On the 20th of July, a complete junction of the allies had taken place ; and relying on the auxiliary move ments of Sir Robert Wilson, (who, with a well-disci plined Portuguese corps, was ordered to Escalona,) and the division of Venegas, which advanced to Argonda, the grand army proceeded to Talavera, where the right of the enemy's outposts was driven in. On the 24th, the corps of Victor fell back from the Alberche, and form ed a junction with the army of Sebastiani. The French having at last combined all their forces, including the garrison of Madrid, the guards of King Joseph, and the corps of Sebastiani, Victor, and Jourdan, first repulsed Cuesta, who had attempted to pursue them.
The Spanish general fell back, after his repulse, upon the British army ; and the allies, determining to await the attack of the enemy, stood in a strong position at Talavera. Their united numbers amounted to 64,000 men, of which 26,000 were British. On the 27th of July, the French, 45,000 strong, advanced to a general action, in which they attempted every quarter of the allied army without success. Being completely repuls ed, they retreated across the Alberche, with the loss of 20 pieces of cannon, and, according to our calculation, of 10,000 men. The loss of the British, on whom the stress of the action fell, was not less than 6000. The Spaniards, who fought bravely, though they were less engaged, had about 1000 killed and wounded. Abun dant triumph has been made over this victory. We con fess it appears to us a less remarkable achievement than the other victories of Lord Wellington, that 64,000 men should, upon a strong position, repulse 45,000. It has been said that the Spanish troops were undisciplined, and contributed little to the victory. This fact we de ny ; for the army of Cuesta was the best disciplined of the Spanish troops. The Spaniards covered the right wing ; and it was by their aid that general Campbell's brigade, which occupied a commanding position in the centre of the armies, was enabled to hold its position, and to capture the enemy's artillery. That the Spa niards were less engaged than the British is certain ; but their usefulness in the engagement certainly brought the force of our army to a fair equality with the enemy, if not to such a superiority on our side as might be reasonably expected to produce a victory.
But the allies had scarcely time to congratulate them selves on the victory, when it was found that the situa tion was dangerous and untenable. Soult, Ney, and Mortier, having formed a junction, had advanced through Estremadura, and got over in the rear of the British ; while Victor, though defeated, had still 30,000 men. Leaving Cucsta to defend Talavera, and to take care of the British wounded, Sir Arthur Wellesley marched, on the 3d of August, to Ovopesa, in the di rection in which Soult was advancing. On the evening of the same day, however, he was informed that Cuesta meant to leave Talavera immediately, dreading that the British would be unable to oppose the united Humbert• of Soult, Ney, and Mortier. The hospital of the British wounded, which the English general had entrusted to him, Cuesta was obliged to abandon to the French.
From this perilous situation, Sir Arthur Wellesley retreated as fast as possible by Delcytosa to Jaraicejo, where he remained for some time, with his advanced posts on the Tagus, unmolested. But his distress for want of provisions, and the means of transport, which he had incessantly and in vain represented to the Spanish government, still continuing to increase, he found it ne cessary to retreat to Badajos, on the frontiers of Portu gal. Here, during the remainder of the year, his army remained, not only inactive, but exposed, from the un healthiness of the situation, to the ravages of a very fatal disorder.
Gerona, the key of Catalonia, had maintained, as we have already mentioned, a noble and protracted resist ance. Almost the only strong part of it was the castle of Montjoi, but even alter this had been reduced to a heap of ruins, the city still stood. By a dexterous and bold manoeuvre of general Blake's, a relief of provisions and ammunition was thrown into the place, and its garrison raised to the effective strength of 3000 men. The French generals, St Cyr and Vcrdicr, after having made four ineffectual assaults, were recalled by Bonaparte from their command, and the siege was entrusted to Augerau, whose unwearied activity and superior num bers, at last succeeded in driving off the covering army of Blake, and taking Gerona by storm, after its walls were beaten down, and the strength, though not the spirit of its inhabitants, had been reduced by famine. Besides the fugitive army of Blake, the Spaniards still maintained, in the beginning of November, a central ar my under Cuesta and the Duke D'Albuquerque, and an army on the left under the Duke del Parque. The lat ter commander being posted at Zamanes, about six leagues to the south of Salamanca, obtained a brilliant victory over a considerable French army, lately com manded by Ney, but now under general Marchand. But advancing to Salamanca, he was defeated at Alba del Tonnes, with immense loss. A similar fate befell the army of La Mancha under general Areisaja, which, at tempting to penetrate to Madrid, was attacked at Ocana, and routed with the loss of 40,000 muskets and all its artillery. Thus, at the close of 1809, (a year never more perhaps to be paralleled in Europe for an opportunity of union against its common enemy), Spain witnessed the successive dispersion and defeat of her principal armies. Her supreme Junta still edited addresses full of pom pous language, and confident expectations ; while their measures were for every practical purpose, either torpid or mischievous. Two circumstances indeed took place, from which a change in the character of their measures wasexpected,—the admission of the Marquis Romana into that body, and the arrival of the Marquis Wellesley as ambassador from Great Britain. But neither of these characters were able to instil into the Junta any portion of their own energy. The Marquis Wellesley only gained their tardy and reluctant consent to one import ant point, viz. the meeting of the Cortes. The 1st of January 1810 was fixed for their convocation.