On 5 September Joffre issued his order com manding his men to engage the enemy. *I feel it my duty,* he said, *to remind you that it is no longer the titne to look behind. We have but one business on. hand— to attack and repel the enemy. An arrny which can no longer ad vance will at all cost hold the ground it has won and allow itself to be slain where it stands rather than give way.* All the comnaanders of armies were directed to assume the offensive.
Early on the 6th Maunoury struck von Kluck's exposed flank. One part of his army fell on the lone single corps on the Ourcq, and the other moved around to the north to cut the German's line of communication. Von Kluck, finding the British did not press his southern front, left his cavalry to hold them in check and with the remainder of his army hastened to the northern side of the Marne. Maunoury thus fotmd himself facing a superior army and saved himself only by the most heroic fighting. He was not crushed, as he might have been, and he punished von Kluck severely, forcing him to draw back to the Aisne after four days of heavy losses. General French followed von Kluck leisurely, pushing back the German cav alry, and crossing the Marne on the 9th, more than two days after von Kluck had crossed it Had he fought as vigorously as Joffre expected, his 100,000 men would have made the battle of the Ourcq a German disaster.
It has since been disclosed that the German armies aimed primarily at cutting off the French armies and not at taking Paris. This plan, von Kludc himself asserts, failed for two reasons: First, the crown prince kept urging a general advance, insisting that there were no French troops in Paris, and, therefore, that von Klerk, who was on the German right flank, was free from all danger. Consequently when 160,000 men appeared on von Kluck's right the latter with great courage, but they could not hold their Imes intact On the right they were driven back three miles and a dangerous gap was inade between them and the next army to the east. Their left had also suffered so much that it was merely able to hold its own. But the fighting had placed the Gertnans in a precarious position; for as their line stretched out to push badc his two flanks it became very thin in the centre. This was the situation on 9 September when Foch borrowed a corps from d'Esperey, who was relieved from immediate necessity by the retreat of von Billow. He placed this corps on his left flank, moved one of his own corps from tbat point and placed it opposite the attenuated German centre, held by the Prussian was left no choice but to retreat; second, the original German plan drawn in Berlin before the war called for an army of 2,000,000 to fol low the attacking army. That army failed to
appear.
Von Kluck's retreat left von Billow's right flank exposed and he also had to fall back, Franchet d'Esperey pressing him all the way across the Marne in a vigorous battle. Still farther east was von Hausen, before whom stood Foch with the newly formed 9th Army. It was here that General von Moltke had ex pected to brealc the French line. He did not relinquish his plan because of von Kludes with drawal to the Ourcq. Reinforcing von Hausen heavily he poured his ultimate strength against Foch, whose centre was at La Fire-Champe noise. The Frenchtnen took the punishment Guards. Then, late in the afternoon, he sent it forward against the Guards. It cut them through like a anife going through cheese. At the same time he ordered a general attack all along his line. The result was that von Hausen's army, cut through in the middle, broke into dis orderly flight, streaming northward. The French pressed on after them, .and followed them to the Aisne, the Duke of Wurttemberg and the German crown prince shifting their lines on the east, so that they kept touch with the retreat The battle of the Mame, as history has named this general engagement, was fought on a line 90 miles long, but within its scope were two encounters winch, in previous wars, would have been called great battles. One was on the Ourcq River, where Maunoury with 200,000 men met and fought off von Kluck with 300,000 men for four long days, until at last von Kluck, fearing to be caught on his southern flank, moved off on the morning of the 10th and left his adversary in possession of the field. The other was at La Fere-Champenoise, where Foch, after being beaten on each flanlc, cut through his opponent's centre at the moment of crisis and made a yawning chasm in the great German line. Joffre's plan was excellent, and all the French armies fought well, but it was Foch's genius that lifted the eng-agement from the level of a drawn battle and made it a great French victory. Of this general the commander in-chief said, in allusion to the work of 9 Sep tember, that he was athe first strategist in Europe" In the batde of the Mame the French fought with fierce courage, throwing themselves un stmtedly on their antagonists, who were better supplied with long range field guns and machine guns. Their light artillery, however, the 75's, proved their superiority, and without them the battle could not have been won. As it was, more than half of the 300,000 casualties were on the French side. But the battle was worth what it cost. It saved France from the heel of the conqueror. It saved Europe from passing under Teutonic domination.