Other military precautions were taken. The public were forbidden ac cess to navy yards and government buildings. Arsenals, bridges, subway entrances, aqueducts, reservoirs and gov ernment plants were placed under strict guard. The Panama Canal was care fully watched. The erection of a new fort was begun at Rockaway Point, in order to strengthen the defense of New York harbor. Legislative action was also taken looking toward preparedness. The House, on Feb. 12, passed the largest Naval Appropriation bill in the his tory of the nation, carrying over $368, 000,000. The President was authorized to commandeer shipyards and munition plants in case of war or national emer gency.
Almost immediately after the diplo matic break with Germany, the United States Government addressed a note to the other neutral nations, advising them of the act and the reasons that prompted it, and expressing the hope that they would see their way clear to taking similar action. None, however, went that far, though protests varying in force were sent by all of them to Ger many.
Ruthless submarine warfare had been carried on with vigor for nearly' four weeks, when, on Feb. 26, President Wil son addressed a joint session of Con gress, and asked that he be given au thority to supply guns and ammunition to American merchant ships, and em ploy any other instrumentalities that might be necessary to protect American citizens and interests on the high seas. He cited two recent cases in which American ships, the "Housatonic" and the "Lyman M. Law," had been sunk, and pointed out that the submarines were acting as an embargo on Ameri can trade. Even while he was proceed ing to the Capitol to deliver his address, news came of another sinking to be added to the list, that of the Cunard liner "Laconia," in which American lives were lost. Immediately after the President's appeal, a bill was intro duced in the House embodying most of his suggestions and, after a debate in which partisanship played no part, was passed, March 1. In the Senate, how ever, the bill failed to pass, although an overwhelming majority was in favor of it. A determined filibuster was or ganized by a small group, who, under the rules of the Senate, were able to pro long debate until the bill died automat ically at the ending of the session on March 4.
The President appealed to the coun try, and the almost overwhelming re sponse convinced him of the depth of the indignation that had been aroused by the action of the recalcitrant group of senators. On March 9, he issued a proc lamation calling Congress to meet in special session on April 16. No purpose was specified, though it was intimated that the President wanted the support of Congress in any action he might find necessary to take for the public defense.
At the same time a statement was is sued from the White House that the President was convinced of his right to direct the arming of merchant ships by Presidential proclamation. This he did on March 12. On that date all mem bers of the diplomatic corps in Wash ington were informed by Secretary Lan sing that, in view of the course of the German Government in sinking ships without warning, the Government of the United States had determined to place upon all American merchant vessels, whose course lay through the barred zone, armed guards for the protection of vessels and lives. In the short space that intervened between the issuance of the proclamation and the actual declaration of war, the position of the United States was that of armed neu trality.
The indorsement of the President's action by the country at large was made the more emphatic because of a sensa tional episode growing out of the corre spondence of the German Foreign Se cretary with the German Minister to Mexico. A letter was published March 1 that was dated Jan. 19, 1917, and signed by Zimmermann, German Foreign Secretary. It told the German Minister, Von Eckhardt, that Germany intended on Feb. 1 to begin unrestricted sub marine warfare, and that this might en danger relations with the United States. In that event, Von Eckhardt was di rected to propose to Mexico that she and Germany make war and make peace together. Germany was to furnish finan cial support to Mexico, and the latter was to recover her "lost territory" in New Mexico, Arizona and Texas. The "details" of this program were to be left to Von Eckhardt. As if this large order were not enough, he was also to suggest that the President of Mexico communicate this plan to Japan and seek to secure the latter's adherence.
While the ingenuousness of the plan was not without its elements of humor, the publication of the letter hardened the determination of the United States to pursue the course it was treading. even if it should lead to war. The revelation of diplomatic clumsiness was particular ly disconcerting to Germany and the pro German elements in this country. The letter was denounced in some quarters as a patent forgery, but on March 3, Zimmermann himself acknowledged that it was genuine and sought to defend it. Mexico made haste to deny any implica tion in the matter and Japan denounced it as a "monstrous plot" that, if pro posed to the Japanese Government, would not be entertained for an instant. These disclaimers, which in the case of Japan at any rate was unnecessary, were ac cepted by our Government, and interest in the matter was soon lost in the greater events that followed.