87. But admit that the cases are clear, that the person whom we are about to leave to death is, obviously and decisive ly, a less important member of society than he whom we attempt to save, if we violate none of those feelings which rise up in the human frame altogether indepen dently of the will of the individual, there can be no hesitation ; but suppose that our proposed conduct will violate them— let it first be considered, that they are not only necessary to the culture, nay even to the formation of individual bene volence, but to the well ordering, perhaps to the very existence of society. Take the strongest case, suppose the filial and parental affections to be annihilated, (and it is absurd to justify and lay down as just, that conduct which, if not counter acted by the eternal laws of our frame, would lead to such annihilation, if that annihilation itself be not an object of de sire), suppose these affections annihilated, and the heart shrinks from the picture. The claims of the helpless infant upon the parent would be rejected; and, if en larged views of duty to society did not induce the parent to think that he had better remove from existence a being who would be a burden to others and himself, and who probably would not be educated so as to be wise and happy, there would arise constant discourage ments, which would effectually prevent those steady uniform endeavours to culti vate the mental and moral powers, which are necessary to attain the object ; and if the evil did not soon eradicate itself; man, if he existed, would gradually sink to the level of the brute. But if the parental affections existed not, neither would the filial. Here it is that the rudiments of good-will are formed in the infant breast ; here it is that the being who is to love all mankind begins his career of love : here is the source of that ardent disinterested benevolence which carries the individual out of himself, which leads him to forget himself and all his immediate interests, and view only the good of others. Can it be supposed that this highly cultivated benevolence is in opposition to that more confined affection from which it sprung ? No, we see it modifying its direction, but never annihilating it. On the contrary, it may be justly affirmed, that the confined affections become more inwrought in the frame, as universal benevolence becomes more and more a ruling feature of the mind ; and it must, for universal bene volence is but the sum total of all the con fined affections, extended by the hand of piety.
88. We have before mentioned, that there are two considerations upon which we ought to act, in cases where we are left to be guided by the views of the con sequences of our actions. The first is, what would be the consequence if our conduct became general 1 the next, what is the probability of this extension of our conduct ? Wherever the claims of the confined affections are in direct opposi tion to the dictates of the enlightened conscience, there can be no room for doubt, though we ought to be careful that our departure from their claims not only is, but, if possible, shall appear to be, demanded by these dictates ; but we are, even in cases which, independently considered, are obvious, to take into con sideration the evil that will result from a breach of those affections. There are
some affections, which not all the efforts of philosophy could succeed in crack eating; vice may do it, and heedless levi ty, but the calm exertion arising from a view to utility never could. refer to the parental affections. Hence it is pro bable, that a sacrifice of them to the pub lic good, would be productive of much less injury, than a sacrifice of the filial affec tions, which are less urgent and lasting. Hence, though we should condemn the parent who left his son to perish in the flames, while he endeavoured to save the life of Fenelon, and should require strong proof that the parental affections existed in him in their due force ; yet we should doubly condemn .the son, who in such a case left his father to perish. Godwin's principles, if carried to their fair extent, would destroy society ; but we do not consider his errors as more than the er rors of judgment. We suppose that the ardour of general benevolence misled him, and that in his wish to make its dictates paramount in the human breast, he forgot, or rather did not observe, that he was aiming to counteract the most essential laws of the human frame. It is one of those numerous instances in which an acquaintance with the human mind is necessary ; had Godwin attended to its laws, it is reasonable to hope that he never would have given a theory to the world, which, even a slight acquaintance with its practicability and effects, should have consigned to oblivion.
89. Seventhly, benevolent and religious persons have, all other things being equal, a prior claim to the rest of man kind. Natural benevolence itself teaches this, as well as the moral sense. Two reasons strongly inforce this; in the first place we thus do what we can towards the promotion of goodness, we add some thing to the strength of the motives which exist, even in the present life, for steady adherence to the practice of virtue. If it be our aim to remove misery without discrimination, we in some degree break .down the barriers of virtue; we cannot remove all ; therefore let our efforts be directed so that they shall tell as com pletely as possible, and it is obvious that this will be most the case, where what we do discourages vice in all its shapes. If indolence be secure of relief from that pressure which it places upon itself, in dolence will be increased; if the appear ance of misery be the only passport to our u-sistance, vice will be continually receiving encouragement —But it is not merely with a view to the relief of actual misery that discrimination is important ; it is equally important with respect to the extension of the means of doing good. We may confidently expect all the op portunities and powers we can commit to others will be most serviceable in the hands of those whose habits are formed upon the model of benevolent piety.— In all cases, however, especially while our benevolence is incipient, we are in some measure to be guided by its mere impulse.—It is one important consequence of doing good to others, that we do good to ourselves, we cultivate our benevo lence, and with it cultivate our happi ness. But that benevolence will be found to rest upon the surest footing, which is made to prompt to exertions which shall not interfere with the most extensive in terests of man.