1. It would be improper to say that so candid a mind, as Mr Flume's is represented to have been, has intention ally sophisticated the doctrines of Locke, or that so great a philosopher was not always eager to discover truth, whether it agreed with his own political opinions or not. Yet we cannot but think, that the careful peruser of Mr Locke's bock, can have no difficulty in reconciling the passage in question to the " general practice of mankind." For it is most obvious, as well from the whole scope of the work, as from the undeniable and notorious nature of the facts themselves, that Mr Locke could never mean to deny the actual existence of absolute monarchy in the world, or that the supreme power in a state did not often actually take part of a man's property without his own consent, or that of his representatives. It is plain that he only meant to affirm, that absolute monarchy was incon sistent with such a state of society, as, from its internal security, and the innumerable advantages thence arising, might with propriety be termed civil ; and that the supreme power in a state could not lawfully take any part of a man's property without his own consent, or that of his represen tatives. Indeed, the opposers of this doctrine seem always to have taken it for granted, that its advocates maintained its applicability to all the different governments which have ever actually appeared in the world. Neither was Locke nor Sidney so little conversant with the history of mankind, as not to know the various sources of fraud and violence, from which political establishments had, in point of fact, too often proceeded. All that they meant to affirm was, that no government could be regarded as law ful, that is, exercising its functions upon any obligatory principle, where the unequivocal, though it might be tacit, consent of the people actually existing under it, was not interposed.
2. It is true, that in none of the instances in which the consent of the people was most directly exercised, did it arise from the universal suffrage, or even, perhaps, from a fair and totally unbiassed majority of the people. It is sufficient if this conventional consent was given in as per fect a manner, or as nearly so, as the nature and structure of human society will admit. An abstractedly perfect ex pression of the popular consent is impossible. Nor can they be accused of supporting an illusory principle, who would rest the legitimacy of government upon that consent of the people which is expressed by such a majority as, from the very nature of society, it is reasonable to expect, or practicable to obtain.
3. We grant that it is impossible, in every instance, to ascertain the precise period when this consent of the peo ple may be considered as fully and unequivocally express ed, or to distinguish between that apparent consent which a tyrant or usurper may exact, and that which is voluntary and free. But the principle is not, therefore, the less real. Pirates, or banditti, may seize a man's person, and carry him into captivity. In that situation he may find it his interest to serve his masters with alaci ity and zeal. Yet nobody would thence infer, that the authority exercised over him was lawful, or that the assent which he gave to it was voluntary and free. None will deny, that those un happy men who, in different parts of the world, exist in a state of slavery, have a right to revolt whenever they can ; yet, from the circumstances of, their birth, and the manner in which they have been brought up, this right is but im perfectly understood by many of them, and perhaps, for the most part, not recognised at all. But that it belongs to them, is not the less certain. The case is the same in reality, though not in degree, with any people whose gov ernment exists otherwise than by their consent alone. The neutral observer may be uncertain, whether or not they are a free people, and they may themselves have employ ed little thought upon the matter ; but that the right, not withstanding, to adapt the government to their own views of national felicity is inherent in them, seems unquestion able.—Again, though it be impossible, in most instances, precisely to fix the period when the national consent may first be regarded as fully and unequivocally expressed in favour of the government, yet, when it is once actually interposed, little doubt of its reality can exist. It may safely be affirmed, that the government of the American States is free ; that is, that the people are sensible that it is co-existent only with their consent, and that the obligatory nature of its acts proceeds from the same source. The like, for a similar reason, may be confidently affirmed of our own government. That the governments of Spain and Turkey are not free, may as safely be affirmed, since it is impossible that this consciousness of consent can, in these instances, exist on the part of the people. We may add, that it is precisely for this reason that these governments seem ready to receive any new form, and that so many of the governments of Europe lately expired without one po pular effort to save them.
It will not, we apprehend, be alleged, that, after all, this principle of the consent of the people is of little in fluence in the actual conduct of nations, and that men, for the most part, submit to their respective governments, and regard them as lawful, from habit, prejudice, or edu cation. It would be difficult, we readily admit, to estimate,
with any precision, the effects which the principle has pro duced, either in ancient or modern times. But from what source, we would inquire, did all the energy of the Greek and Roman character, in the best days of these states, pro ceed ? Whence was each individual conscious of a degree or political importance, of which most modern nations seem to have little conception ? It obviously arose from the con viction with which every man was impressed, that not only each act, but the very existence of the government, de pended, in some measure, upon his individual concur rence. It was this conviction that made him proud of his country : it was the principle that incited him to every ef fort for her prosperity, or exposed him to every danger for her glory. Nor in modern times has the principle been altogether inefficient. The policy, indeed, has prevailed of discountenancing it as much as possible ; and as most of the feudal governments of Europe arose in utter viola tion of it, so their subsequent aim has been to suppress it as seditious and criminal. Yet it is to this sentiment chiefly, as the unfailing and copious fountain of all her exertions, that our own country has so long owed, and still so emi nently maintains, her splendid distinction among nations. The latter periods also of the history of America and of Europe afford eventful instances of its more general dif lusion, and seem yet to support the hope of its further progress. It does not appear idle, therefore, to speculate upon this principle. Let us, besides the example of out own political institutions,—of which when it ceases to be the actuating spirit, they will cease to be worth 1.reserv ing,—expressly divulge its nature and effects. Let us impress it on the general mind. We shall thereby create a perpetually living motive to liberal action, which, in pro portion as it is diffused, will controul despotism, and ex tend the triumphs of liberty.* But as those philosophers who overturned the system of Filmer erected another in its place, did Mr Hume and his followers offer, in their turn, a substitute for that which they had opposed ? We think not. In comparing the his tory of that great writer with his Political Essays, it is not easy, we believe, to discover any distinct and consistent principle, by which he would try the lawfulness of any form of civil government. At one time, he would seem to have regarded as legitimate every government which was once established, and, from whatever motive, acqui esced in by the people : a doctrine which appears to lead, without any circuit, to the encouragement of usurpation, and the exercise of tyranny. At another time, he appears to have reposed in the very principle he had been combat ing. " The observation," says he, " of our general and obvious interests, is the source of all allegiance, and of that moral obligation which we attribute to it. What ne cessity, therefore," he continues, " to found the duty of al legiance or obedience to magistrates on that of fidelity, or a regard to promises; and to suppose, that it is the consent of each individual which subjects him to govern ment, when it appears that both allegiance and fidelity stand precisely on the same foundation, and are both sub mitted to on account of the apparent interests and neces sities of human society." The interests which are here meant, must be those advantages which appear to the mind of the people as well worthy of preservation ; and, consequently, their adherence and consent to the govern merit from which these advantages proceed, or by which they are protected, is implied; since, were they to with draw this consent, the government would become preca rious, or actually perish, and with it, consequently, those interests for whose sake alone they had formerly support ed it. The question, therefore, in this case, seems to re solve itself into the mere propriety of the appellation by which the principle has been distinguished ;—a point of too little importance to merit consideration. Call it the consent of the people, or a sense of their own interests, it is of no consequence, provided they be made sufficiently sensible that there can be no legitimate government that is not established for their good, and co-existent only with their opinion that it is so.
Tne philosophical scepticism in which Mr Hume indul ged, necessarily arose, perhaps, from the very nature of several of the subjects upon which he employed his ex quisite powers ; yet we need not extend the remark to the principle we have been considering. It would seem to lie too near the surface, to elude a penetration much fee bler than that of Mr Hume. In fact, at the time that phi losopher wrote,• a coalition of parties was the wish of every good man in the community. The friends of the exiled family were still numerous in the nation. A junto favourable to their interests had recently been discovered in the cabinet itself; and a rebellion, countenanced and supported by the power of France, had actually broken out for the put pose of restoring them to the throne.