The phrenologists have chiefly confined their attention to the organs of the brain, and the various faculties of which these are the instruments. The former writers on mind —Reid, Stewart, Brown, and others—gave, on the contrary, their chief care to the men tal acts called attention, perception, conception, etc., which they considered as faculties. The phrenologist does not overlook the importance of this department of mental phi losophy, but differs from the metaphysicians in considering perception, conception, memory, etc., as only modes in which the real faculties above described act. This dis tinction is one of great importance.
According to the phrenologists, the faculties are not mere passive susceptibilities; they all tend to action. When duly active, the actions they produce are proper or necessary; in excess or abuse, they are improper, vicious, or criminal. Small moral organs do not produce abuses; but they are unable to prevent the abuse of the animal organs, as larger tend to do; thus small benevolence is not cruel, but it does not offer sufficient control to destructiveness, which then impels to cruelty. Cateris paribus, large organs have the greatest, and small the least tendency to act—each faculty producing the feeling or idea peculiar to itself. In active constitutions, the brain partakes of the general activity, and conies more readily into play than where the constitution or tem perament is lymphatic. Health and disease, exercise and inaction, nutrition and starva tion, have also great influence in modifying both the power of the cerebral organs and their readiness to act. Moreover, when certain faculties have been much exercised for a series of generations in a family, they are apt to be manifested in greater strength and activity than where no such hereditary influence exists. Seeing that all the organs tend to action, each, it is concluded, must have a legitimate sphere of action, and be necessary for the welfare of man.
The PROPENSITIES and SENTENIENTS cannot be called into action by the will. We cannot fear, or pity, or love, or be angry. will by willing it. But internal causes may stimu late the organs, and then, whether or not, their emotions will be felt. Again, these feelings are called into action in spite of the will, by the presentation of their external objects—cautiousness, by objects of tenor, love, by beauty, and so on. The excitability of the feelings, whether stimulated from within or without, is increased by activity of the temperament. Insanity is a frequent result of over-activity of the pro pensities and sentiments. These may be diseased and yet the intellect sound. The con verse is also true. When an organ is small, its feeling cannot be adequately experi enced. The will can indirectly excite the propensities and sentiments by setting the intellect to work to find externally, or conceive internally, the proper objects. Lastly,
these faculties do not form ideas, but simply feel, and therefore have no memory, con. ception, or imagination.
The PERCEPTIVE and REFLECTING FACULTIES, or intellect, form ideas, perceive rela tions, and are subject to, or rather constitute, the will, and minister to the affective fac ulties. They may be excited by external objects and by internal causes. When excited by the presentation of external objects, these objects are perceived, and this act is called PERCEPTION. It is the lowest degree of activity of the intellectual faculties; and those who are deficient in a faculty cannot perceive its also is a mode of action of the faculties, not a faculty itself.' It is (lie activity of the faculties from internal causes; either wilted, or involuntary from natural activity.—IMAGINATION is conception carried to a high pitch of vivacity.—MEmonY, too, is not a faculty, but a mode of action. There is no such thing as the general memory of the metaphysicians, but every intel lectual faculty has its own memory. Memory differs from conception and imagination in this, that it recollects real objects or events which it has actually perceived, and adds the consciousness of time elapsed since they were perceived. The other named modes of action do not require realities or time.—JUDGMENT is, properly, the perception of adaptation, fitness, and necessary consequence; tins is a mode of action of the reflecting powers. In a certain sense, the perceptive faculties may each be said to possess judg ment; as coloring judges of colors; form, of forms; tune, of music. By the word "judgment," however, is meant right reasoning, sound deciding. To this, a proper balance of the affective faculties is essential. There can be no sound judgment where any of the .feelings are excessive.—CoNsmorssEss is the knowledge which the mind has of its own existence and operations.—ATTENTION is not it faculty, but the application, or tension, of any or all of the intellectual faculties.—ASSOCIATION is the succession of ideas in the mind, each seeming to call up that which succeeds; so that in our waking-hours the mind is never without an idea passing through it. This is a state or condition of the faculties, not a facultv.—PAssiox is any faculty in excess: love is the passion of =alive ness in union with adhesiveness and veneration; avarice, of acquisitiveness; rage, of destructiveness.—PLEAsrutE and PAM JOY and GRIEF, also belong to each faculty, according as it is agreeably or disagreeably affected.—IIAnn is the power of doing any thing well, acquired by frequently doing it. But before it can be done at all, there must be the faculty to do it, however IlWkWfadry.—TASTE was held by Mr. Stewart to be a faculty, 4nd to be acquired by habit. It seems to be the result of a harmonious action of all the faculties.