The murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, by two Bosniac Serbs at Serajevo, on 28 June 1914, is wrapped in mystery. After a strangely long interval, Austria, on 23 July, accused Serbian officials of complicity in the crime and proffered de mands incompatible with Serbia's independence. An acute crisis at once arose; for the Germans and Hungarians of the dual monarchy de manded war with Serbia, °the little brother,' whom Russia, the big brother," was in honor bound to protect. Faithful to the law-abiding and pacifist procedure adopted by him in 1908 and 1912-13, Grey at once proposed that Great Britain and France should moderate the actions likely to be taken by Russia, while Germany and Italy sought to assuage the anger of Austria. Thus only could a war be averted, first be tween Austria and Serbia, secondly between Russia and Austria, thirdly between Germany and Russia, fourthly between Germany and France, with danger of involving Belgium and Great Britain. The two systems of alliances or Ententes had helped to preserve peace in 1908 and 1913; but, if war began in any quarter; those alliances were likely to make it general — a consideration manifest to every statesman. The Austrian note of 25 July to the Austrian Ambassador at Petrograd indicated that, if Russia drew the sword on behalf of the Serbs, she would meet both Austria and Germany in arms. Von Tschirsky, German Ambassador at Vienna, stated that his government was °back ing up" Austria; and this provocative attitude of the Central Empires was certain to embroil them with Russia and her ally, France. The German Chancellor, Bethmarin-Hollweg, and the, Foreign Minister, von Jagow, have de clared that they always worked for peace. Certainly their attitude was more pacific than that of the Crown Prince, Tschirsky, and the Kaiser's military advisers. Possibly they all hoped to overawe Russia in 1908-09 and 1912 13. If so, they were playing with fire. The present crisis touched the honor of the Tsar more closely. He is reported to have said on 25 July, °We have stood this sort of thing for seven years; this is enough.' France accepted Grey's proposal to seek to assuage Russia and Italy agreed to try and calm her ally, Austria; but on 28 July (the day after the return of Kaiser Wilhelm to Berlin from a yachting cruise) Germany refused to entertain Grey's proposal; and on that same day Austria de clared war on Serbia. We may note here two facts: (1) Italy (conscious of Austria's aggres sive designs on Serbia in 1913), soon declared that she would remain neutral in the war brought about by the provocative conduct of her allies; (2) Grey, on 25 July, declined the proposals of Russia and France to declare his complqte solidarity with them in the present dispute. His refusal has been sharply criti cized; but it proves his extreme caution and his reliance on pacific procedure at that date. Fur ther, his action facilitated the independent and neutral attitude now adopted by Italy. A warlike attitude adopted by the British govern ment must have compelled Italy to side with her allies.
After the declaration of war by Austria on Serbia (with the approval of Germany) events marched rapidly. Very early on 31 July there appeared at Vienna the order for a complete mobilization and this almost certainly preceded a similar order by Russia on the same day. But the two empires continued to negotiate and on 1 August seemed not unlikely to reach a settlement. But on that day the German gov ernment demanded that Russia should demobi lize within 12 hours, otherwise it would mob ilize. (It had already ordered the preliminary steps known as Kriegsgefahr). Compliance with the German demand would have left Rus sia unready in the face of the complete readi ness of Austria and the almost complete readiness of Germany. On Russia meeting this demand with silence, the Kaiser declared war on Russia late on 1 August. His last note contained the statement that he °had under taken in common with Great Britain the oart of mediator" between Austria and Russia. This tribute to the peaceful policy of Sir Edward Grey is in one respect incorrect. Grey had requested him merely to restrain Austria and this he had not done. Germany's attack on Russia was certain to embroil France; but the Kaiser's declaration of war on France did not reach Paris until 3 August at 6:45 P.M.
Until then the British government could not have taken definite action, though Mr. Asquith had declared the outlook to be °extremely grave." In fact, the first sign of hostilities in the West came at Berlin on the night of 29 July. After an imperial council meeting held at Pots dam on that evening, the German Chancellor asked Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador, whether Great Britain would remain neutral in case of a European war, if Germany promised to take no land from France (he would not pledge himself about the French colonies), and also to restore the independence of Belgium in case a French menace to that kingdom compelled Germany to invade it. Neither Goschen nor Grey assented to these °infamous proposals," to use Mr. Asquith's phrase. Discerning danger for Belgium, Grey on 31 July requested both Germanyl and France to declare that they would respect her neutrality, as they had cove nanted to do by the fundamental treaty of 1839. (See BriztUns). France at once agreed; Ger many sent an evasive reply. Accordingly on 1 August Grey informed Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, that °if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant, while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public opinion in this Lichnowsky then asked whether Great Britain would remain neutral if Germany respected the neutrality of Belgium, but Grey declined to bargain about a matter on which Germany had pledged her faith and when Lichnowsky suggested that Ger many might perhaps guarantee the integrity of France and her colonies, Grey declined to follow him on a path so different from that which the German Chancellor had marked out. Grey resolved to keep his hands free, doubtless because the German government, during the Haldane interview at Berlin in the spring of 1912, had sought to tie the hands of the British government in all eventualities likely to arise. Lichnowsky informed the German government on 1 August that "Grey returned again and again to Belgium's neutrality and was of the opinion that this question would play a great part'— i.e., in deciding British policy.
It is clear, then, that the Asquith cabinet. in its meeting on the morning 1 August had come to no definite decision and was inclined to wait on public opinion. On Sunday, 2 August, Grey assured M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador, of succor from the British fleet (held in readiness since 27 July) if the German fleet attacked that of France or her coasts. This promise (conditional on the sanction of Parliament) resulted from the recent arrange ment whereby the French navy retained its chief strength in the Mediterranean, the British nayy concentrating mainly in the North Sea, the English Channel and the Atlantic. And it is almost certain that war with Germany would sooner or later have arisen from this promise if Germany had carried matters through accord ing to the plans of her general staff, which im plied the °smashing' of France. But the rup ture came owing to another incident in the °smashing° policy. Late on 2 August the Ger man government demanded from that of Bel gium permission to send its troops through that country on the pretext that France had violated Belgium neutrality. Early on 3 August the Brussels cabinet denied that France had been guilty of any such act, protested against the German demand and asserted its resolve to resist to the uttermost. King Albert also telegraphed to King George, requesting help from Great Britain as a guarantee of Belgian neutrality. Thereupon the indecisions of the British cabinet ended and in the even ing sitting of Parliament on 3 August opinion (except among a small minority) pronounced strongly for the maintenance of the British pledge to Belgium. Grey's ultimatum of 4 August, drawn up in this sense, met with a decided refusal at Berlin, the Chancellor in his excitement exclaiming that England was going to war "just for a scrap of paper'; while Zimmermann, Under Foreign Secretary, said that neither on that night nor on any night would Germany assent to the British de mand for Germany's withdrawal from Belgium. This defiant refusal by Germany to desist from the invasion of Belgium (a course still open to her) led to a state of war with the United Kingdom before midnight of 4 August.