should be considered as less founded ; we should perhaps in all cases, certainly in most, unhesitatingly sacrifice much private advantage, and even the apparent good of others, to con sistency in our adherence to what on the whole must be best. We may indeed think that the consequences which would arise from the general adoption of our in dividual conduct, ought not to be attribu ted in any way to us ; but we should re collect that if we once break down the barrier, however small the breach, the ad vantage gained by the enemy is evident. In fact, when once we remove the limits which reason and revelation fix, we usurp to ourselves the privilege of the Almigh ty, and cannot fail to prove our own weakness. It is on this ground, and with great justice, that Paley considers crimes as deriving their criminality, not so much from the consequences of the individual action, as from the consequences which would result from such actions becoming general. Thus the man, who by the for gery of a one pound note, may probably render no individual injury worth esti niating'in the punishment of a fellow crea ture ; and another, who by the forgery of a large bill, without direct intention, ruins an individual funily, are both equally cul pable in the eye of reason, and perhaps as far as punishment is beneficial to others, he who has forged the one pound note deserves greater severity of punishment, because the means of committing his de predation on society are much more prac ticable than in the other case. But in both it is not the individual injury sus tained that is to regulate the proportion of demerit, but the consequences which would follow the total destruction of com mercial intercourse and of mutual confi dence.
76. By the application of this important principle, much of that obscurity is dissi pated, which seems to involve some ques tions on morals which are intimately con nected with the well being of society.— Many of those violations of veracity, for instance, which even benevolence seems to authorise, will appear to be direct de viations from the soundest principles of morality, and consequently to be unau thorised by benevolence, when viewed in their fair extent, however much the im mediate consequences may seem to de mand them. There is, however, one re striction to this rule, which seems to be necessary, in order,to enable us fully to submit to its influence, It is, whether the probability of our conduct being general ly adopted, be sufficient to counterba lance the advantages or disadvantages which would arise if such general adop tion took place. Let us apply it to the case I have already adduced of the viola tion of truth. Now it is very obvious that in most cases in which there is any strong tendency to such violation, it ari ses from the desire to remove or avoid some ill attending our adherence. Hence
the temptation to repetition, either by our selves or others, will always be sufficient ly powerful, if no counterbalancing consi derations prevented to induce us to devi ate from truth; and therefore the proba bility of our conduct becoming general, is indefinitely great, and consequently in definitely strengthens the reasons we draw against such deviations, from their ill effects if they become general. On the other hand, it is obvious, that if all who could aflbrd it gave to the poor to the extent of their ability, the sources of industry would be dried up, and society would immediately fall into such confu sion, that if the ideas of punishment were not very enlightened, alms-giving might he deemed a capital crime. Hence we might argue from the general principle already laid down, that we ought not to give at all ; and we think Paley defective in appearance at least for having furnished no clue to a solution of the difficulty. It is immediately solved by the restrictive rule which has been laid down ; what is the probability that alms-giving will become general, or even so general as to produce the feared effects in a small degree ? If this be very small, we have nothing more to do than to consider which is the best direction for our superfluities, and give, with the certainty that our conduct will not become so universal as to render it injurious instead of beneficial. We now proceed, following Hartley as our outline, to consider those rules of conduct by which we may safely guide ourselves through the intricacies of human life.
77. The first ride is, that we obey the Scripture precepts in the natural obvious meaning of them—The Scripture pre cepts are indeed in themselves the rule of life. There is, however, the same kind of difficulty in applying them aeon., rately to particular cases, as in applying the above-mentioned most general rule, by means of an estimate of the conse quences of actions. It is impossible in many particular cases to determine pre cisely the connection cf the action with the precept. However, unless it would obviously lead a person to act in opposi tion to some or other of the following rules, it is the safest way, in the particu lar circumstances of real life, to recollect the Scripture precepts, and follow them in their first and most obvious sense. • 78. Secondly, great regard must be had both to the dictates of our own moral sense, and that of others. It is remarked, with great justice, by Dr. Aikin, that, in a mind whose moral powers have been cultivated, second thoughts are seldom the best. The first are the impulse of well-regulated feeling, and are produced instantaneously, without attention to all the petty suggestions of self, which crowd themselves iu various ways into our minds, and by leading to doubt, and then aided by inclination to disobey, prevent the efficacy of the conscience, and throw a mist over the befoTe clear directions of duty.—With respect to the moral sense of others, two Motives should induce us to regard its dictates. The one is purely benevolent : we ought not to throw any impediMent in the way of the duty of others : the other ig, that prudence and humility direct, that we use the experi ence and the feelings produced by great moral culture, as guides of our own con duct.