It would be frivolous to occupy much time in examin ing a theory so ridiculous. It could scarcely, one would think, have drawn the attention of the Sidneys and the Lockes to its refutation. Vet, however easy the task, it will not appear unworthy even of such men, when we consider the bias of the times, and the impression which Filmer's book appears to have made upon the public mind. The philosopher and the patriot felt alike indignant at the insult which had been offered to their country ; and the employ ment of their talents upon a subject so far beneath their powers, they deemed a sacrifice well due to public virtue.
As Filmer had found it expedient to have recourse to the standard of public faith for the arguments by which he had supported his system, so the writers, to whom we have just alluded, found it necessary to resort to the same stand ard for the arguments by which they were to overturn it. They denied that there was any text of scripture that as serted a right of absolute fatherhood, or unlimited paternal jurisdiction in Adam ; but, on the contrary, maintained, that neither Adam, nor any other man, ever had a right to any further paternal jurisdiction than was necessary for the protection, improvement, and welfare of his children, dur ing those years of minority when they were unable to pro tect, improve, or provide for themselves ; and that this pa ternal jurisdiction was more properly termed parental, since it implied duties that belonged equally to Eve, and every other mother, as to Adam, and every other Father,— the nature of the duties requiring such common jurisdic tion. Second, The jurisdiction granted to Adam over Eve, could not be understood to mean a political jurisdiction, or the right of life and death ; but merely such a right of eon troul, as, in matters regarding their coin inon interest and pro perty, would enable the husband, in the event of opposite opinions, to decide, and so prevent that endless contention which would arise, had no superior authority been confer red upon either. Third, As the donation which God is said to have given to Adam of the earth, with all the animals upon it, is nowhere to be found in scripture, so, had it been given, it could not have been absolutely and exclusively, but only so far as his own use might require,—it being ab surd to suppose, that God would give to one man an ex clusive right to what, from its extent, was infinitely beyond his power of enjoyment, and would, at the same time, call other rational beings into existence, who should be at this favoured person's mercy for a foot of ground to stand up on, or a morsel of food to support life. But, fourth, Al though Filmer had succeeded in establishing these pre mises, it did not follow that such absolute rights were to descend to his next heir. If it did so follow, who was his next heir ? for God has neither by scripture, nor by human reason, pointed out a natural and invariable line of succes sion in the person of any individual. Granting however this also, it was still incumbent on Filmer to spew, not only that the patriarchs possessed this absolute authority, and that they possessed it from Adam through this invariable line, but that it has also come down from them to modern kings through the same invariable line,—an attempt, which only requires to be stated to evince its extravagance. But still,
granting even this extravagance, there must be only one legitimate monarch in the woi Id, only one king who reigns jure divino, derived in this direct line from Adam, and all the rest must be usurpers and interlopers, against whom every honest man and sound Christian should raise his arm, never to be pacified till all the nations of the globe should be reduced to the arbitrary and exclusive dominion of this lineal descendant, and true heir of Adam ! These writers having thus demonstrated the absurdity of this theory jure divino of Sit Robert Hiner, they conceiv ed it necessary to substitute another, more friendly to liber ty, and more consistent with truth. They proceeded, ac cordingly, to point out what they regarded as the only foundation and just limits of legitimate government ; and this, they maintained, was the consent of the people.* That the consent of the people, they contended, is neces sary to all legitimate government, seems not to admit of argument; for the very notion of such a government im plies the notion of a contract between those that govern and those that obey. By what other right, or upon what other foundation, can any form of goveritnent which is to be regarded as legitimate, that is, binding upon the people to preserve and obey it, be either originally established, or afterwards exercised ? Various other fout.dations of legiti mate government, indeed, have been pointed out and de fended ; but all of them appear to be sufficiently irrational. The doctrine of the right of conquest, where such conquest has been occasioned by the repeated and aggravated hosti lity of the party conquered, is perhaps the least exception able. But besides that the arbitrary form of government established in consequence of conquest, involves the inno cent with the guilty, it is a punishment disproportionate to the crime. The victor, in such a case, has no other right than to indemnify himself sufficiently fir the injury he may have sustained, either by former provocations, or the actual war. He can only demand compensation for the past, and security for the future. And this he may, in most instances, sufficiently obtain, by making it a losing bargain to his ene mies to offer him injury. This loss, indeed, must be pro portionate to the circumstances of the case ; but no case can be figured, where it ought to amount to absolute authori ty on the part of the conqueror ; that is, to slavery on the part of the people. A few captives taken in actual war may be reduced to that unhappy state, where the law of retaliation, and only where such law demands it ; but no national offence can infer the punishment of national sla very. It is possible to imagine cases, where security for the future may require the conquered to submit to the government of the conqueror ; but such government can not be legitimate, unless it be as free as is compatible with that security.