52. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WORLD WAR. The participation of Great Britain in the World War, in August 1914, has been ascribed to causes so diverse that it seems advisable briefly to describe the chief events which brought it about, and to leave the reader to form his own conclusions. Geographical and commercial factors brought the German Empire, founded in 1871, into rivalry with Great Britain. The British Isles lie athwart the path of Germany to the Atlantic, and their emigrants had occupied large portions of the earth's surface long before the Germans ac quired their first colonies (1884). Since that date Germany has annexed 1,123,078 square miles of colonial territory, or at the rate of more than 37,000 square miles a year, without incurring serious risk of war. Both Gladstone and Lord Salisbury approved her colonial ex pansion, which proceeded most rapidly in the years 1884-1900 when she possessed a very small navy. As the Free Trade policy of the United Kingdom and its dependencies favored the growth of Germany's commerce (even after 1879, when she began to penalize British im ports), it is clear that the islanders were not actuated by jealousy of her commercial ex pansion.
That rapid expansion failed to satisfy the ambitions of Kaiser William II and his people. Their triumph over Austria in 1866 and France in 1870 fostered the belief that a more thorough preparation would ensure to them a far grander future, and they came to regard themselves as cooped in, while the easy-going British, the *decadent" French and the badly governed Russians had a disproportionate share of the earth's surface. These views were in culcated by the German Navy League, the Pan-German League and similar bodies. Party strifes in England and France and political corruption in Russia these peoples, while the prestige and power of Germany steadily rose. She had secured the alliance of Austria in 1879, of Italy in 1882, of the King of Rumania in 1883, and an Entente with Turkey in 1898. Despite the Franco-Russian alliance of 1891-94, her position in Europe was supreme. In January 1896 William II an nounced Weltpolitik to be her paramount aim; and in 1898 he secured the passing of the first Navy Bill, which, during the fierce Anglopho bia of the Boer War (1899-1902) was sup plemented by a more ambitious Navy Bill (1900). The new German fleet was not ready until 1904, otherwise an Anglo-German con flict might have broken out during that war. In 1901-02 the British government sought to frame an alliance with Germany, as also with Japan, chiefly on questions in the Far East. The Berlin government repelled those ad vances; but Japan welcomed them and signed the treaty of 30 Jan. 1902, which ended the period of England's "splendid isolation.* Count Reventlow* and other German writers approved the rejection of British offers of friendship because the interests of the two empires were divergent, and Germany could not tie her hands by a treaty which might limit her colonial and naval efforts.
Already German aims were centred on the Near East. In November 1898, soon after Kitchener's victory over the Mandists at Omdurman, William II visited Constantinople and Damascus, and at the tomb of Saladin, solemnly promised ever to befriend the "300, 000,000 Moslems" of the world. In 1903 the results of the visit materialized in the plan of the Bagdad Railway, which assured to its German promoters large mining and other rights along its course. Together with its branch southwards to the Hedjaz and Mecca, it promised to assure Teutonic supremacy in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Syria and the Sinai tic Peninsula, besides facilitating military ac tion against the Suez Canal and on the Persian Gulf. Dr. Paul Rohrbach declared, in a later edition of his book 'Die Bagdadbahn' (1911) that the railway would enable the Central Em pires and Turkey to attack England in Egypt with every hope of success. We may note here the later utterances of German writers of repute. Professor Hettncr, 'Die unsere Weltpolitik) (Berlin 1915i , says "Such a policy [alliance with Turkey opens the way to Egypt and Persia and t rough the Persian Gulf (where England's supremacy must be broken] to the Indian Empire and surrounding lands." Dr. Freiherr von Mackay Vierbund,' Stutt gart 1916) : "The foremost direction for the blow to be struck by the new Quadruple Al liance is known. Its point is defined in the phrase 'Ostend-Bagdad.' It is directed against Britain's supremacy of the seas and the chain of naval stations connecting the North Sea with India.* Professor Roloff ('Eine map tische Expedition,' Giessen 1915): "Even if the British escape catastrophe in Egypt, their occupation of that land will bring them little profit and less peace of mind if Turkey emerges from this war rejuvenated and strong.* Vela ((Die Zukunft der Tiirkei,' Leipzig 1915): "The motive which inspired the friend ship with Turkey was identical with that which inspired the acquisition of Heligoland.* Even
in 1903-04 Germany's Oriental policy aroused alarm in Great Britain and France. Possibly it prompted, certainly it facilitated, the conclusion of their Entente Cordiale in April 1904. The maintenance of their interests in the East was clearly more important than persistence in out worn jealousies respecting the Newfoundland fisheries, Siam, Egypt, etc. Thus, Germany's naval and Oriental policy produced what may be termed the Diplomatic Revolution of the 20th century, the two western powers burying the hatchet and becoming fast friends. The German government and press admitted that that Entente was not directed against Germany; but the Kaiser soon sought to dissolve it, e.g., by his melodramatic intervention in the Moroc can affair. (See MOROCCO, HISTORY). As his landing at Tangier and his declaration for the independence of the Sultan of Morocco occur red very soon after the Russian defeat at Muk den, he evidently sought to make capital out of the weakening of the Franco-Russian com bination. The Morocco question became for a time a uMachtfrageb (trial of strength). Finally it was referred to a General Conference of the Powers at Algeciras (spring of 1906), at which Germany's highhanded action met with no support except from her "brilliant second,* Austria. Indeed, it helped on an Entente between those former rivals, Great Britain and Russia (August 1907) ; for they, no less than France, were threatened by the recent development of Austro-German policy in the East. Russia, after her defeat by japan, was in a position of marked in feriority to the Central empires in respect to armaments. Great Britain and her new friends had also felt deep concern at the persistent refusal of Germany, and the general refusal of Austria to listen to proposals of arbitration and limitation of armaments put forward at the Peace Conferences held at the Hague in 1899 and in June 1907. The first Conference, held on the invitation of Tsar Nicholas II, had led to no definite result, owing chiefly to the opposition of Germany; but the other states, ri in general, agreed to the principle of those proposals and most of them have since framed treaties of arbitration. In the years 1906-07, Great Britain invited Germany to agree to a plan for limiting naval construction; but despite the retarding of the British naval pro gram during the discussions, the Berlin gov ernment declined to restrict its program. Equally discouraging was its attitude at the second Hague Conference. Armament having dangerously increased since 1899, the repre sentatives of nearly all the sovereign states there assembled again affirmed the need of limiting the growth of armies and navies. The Conference also extended the powers of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, established in 1899, hut failed either to found a permanent Court of Arbitral Justice or to draft a general and uniform Arbitration Treaty which all states should pledge themselves to adopt. The chief opposition came from Germany and Austria. Germany also led the opposition to the British proposal prohibiting the use of drifting mines at sea. (For the attitude of her military and naval circles toward these conferences see the section entitled °Utopian and Intrigen im Haag" in Reventlow's work already named). Further efforts by the Cambpell-Bannerman Min istry in London to frame a friendly agreement with Germany met with failure and the British naval program of 1909 reflected the widespread alarm caused by the rapid growth of the Ger man navy. That growth was accelerated by the German Navy Bill of April 1912 (coincident with a new Army Bill equally alarming to France and Russia) which provided that, by the year 1920, the German navy should consist of 41 battleships, 20 armored cruisers, 40 unarmed cruisers, 144 destroyers, and 71 sub marines. This force, concentrated almost entirely in the North Sea and the Baltic, would consti tute a serious threat both to Great Britain and Russia. Mr. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, had again proposed a °naval holi day"; but, his offer being declined, he pointed out in a memorandum to the Canadian govern ment that in 1915 Great Britain would possess 25 dreadnoughts, 2 Lord Nelsons and six battle cruisers, as against 17 dreadnoughts and six battle-cruisers for Germany; and the margin of safety would thereafter diminish for Great Britain. This ominous situation became darker owing to the failure of Lord Haldane (q.v.) during a visit to Berlin in the spring of 1912, to arrive at a friendly understanding with the German chancellor, except on terms which would bind Great Britain to absolute neutrality in nearly every conceivable case. Lord Haldane could not consent to tie Britain's hands in the rigid way demanded by the German govern ment.