79. Thirdly, it' is very proper that, in all deliberate actions, we weigh, as well as we can, the probable consequences on each side, and suffer the balance to have smite influence in all cases, and particu larly where the other rules do not inter fere, or where they fail of application. But they are generally the dictates of self-interest and pride, to be determined by our own judgments as to quence, in opposition to rules of duty.
SO. Fourthly, The impulse of the more instantaneous emotions of good-will and compassion will not always furnish a suf ficient guide ; at the same time they ought to have great regard paid to them, lest we contract a philosophic hardness of heart, by pretending to act upon high er and more extensively benevolent views than vulgar minds, or the more feeling sex, &c. Some, however, carry this much too far on the other side, and encourage many public mischiefs through a false, .misguided tenderness to criminals, per sons in distress through present vice, &c. When feeling is thus made the guide of conduct, he who can best play upon the sympathy, and best decorate his tale of woe, will meet with a reward for his in genuity, due only to the modest merit which *rinks from the public 'view,"or at least obtrudes not itself upon our notice. The injury done to society at large by this ill-directed compassion, so generally prevalent, because it gratifies without trouble, is very great indeed ; and while we have it in our power to cultivate com passion and sympathy, by the view and the relief of real misery and suffering worth, the desire of such cultivation is scarcely sufficient to exculpate us, when our minds have acquired some degree of comprehension, from the charge of pre ferring a selfish, indolent gratification to the good of others. To use the words of the elegant Stewart, " the dictates of rea son and conscience inform us, in lan guage which it is impossible to mistake, that it is sometimes a duty to check the most amiable and pleasing emotions of the heart ; to withdraw, for example, from the sight of those distresses which stronger claims forbid us to relieve, and to deny ourselves that exquisite luxury which arises from the exercise of huma nity." 81. Fifthly, the rule of placing our selves in several situations of the per sons concerned, and inquiring what we should then expect, is of excellent use for directing, inforcing, and restraining our actions, and for producing in us a steady, constant sense of what is fit and equitable.—This rule is so comprehen sive, that it may be called the sum and substance of Christian morality. It has been objected by some, that it teaches nothing, for it shows not what justice is ; and that it is 'an improper rule, for we ought not to do to others what we should wish them to do to us, but what we may justly expect them to do to us. But this is
no real objection. The object of the rule most probably is, to serve as a criterion of duty which should counteract the im pressions of self. We never need fear lest we should carry our imaginary sub stitution to too great a length, and think of what passion or interest might lead us to expect : when not under the influence of passion or interest, it is more than pro bable that we shall be guided sufficient ly accurately. Our only danger is, lest we should not go far enough, that we should admit of this principle, which, if circumstances had been real, ought to have had no place.—This rule of duty, .says Dr, Reid, comprehends every rule of justice without exception. It compre hends all the relative duties, arising ei ther from the mere permanent relations of parent and child, of master and ser vant, of magistrate and subject, of hus band and wife, or from the more ton sient relations of rich and poor, of buyer and seller, of debtor and creditor, of be nefactor and beneficiary, of friend and enemy. It comprehends every duty of charityand humanity, and even of courte sy and good manners.—He who acts inva riably by this rule, will never deviate from the principle of his duty but from an error of his judgment.
82. The word justice (says Mr. Stew art, in his " Outlines"), in its most exten sive signification, denotes that disposition which leads us, where our own temper, or passions, or interest, are concerned, to determine and to act, without being biassed by partial considerations. In or der to free our minds from the influence of these, experience teaches us either to recollect the judgments we have former ly passed in similar circumstances, on the conduct of others ; or to state cases to ourselves in which we, and all our per sonal concerns, are entirely left out of the question.—Justice operates, first, in re straining the partialities of the temper and of the passions ; and, secondly, in re straining the partialities of selfishness, where a competition takes place be tween our interests and those of other men. These two modifications of justice may be distinguished from each other, by calling the first candour, the second inte grity or honesty. The professor's re marks on the subject of candour are very valuable and important ; and we deem no apology necessary for laying them before our readers. This disposition, he ob serves, may be considered in three points of view ; as it is displayed in judging of the talents of others ; in judging of their intentions ; and in controversy.