Earlier on that day the Chancellor said to the Reichstag: °This is now for us a case of self-defense in time of necessity; and necessity knows no law (stormy applause). Our troops have occupied Luxemburg (cheers), and have perhaps set foot on Belgian soil (renewed cheers). That is against international law. . . . The wrong which we are doing we will try to make good again, as soon as our military goal is reached Strange to say, the German Socialists, with one prominent excep tion, that of Liebknecht, supported the gov ernment; and the enthusiasm with which the Reichstag greeted the news of the unprovoked invasion of Belgium, probably strengthened the resolve of the German government to proceed with that invasion, regardless of what Great Britain might say or do. The Reichstag and the majority of the Socialist members thereby made themselves responsible for the wanton attack upon France and Belgium in the course of a dispute, which as we have seen, originated in the Balkans and in the Oriental policy of the Central Empires. But it is equally probable that even if the Reichstag and the Socialists had opposed a war policy, the German govern ment would have adopted it owing to the im mense advantages which it then possessed over France and Russia in the matter of equipment and in general preparedness. After the Im perial Council meeting held at Potsdam on the evening of 29 July, the policy of Germany pointed to a rupture with both Russia and France and an invasion of Belgium. The "infamous proposals" thereafter made to Sir E. Goschen were supplemented on 30 July by Jagow's declaration to Goschen that Germany must begin her military preparations: "He re gretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, hut it would be a military necessity.' Everything shows that by 30 July the military party at Berlin gained the upper hand over the more peaceful Chancellor and Foreign Min ister — perhaps, we may add, over the Kaiser also. The unpreparedness of France (main fested during the debates of mid-July at Paris), the prevalence of strikes in the whole transport service of Russia and the seeming imminence of civil war in Ireland, presented a concurrence of opportunities which encour aged the war-party at Berlin to insist on a swift and crushing blow at Paris, so that France (in Bernhardi's words) could never again come across Germany's path. The oc cupation of Belgium and northern France would also give Germany a vantage ground for the "inevitable' settlement with the British, who (in the German program) were to re main distracted by the Irish feuds and labor troubles, until the day of reckoning arrived. With Antwerp, Ostend, Calais and Boulogne in German hands, that reckoning would have been ominous. But Germany overreached her self. In face of the obvious duty to Belgium, to France and to the British race, the divisions in the British cabinet, in the nation (for a time also in Ireland) vanished and the overbearing methods adopted' by Germany united the once loose compact of the Entente Powers into the finest alliance recorded by history.
German writers have blamed their Chancel lor for admitting that their invasion of Belgium was an international crime. Some argue that the German Empire was not bound by Prussia's signature of the Treaty of 1839, though in other and similar matters it has taken over her obligations. Other writers state that the Glad stone government in making a separate con vention with France and Germany for pre serving Belgian neutrality in the War of 1870, admitted the lapse of the Treaty of 1839. But the earlier treaty was fundamental to the ex istence of the Belgian state and the Conven tion of 1870 (in Professor Geffsken's words) did not impair the original treaty but rather applied it to the special emergency of the war of that year. Others, again, state that Bel gium's neutrality lapsed because of certain informal conversations (a word which the Ger man official organ distorted into which two British military attaches at Brussels had with Belgian officials in 1906 and 1912, with a view to concerting plans for the eventual dispatch of a British expeditionary force for the defense of Belgium against German in vaders. But such conversations often occur,
especially in lands threatened as Belgium was in and after 1906 by the new German strategic railways up to her eastern frontier; and such conversations do not in any way bind the gov ernments concerned. No was framed between Great Britain and Belgium, as German writers assert. Indeed, on both occasions the Belgian officials stated that Brit ish troops must not be sent without the con sent of Belgium. Britain did not despatch her ultimatum to Berlin on 4 Aug. 1914 until after the receipt of Belgium's appeal for aid. The procedure of both States was correct and refutes the German claim that Belgium was Britain's tool since 1906.
Other German publicists have asserted that the War of 1914 was altogether due to British greed and envy and was a °trade war" got up by the modern Carthage, which since 1904, had sought to encircle Germany and her allies. Whether England or any other state could °encircle a block of territory stretching from the North Sea to the Black Sea, from the Baltic to the Tyrrhene Sea can be decided by reference to the map; and a comparison of the relative freedom of British and German fiscal policy is also decisive on the question of a °trade war.) That Germany took up arms to vindicate the °freedom of the seas" against England's tyranny is now scarcely worth dis cussing. But these and other explanations of the cause of the war are focused in the fol lowing petition of many German professors and officials to the Chancellor, dated 20 June 1915: the sake of our own existence we must ruthlessly weaken her (France), both politi cally and otherwise economically and must im prove our military and strategical position with regard to her. For this purpose, in our opinion. it is necessary radically to improve oar whole Western front, from Belfort to the coast. Part of the North French Channel-Coast we must acquire in order to be strategically safer as re gards England and to secure better access to the ocean.° (After stating that German in terests and honor require the annexation of Belgium, Poland and the Baltic provinces of Russia, the petition continues) : must supplant the world-trade of Great Britain. By her blockade of Germany England has taught us the art of being a European power militarily and industrially independent of others. We must immediately seek to create for ourselves, apart from the Empire of the Seas, a continental commercial enceinte as ex tensive as possible. Our friends, Austria-Hun gary and Turkey, will open to us the Balkans and Asia Minor and thus we shall assure our selves of the Persian Gulf against the claims of Russia and Great Britain. . . . We need liberty of the seas, which was the real cause of the war between England and Germany. To obtain it we must Egypt, the connecting land between British Africa and British Asia — Egypt, which, with Australia, makes the Indian Ocean an English sea, which joins up all the British colonies with the mother coun try, which (as Bismarck said) is the neck of the British Empire. The Suez Canal will then be free, and Turkey will regain her ancient right. . . . From England, which has been so niggardly in men, we can never demand enough money, because England raised the whole world against us with gold.° This document (published in °Current History)) for October 1915), reveals the views of German ((annexationists)) on the origins of the war and the aims which Germany sought to pursue. It may finally transpire that that program (involving the destruction of Serbia in order to dominate the near East, and the occupation of Belgium and northern France in order to compass the ruin of Great Britain) formed the fundamental cause of the war.