The haughty attitude of Germany in these questions and in others soon to be noted, caused the more concern because it reflected the force ful doctrines inculcated by Nietzsche, Treitschke and Bernhardi. Nietzsche in his philosophic extravaganzas scoffed at Christianity for teach ing what he termed a "slave-morality"; whereas the °superman" would resolve to secure power over inferiors; and the new °tnagistral moral ity" would confer pre-eminence on the nation which aimed at the heroic life. Alexander the Great and Napolean the Great were his heroes; and his work, though non-political, popularized the idea of conquest over weaker peoples. Far more direct was the influence of Trenschke, whose lectures and writings in 1866-96 pro claimed the praises of the Prussia of Frederick the Great, Blucher and Bismarck. In turn Austria, France and England were his bugbears. Pointing to German triumphs and German effi ciency, he bade his countrymen overthrow the modern Carthage: °Our last reckoning, that with England, will probably be the most tedious and the most difficult." Then again he glorified war and scorned the "weary, spiritless and ex hausted ages which have played with the dream of perpetual peace." These teachings permeated German universities (and through them the schools) with a bellicose and Anglophobe spirit, which General von Bernhardi accentuated by his book 'Germany and the Next War' (October 1911). Scoffing at pacifists as vision aries, cowards or hypocrites, he bade Germany realize her true mission by war. °Might," so he wrote, °is the supreme fight; and the dis pute as to what is right is decided by the arbi trament of war. War gives a biologically just decision." Again,— °In certain circumstances it is not only the right but the moral and politi cal duty of the statesman to bring about a war." He regarded Germany's interests as fundamentally opposed to those of Great Britain, far less so to those of Russia, and he pronounced the Franco-Russian alliance as of doubtful solidity. °Therefore," he wrote, °we must square our account with France if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path. . . . Even English attempts at a rapprochement [to Germany] must not blind us to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of suc cess." It is doubtful whether these views were held by the majority of the German people, even in 1914; but they provided the governing and influential classes (well organized in the Leagues above named) with a fighting creed which at the crisis prevailed over the vaguer and less exciting creed of the German Progres sives. In Great Britain the definite triumph of the Liberals in the general elections of 1910 ensured a peaceful policy except in case of dire necessity.
Meanwhile the repose of Europe had been disturbed by crises in the Balkans and Morocco. In October 1908 Austria surprised the world by declaring that she annexed Bosnia, which she had occupied as the mandatory of Europe since 1878. Sir Edward Grey on behalf of Great Britain strongly protested against her action; so did France and Russia, likewise Serbia, which now lost her outlet seawards; but Germany stoutly supported Austria; and the Entente Powers and Serbia gave way (1909). In 1911 the internal crisis in Morocco became acute owing to the spread of anarchy; and when France took measures to protect the °special interests" which the Algeciras Con vention recognized as hers by right in that land, Germany intervened by sending a cruiser to Agadir (July 1). Sharp tension ensued,
especially after the declaration of Great Britain (4 July) that she must be consulted about any new arrangements in Morocco. This declaration Germany . ignored. Accord ingly, on 21 July, Mr. Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, publicly stated that Great Britain would not allow herself to be treated as °of no account in the Cabinet of Nations.' These words aroused heated demands in Ger many for war against Great Britain and France. The Berlin government, however, kept cool, bargained dexterously with France and by the treaty of 4 Nov. 1911 secured some 100,000 square miles of French Kongoland in return for recognition of the protectorate of France over Morocco and changes not unfavorable to German interests in that quarter. Again the German press indulged in orgies of Anglo phobia and Gallophohia, which the Crown Prince publicly encouraged. Perhaps a rupture would then have occurred if German finance had not been in a critical state and if the en larged Kiel-North Sea Canal had not still been imcompleted.
In the autumn of 1912 Turkish misrule in Macedonia brought Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, to a secret agreement; and, failing to bend the Ottoman government, they encountered its hostility in the autumn. The League soon defeated Turkey, but disputes about the sharing of Macedonia and East Al bania (fomented from Vienna) led to the fratricidal war of 1913, ending in the unsatis factory treaty of Bucharest (10 Aug. 1913), which left all the Balkans divided and enibit tered. The following facts challenge attention (1) the hostility of Austria to Serbia's efforts to reach the Adriatic, both in 1908 and 1912; (2) the subservience of Bulgaria and of the yqting Turkish regime to the Central Empires; (3) the triumph of Austro-German policy, which aimed at the disruption of the Balkan League; (4) the comparative helplessness of the Entente Powers when opposed to the Cen tral Empires, though these had but slight sup port from Italy (latterly engaged in a war with Turkey) ; (5) the certainty of further trouble in the Balkans owing to internal feuds and the southeastern thrust of the Central Empires, a thrust aimed primarily against Britain in Egypt but also threatening to the Asiatic interests of France and Russia. It is now known that in August 1913 Austria applied to Italy for help in a general attack by the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria and Italy) on Serbia; but Italy refused to share in so wanton an act of aggression. Germany also seems to have dis suaded her overzealous ally, probably because German armaments and the Kiel Canal were not completed. In April-June 1913 the German Chancellor applied to the Reichstag for a new • army bill, adding some 63,000 recruits a year and bringing the peace strength up to 870,000 men. A special finance bill of a very drastic kind was also introduced to meet the extra nonrecurring expense of nearly $265,000,000 and the extra annual cost of nearly $47,500,000, in volved by the proposed changes. The War Minister added that Germany wanted peace, but uif war came, she wanted to win.— The best parry is the lunge; the best covering force is the offensive.° Despite sharp opposition, both bills were passed. By midsummer 1914 the changes had taken effect; the military equip ment was complete, and the Kiel Canal, then re-opened, was available for the largest battle ships.