The session of parliament was opened on the 2fid of January, 1810. In his majesty's speech, although it was acknowledged that the principal ends of the expe dition to the Scheldt had not been attained, it was confi dently hoped, that advantages materially affecting the security of the kingdom would be found to result from the demolition of the docks and arsenals at Flushing. The expulsion of the French from Portugal by his ma jesty's forces under the conduct of general Wellesley, now created Lord Viscount Wellington ; the late victory of Talavera ; the spirit of unanimity displayed by the Portuguese ; and the confidence reposed by their regent and their local government in our alliance ;—these, as well as the assembling of the Cortes in Spain, were sub jects of congratulation in the royal speech. The inter course between his majesty's ministers and the Ameri can government, was stated to have been suddenly and unexpectedly interrupted ; but the hope and desire of renewing friendly relations with that country, were strongly expressed. In the course of the debate upon the address in the lower house, the chancellor of the exchequer boasted, with considerable triumph, over those who had prognosticated the ruin of our trade from the effects of the orders in council; that the exports of the last year had not only exceeded those of the preced ing, but of any former year in the most favourable period of peace. The exports of the year ending in October 1809 were greater, by seven millions, than during the most abundant years of trade and peace, and by ten mil lions than any preceding year of war. On the 27th of the same month, the commons resolved to institute an inquiry into the policy and conduct of the expedition to the Scheldt: The inquiry continued till the end of March. As the apology for the expedition, offered in the royal speech at the opening of the session, viz, that advantages affecting the security of the kingdom had resulted from demolishing the docks and arsenals at Flushing, was little calculated to satisfy the public mind, ministers were not only foiled in their attempt to preclude enquiry, but obliged to make a long and labo rious defence of the measure. Lord Porchester, in moving a resolution of censure upon ministers, express ed his full conviction that no blame was imputable to either the military or naval commanders. The resolu tion, he contended, was preposterous in its objects. un dertaken, not merely without regard to the insurmounta ble difficulties that lay in the way of those objects,* but against the predictions of the best naval and military authorities which had been consulted. Nothing but de feat could have been augured. The disappointments had been regularly traced, and distinctly foretold. Ad verting to the evidence which had come before the house, he stated, first, that of Sir D. Dundas, who, early in the summer, had been questioned as to the chance of success in an attack upon \Valcheren. Sir D. Dundas, though. unwilling to give an opinion, where sufficient information was not afforded, had spoken of Antwerp as a strong town, capable of standing a regular siege, at least till the whole force of France and Flanders could be poured upon the British ; and urged Lord Castlereagh to consider the delay and disparity of force, which might make the expedition ruinous and disgraceful. The next evidence was that of General Calvert, who had warned the war minister, that the movements of our army must be subject to many impediments, and that the sieges of the towns must at all events occupy a period sufficient to allow the collecting of the whole Dutch and Flemish garrisons to overwhelm our few troops, through that most difficult country. Colonel Gordon,when consulted on the business, had concluded by declaring, in the most impressive and decided terms, that the enterprize was one of the most desperate nature. General Broderick's evidence established the conclusion which had been de rived from the former authorities. General Hope, upon maturely weighing the whole matter, decided upon it, that the attempt would be full of hazard, likely to do much mischief if it failed, and little good if it succeeded ; and leaving us this consolation in not making the at tempt, that nothing of serious advantage was lost by our leaving it untried. Of five military authorities that were consulted, four were directly adverse, and one unfriend ly to the plan. Lord Castlereagh, (said the noble mover of the censure,) appeared as if he had asked for advice only for the purpose of acting against it. Ministers had formed a plan for attacking Antwerp, and for the cap ture and destruction of the French ships, arsenals, and depots; yet it was not until after orders were given to prepare the troops for this service, that they had begun to arrange a plan of operations for making good their entrance into the Scheldt. The passage to Cadsand was indeed forced ; but how was it forced ? The gallant Captain Hanchett of the Raven had declared, that the shells of Flushing came aboard of his ship, while the round shot of Cadsand went through her ; and Sir Rich ard Strachan had told them farther, that the ship was crippled and stranded. Against Antwerp, disposed as our forces were, we could have brought only 17,000 men. Was the French empire so low in respect to mi litary resources in this quarter, a quarter where the channels of communication are so numerous, as not to muster an army from Flanders, from Holland, Westpha lia, from the vicinity of Paris itself, sufficient to over whelm so small an army ? Only 17,000 men, of all our farce, could have ever been brought to attack Antwerp, (setting aside all consideration of Fort Lillo, and of every obstacle to their advance upon Antwerp.) and yet it had been declared that 40,000 men were requisite to besiege Antwerp. Antwerp, according to the plan of Lord Castlereagh, was to have been taken by a coup de main ; but in the event of an assault proving unsuccess ful, the object was to be attained by bombardment. With regard to the coup de main, Lord Chatham had urged, in his own vindication, that to carry the place by a coup de Main, was impracticable. The same was the opinion of General Sir W. Erskine, whose professional knowledge, displayed in his examination at the bar, had excited the admiration of the house, had stated, that having been at Antwerp in 1794, he knew it to be secure against a coup de main, and that in one week it might be put in a situation to stand a siege. Sir W. Erskine, too, had mentioned his doubts respecting the expedition to Sir Richard Strachan, and by him they had been report ed to Lord Castlereagh before the expedition sailed. It appeared that all the predictions of the former officer had been verified. Sir Eyre Coote, the Marquis of Minify, General Calvert, had all agreed that the assault of Antwerp was either hazardous or impracticable.
From these facts, supported by evidence before the house, and from a minute survey of the diffuse and di vided plan of operations given in toe separate instruc tions of the commanders, Lord Porchester affirmed, that the enterprize, if not impracticable in itself, was at least rendered so by the bad arrangements of its contrivers. The pestilence, which had so frightfully destroyed our army, he said, was known to professional men, and must have been known to ministers. Was it forgotten what our troops had experienced from the climate of Wal cheren in 1794? and yet the season was chosen for ope ration when that pestilence was known to be most fatal. After it was known in September, that there were 8000 sick in Waleheren, lying without medicines, without blankets, and without shelter, the most fatal delays had occurred in relieving the misery of our army. Ile was not disposed to lay all the blame of that delay on go vernment ; but when Lord Chatham relinquished the ulterior objects of the expedition, why had not the army been recalled from that scene of death and contagion, whilst it could be called an army? We were not to be told that Walcheren was to be kept as a military position, because it would cost more to retain it than it was worth, because our frigates could not remain at any time in the Veergat, Ter Teer being within the range of the ene my's shot and shells. The population of Britain could
not supply the waste of such a position. Why had ministers been so callous to the sufferings of our brave men, while the country so deeply sympathised with them ? Intelligence of the calamitous state of the troops was received on the 2d of September. On the 8th Lord Castlereagh resigned ; and on the 17th Lord Liv erpool's letter for the recal of the army was dated ; but the whole of that period which should have been em ployed in arrangements for saving the lives of our sol diers, was consumed by ministers in their disgraceful squabbles for office. The last defence of the expedi tion to which his lordship alluded, was its acting as a supposed diversion in favour of Austria. All the evi dence in behalf of ministers to this effect, was the opi nion of Colonel AIosheim ; who could state no other ef fect which it produced, than the return of two or three battallions from Louvain. It was known before the ex pedition sailed, that the defeat of the Austrians had de cided the fate of the campaign, and the fate of the Aus trian war. And this was the moment chosen to speculate in diversions, when France had every where a force completely adequate to the defence of every part of her empire.
Lord Castlereagh, in reply, acknowledged, that he could produce no formal opinions directly in favour of the expedition ; but he had had a variety of conversa tions with military judges on the subject, which were so satisfactory, that he took the king's pleasure on the sub ject on the 14th of June, though the measure was not finally decided on till the 21st. He contended, however, that it was not necessary for government to protect it self, as to the policy of an expedition, by the previous sanction of military authority. lie appealed, if the ex pedition to Buenos Ayres was adopted on previous mi litary information. The expedition, planned by thr great Lord Chatham, against Rochefort completely fail ed : The officer to whom it was entrusted had an im pression that it would not succeed, and applied for a srecffic plan of operations. Lord Chatham re plied, that it was for government to judge of the policy of the plan : it was for him to look to its execution, and to judge of his measures from contingencies that might arise.
In answer to all the objections that had been urged against the expedition on the score of policy and delay, he a ould maintain, in the first place, that it could not have been sent out sooner, and that no where could it have been employed so advantageously. Some thought it would have been employed more advantageously in the peninsula, others in the north of Germany. Both parties reprobated its being employed in what they call ed a selfish object. It was our duty to send an army to the opposite coast, even though it should not be able to make a considerable advance from it. Four days be fore the expedition was determined on, government re ceived news of the battle of Aspern ;—were they not justified in sending an army to the continent, when the fate of the world depended on what was passing on the Danube ? The battle of \Vagram which followed, ad verse as the result of it was, shelved the person at the /read of affizirs in France the danger of committing his crown to a second struggle. The issue of the combat was known to his majesty's ministers only the day be fore the expedition sailed. To prove that the expedi tion operated a diversion in favour of Austria, it was not necessary to show that troops were sent from the Da nube to oppose it, it was sufficient if he could skew that troops were prevented from joining the at may in Moravia ; but it was a fact, that though no troops were sent from the Danube, the garrisons of Custrin, Glogau, and the other fortresses in Silesia, were concentrated, and sent into the north of Germany to oppose it. As to sending the expedition to that quarter, in the first instance, no thing could have been more unjustifiable. In the first place, it would have been necessary for them to create an army in the north of Germany ; and were they afterwards to disgrace themselves by abandoning our supporters in that quarter ? But although the object of the expedition was not selfish, he was content to defend the single object of obtaining Walcheren. The value of the place, in the opinion of our ancestors, had been proved in many cases. In the time of Queen Elizabeth it was retained. In 1747 it was also kept possession of. It had, indeed, been retained by many different ad ministrations, and relinquished rather on grounds of military interest than medical inexpediency. The un wholesomeness of the climate of 'Midterm, was not, however, to be imputed to him, as involving the fate of the whole army ; it could, at most, only concern that part of it which was destined to the island itself, and did not involve that part which was destined to Antwerp, a place comparatively healthy. A hope had indeed been entertained, that the ultimate object of the expedition, the seizure or destruction of the ships at Antwerp, might have been effected before they got above that city, or even under the protection of Lillo. This hope was frus trated by one of those chances of war, which it was im possible to foresee, and for guarding against which no ministry could be responsible. The question then was. whether the advantages naturally to be expected from the expedition, were to be put in competition with the risk ? The effects of disease had proved greater than even medical men expected. Government had acted on the best possible information. The enemy had, at the latest, a force of only 30,000 men in that quarter. We had, including seamen, 43,000 men to act against Ant werp. It was confidently expected, that the navy would be able to co-operate against the place. General Sir NV. Erskine had thought, that it could not be taken by a coup de main; but, with deference to that officer's opi nion, he conceived it to be outweighed by what he con ceived to be better authority. The fortifications of Ant werp had not been repaired since the days of the Duke of Parma. It was the opinion of Sir D. Dundas, that Antwerp might be reduced by bombardment like Copen hagen,—the latter city had out-works, Antwerp had none. The time spent before Copenhagen was ten days; Antwerp should have been reduced in half that time. In June, it is true, the enemy were said to have 20,000 men in that quarter ; but the insurrection in the north of Ger many, the ferment in Holland, the general spirit which arose in Europe from the news of the battle of Aspen), immediately after obliged the French to reduce that force to No effort appeared to be made for the defence of Antwerp, till the arrival of the British armament. We came upon them by surprise. If evi dence, amounting to mathematical demonstration, were always to be required to justify military enterprizes, what bold or great designs %would be undertaken ? there would be an end to enterprize, to the brilliant achieve ments which had raised the fabric of British glory. It was not on this cold principle, that Nelson ventured to attack the Danes at Copenhagen, or that Wolfe ascend ed the heights of Abraham. If such enterprizes were to be sanctioned by official calculations, he would say, that the glory of the British empire was at an end.