On July 9, 1916, the German subma rine "Deutschland," a commercial vessel entered the port of Norfolk and pro ceeded to Baltimore. No attempt was made by this Government to discrimi nate between it and any other commercial ship in the matter of port facilities. This led to a remonstrance on the part of the Allied nations, directed to all neu tral nations, but primarily directed at the United States with the "Deutsch land" incident in view. The Entente view was that the peculiar characteris tics of submarines are such that they ought not to be allowed the same port privileges as other merchant vessels. Among these characteristics were the ability to dive, by which they could avoid control and identification, so that their character as neutral or belligerent, as naval or merchant vessel, could not be ascertained. The United States, however, refused to accept this reason ing as a rule of action.
Much less peaceful was the visit of the German war submarine, the "U-53," which unannounced entered Newport harbor, Oct. 7, 1916, and after deliver ing mail for the German Embassy, de parted after a few hours' stay. Within the next two days, the "U-53" had sunk in swift succession one Dutch, one Nor wegian and three British ships, within sight of the American coast. Legal warning was given in each case, and the crews permitted to escape, some of the latter being picked up by American destroyers in the vicinity. The bringing of the submarine war to this side of the ocean created considerable excitement, and the question was raised whether the action of the submarine did not con stitute a blockade of the American coast and an infringement upon Ameri can rights. The matter, however, was permitted to stay in abeyance.
On Oct. 30 the British ship "Marina" was torpedoed while on her way to this country and six Americans of fifty who were on board were killed. Then came an attack upon the American steamer "Chemung" and that on the steamer "Russian" with a loss of 17 American lives. No adequate explanation was forthcoming.
While the two countries were by these occurrences being brought nearer the brink of war, efforts were being made by the President of the United States to find some common grounds on which. peace might be secured, or negotiations at least opened, between the Entente and the Central Powers. The occasion was offered by the German announce ment on Dec. 12, 1916, that the Im perial Government was ready to enter into peace negotiations. The terms were couched, however, so much in the spirit of a victor magnanimously offering peace to the vanquished that they were em phatically, almost curtly, refused by all the Allied nations. Despite this refusal,
the time (Dec. 181, seemed auspicious for the President of the greatest of the neutrals to act as mediator, although he stated that the plan had been conceived long before the issuance of Germany's offer. What the President sought to ob tain was a concrete statement of terms, on which negotiations might be initiated.
The crux of his note was contained in the passage: "The leaders of the sev eral belligerents have stated those ob jects (i. e. of the war), in general terms. But stated in general terms, they seem the same on both sides. Never yet have the authoritative spokes men on either side avowed the precise objects which would, if attained, sat isfy them and their people that the war had been fought out. The world has been left to conjecture what definite re sults, what actual guarantees, what political or territorial changes or read justments, what stage of military suc cess even, would bring the war to an end." The President's views found an echo in the United States Senate, which passed a resolution approving it. The note also created a profound sensation in the nations at war. By the peoples of the Central Powers it was in the main approved, largely because of the favorable military situation in which at the moment they found themselves. By the Allies, however, much of whose ter ritory was occupied by German forces, the note was received without enthusi asm and in some quarters with thinly veiled resentment. The Allies, however, seized the occasion to present to the world a detailed statement of the prin cipal aims they had in view in the war they were waging. Those aims are nar rated in full in another place (see WORLD WAR). To this statement, the German Government made rejoinder on Jan. 11, in a note which scouted the demands of the Entente, declared that Germany had made a sincere attempt to open negotiations for peace and placed all blame for the war's continu ance upon the shoulders of their enemies. The net result of the President's effort was nil.
A significant episode in connection with the speech was a statement issued by Secretary Lansing on Dec. 20, two days later. He stated that the note had been prompted by the fact that "we our selves are drawing nearer the verge of war." This official statement created great alarm, so great indeed that the Secretary felt impelled later in the same day to explain away the indiscreet utter ance. His efforts were only effectual in part, however, and uneasiness persisted. It was felt that more was going on be hind the veil of diplomatic exchanges than had hitherto been suspected.