It would seem, therefore, they argued, that the doctrine of the consent of the people, as forming the only foundation for legitimate government, requires only to be sufficiently explained, in order to be acknowledged.
This consent they conceived to be of two kinds. First, that which is implied in consequence of certain acts of the people ; and, second, that which is direct, and expressly conventional.
First, The greater part of the governments, as well ancient as modern, to which the epithet of legitimate can with any propriety by applied, have been of the first des cription. They have all been originally constituted, and afterwards exercised, in consequence of the implied con sent of the people ; an implication by no means doubtful in its nature, or feeble in its conventional effects ; but, on the contrary, more generally, as well as more powerfully binding, perhaps, than that consent which is direct and express.
These governments have been the same in their origin, and similar in the first periods of their progress ; but, for the most part, sufficiently varied in the subsequent and concluding eras of their history. At first, the savage who roamed the desert, was at once the father and supreme civil governor of his family. Convenience, and the ties of blood, soon united a certain number of families into a tribe, village, or horde. The same natural sentiment of confidence and respect, which had impelled the children of a family to admit the father's authority, impelled the several families of the same tribe or village to admit, in time of peace, the authority of those individuals amongst them, who were most celebrated for wisdom and experi ence; and, in time of war, of that single individual who was most renowned for his martial skill and achievements. But as war among rude nations (alas ! in more civilized periods also) ever occupies milen more of the public attention than peace, and as, from its nature, there can be only one supreme leader at a time, sufficient opportunity is then afforded him of acquiring a greater share of public respect, and of being regarded as of greater national importance, than those individuals in whose authority he is only a sharer in time of peace. Hence the consideration which
the leader or king, in civilized as well as in rude periods, acquires over the other individuals of the civil administra tion, whether that consist of a stmate, (as it comes after wards to he termed.) a popular assembly, or both. This leader or king, as well as the other members of the civil administration, are not, in the earlier periods of the his tory of political government, expressly elected by the con curring voice, by the majority, or by any other avowedly conventional act of the people. Their experience, their wisdom, and their virtues—such virtues as men in those ruder periods can understand and admire—invest them with authority, and render them the natural objects of respect and obedience. The people soon perceive the beneficial effects of submission, and, by a thousand dif ferent acts, testify their concurrence in a government so naturally formed, and so advantageously administered. As the king, or any of the other rulers, dies, or from any other cause becomes unfit for discharging the duties of his sta tion, another, of similar accomplishments, succeeds him by the same natural means, and receives the same natural obedience. For obvious reasons, the successor is com monly the immediate descendant, or intimate friend, of the deceased, unless a striking deficiency of capacity disqualify him. As the ideas, however, of property extend and im prove, and as other alterations take place in the progress of society, men come to acquiesce in that hereditary suc cession to civil authority, for which kings and rulers now begin to struggle. The people perceive its tendency to exclude rival and tumultuary pretensions to power, and, in this respect, soon actually experience its advantageous consequences. Their original acquiescence is confirmed by their voluntary obedience, and their acknowledgment of the legitimacy both of the constitution, and of the admin istration, of the government, is sufficiently declared by their reiterated acts of co-operation, as well in forming as in executing the laws, and in modifying, when necessary, the form itself of the civil polity.