83. The difficulty of estimating candid ly the talents of other men arises, in a great measure, from the tendency of emulation to degenerate into envy. Not withstanding the reality of the theoreti cal distinction between these dispositions of mind, it is certain that in practice no thing is more arduous than to realize it completely ; and to check that self-par tiality, which, while it leads us to dwell on our own personal advantages, and to magnify them in our own estimation, pre vents us either from attending sufficiently to the merits of others, or from viewing them in the most favourable light: Of all this a good man will soon be satisfied from his own experience ; and he will en deavour to guard against it as far as he is able, by judging of the pretensions of a rival, or even of an enemy, as he would have done if there had been no interfer ence between his claims and theirs, In other words, he will endeavour to do jus tice to their merits, and to bring himself, if possible, to love and to honour that ge nius and ability which have eclipsed his own.—Nor will he retire in disgust from the race, because he has been outstrip ped by others, but will redouble all his exertions in the service of mankind ; re collecting, that if nature has been more partial to others than to him in her intel lectual gifts, she has left open to all the theatre of virtue ; where the merits of in dividuals are determined, not by their ac tual attainments, but by the use and im provement they make of those advanta ges which their situation has afforded them.
84. Candour in judging of the inten tions of others is a disposition of still greater importance.—It is highly proba ble that there is much less vice, or crimi nal intention, in the world, than is com monly imagined ; and that the greater part of the disputes among mankind arise from mutual mistake, or misapprehen sion. Every man must recollect many instances in which his motives have been grossly misapprehended by the world ; and it is reasonable for him to allow that the case may have been the same with other men. It is but an instance then of that justice we owe to others, to make the most candid allowances fbr their ap parent deviation, and to give every ac tion the most favourable construction it can possibly admit of. Such a temper, while it renders a man respectable and amiable in society, contributes perhaps more than any other circumstance to his private 85. Candour, in controversy, implies a strong sense of justice, united to a sin cere and disinterested love of truth. It is a disposition of mind so difficult to pre serve, and so rarely to be met with, that the most useful rule, perhaps, to be giv en with respect to it, is to avoid the occa sions of dispute and opposition. A love of controversy indicates not only an over weening vanity, and a disregard for truth, but in general, perhaps always, it indi cates a mediocrity of genius ; for it arises from those feelings of envy and jealousy which provoke little minds to depreciate the merit of useful discoveries. He who is conscious of his own inventive powers, and whose great object is to add to the stock of human knowledge, will reject unwillingly any plausible doctrine till af ter the most severe examination ; and will separate with patience and temper the truth it contains from the errors that are blended with them. No opinion can be more groundless, than that a captious and disputatious temper is a mark of acuteness. On the contrary, a sound and manly understanding is, in no instance, more strongly displayed, than in a quick perception of important truth, when im perfectly stated and blended with error : a perception which may not be sufficient to satisfy the judgment completely at the time, or at least to enable it to obviate the difficulties of others ; but which is suffi cient to prevent it from a hasty rejection of the whole, from the obvious defects of some of the parts. The effects of con troversy on the temper, although abun dantly sensible even in the solitude of the closet, are more peculiarly adverse to the discovery of truth in those dis putes which occur in conversation ; and which seldom answer any purpose, but to rivet the disputants more firmly in their errors. In consequence, indeed, of such disputes, the intellectual powers may be sharpened, and original hints may be suggested ; but few instances are to be found, in which they do not mislead the disputants to a still greater distance from truth than before,4and render their minds still more inaccessible to convic tion.
86, Sixthly, persons in the near rela tions of life, benefactors, dependants, and enemies, seem to have in most cases a prior claim to strangers. General bene volence arises from the cultivation of the particular sources of it. The root must
therefore be cherished before we can ex pect the branches to flourish, and the fruit to arrive at its perfection. Attention to this rule leads us to avoid all those opinions, which attempt to found univer sal upon the ruin of confined benevolence : however specious, they may appear they are false, because they counteract the moral improvement of man by checking it at its origin. We particularly refer to those which Godwin has advanced in his work on Political Justice. His most ge neral principle is, that every individual exertion should be directed so as to pro duce the greatest possible sum of good to the species. Hence, that if we have the power to save the life or increase the happiness of one or two fellow creatures, we owe our exertions to him who is use and perhaps extensively useful to so ciety, in preference to him who is an use less, or perhaps injurious member of society. The claims of self are excluded by the general principle. "What magic," says Godwin, " can there be in the word my, which should change its operation 1" Hence the claims of confined charities ought not to oppose the deductions from the general principle. Hence it is not our business, in the direction of our bene volent exertions, to consider what is the relation in which the individual stands to us ; but that in which he stands to socie ty. Not, is he my parent, relative, friend, or benefactor ; but, is he a worthy or a worthless member of society. Godwin's errors are the more injurious, because they appear to be the errors of benevo lence; they result from the inaccurate extension and application of principles which in themselves are indisputable. Whenever private interest interferes with the public good, private interest is to be sacrificed; and this, whether our own immediate good is the object, or the good of those who are intimately connected with us, by some of the natural bonds ; that is, those which arise in the mind by the laws of our constitution. That the conduct dictated by confined charity is to yield to general good, cannot be disputed ; but that we are in all cases to act totally independently of a regard to those con fined charities, is a position which will not bear the test of experience nor of the mental constitution of man. In the first place, benevolence never could arise in the human soul, but through their me dium. Love to others is founded on feel ings originally personal, then it embraces the narrow circle of our immediate friends and acquaintance, and then perhaps there is little difficulty in extending it to those who bear with us the relation of children to the great parent of mankind. But be fore we can form the desire to do good to all men, we must have formed the de sire to do good to some men ; and though the desire of doing good to some, may be of that confined nature which would lead to the promotion of their aggrandisement and happiness, at the expense of those of others, yet the confined charities form too important a part in the great system, to be on this account rejected, as not being on the whole safe guides. We may lop off the excrescences, but it would be folly to destroy the root. But, secondly, admit the formation of the feelings of ge neral benevolence independently of the private charities, it is obvious, that with out long culture and enlarged views, the general feelings cannot acquire the vivid ness, which, by their frequent recurrence and particularity, the more confined feel ings can. hence the removal of misery would be left to those who had thus cul tivated the extensive affections, and con sequently the means of removing it must be most materially diminished. Thirdly, it would leave no rule for conduct upon which any one could act. If we are to be determined in our acts of benevolence, particularly in cases of immediate urgen cy, merely by the consideration of the utility of the individual to society, our lives would be a continual series of cal culation, and, in general, of erroneous calculation. Who is there capable of accurately appreciating the worth of the individual 1 Our ideas are, in general, formed merely upon the appearances which strike our attention, and fbrce us to observe them. The silent efficacy of example and private exertions to remove misery, and still more to remove or pre vent vice, the parent of misery, are in ge neral known only to Him who seed' in secret. Even in cases where much is obvious, what diversity shall we find in opinion ? and where the co-operation of individuals for the benefit of others is necessary, how improbable that they should have formed the same standard.