6. The Battle of the Marne.—At the Oise the British obtained a day's rest. The Ger mans were nearly as tired as their opponents and needed respite from their heavy marching. The line then ran from Verdun almost straight to 'Guise, where Lanzerac's victorious army stood, and then curved through Saint Quentin until it came to Noyon. Behind it about 12 miles was a position through La Fere, Laon and Rheims, at which the French High Command had been expecting to stand against the invaders. Joffre visited General French on the 29th and talked over the situation. His conclusion was that it would be unwise to offer battle until the British had recovered from their recent trying experiences. Accordingly, he ordered all the armies to retire south of the Marne. From 30 August to 3 September the retirement went on, the Germans following and striking wher ever opportunity offered. The British proceeded to the Grand Morin, the French on the east placing themselves in a line that ran through Provins, Sezanne, Maily and Bar le Duc. Germans followed and were crossing the Marne at many places on 4 September. 'Their •rapid march into the heart of northern France to a line east of Paris itself gave them the assur ance of victory. Day after day strong cities fell into their hands; Lille, Peronne, La Fere, Saint Quentin, Noyon, Rheims, Soissons, Cha teau-Thierry, Chalons and many others. *Vic tory after victory i* ran the news back to the Fatherland. The German High Command thought the British crushed and the French so weakened :that only a stnashing blow vtas needed to finish them. It was at this point that a movement was made to deliver the smashing blow.
On 1 September von iChtek, on the western end of the line, was at Seals, north of Paris, and the German crown prince was west of Ver dun, 115 miles due east. In between were the armies of von Billow, von Hausen and the Duke of Wiirttemberg, in all considerably more than 1,000,000 men. On that day orders were given to draw the lines in. As the crown prune moved southward he veered to the west, and as von Kludc moved southward be veered to the east The result was that late on the 5th the line was only 90 miles long and proportionately denser and more powerful. This concentrated force was to be thrown on the French with the intention of breaking through at the centre and crushing the two wings in detail.
Two facts served to defeat this scheme: .(1) At the French centre was an army under Foch, newly constituted and ready to die in its tracks. Foch had saved the day at Morhange, and he was to save it several other times dunng the course of the war. It was a bit of extremely good fortune that he was at the critical point In the battle of the Mame; (2) Joffre had as sembled a strong army on von Kluck's right, unsuspected by the Germans, which was ready to play an important part when the proper mo ment arrived. It came into touch with the enemy on 28 August All the way down from the Sambre von Kluck knew a body of French reserves were operating off his right flank, but his cavalry took care of them, pushing them southward and occupying Lille, La Bass& and Amiens. When he heard of troops on his left after the 28th he thought they were of the same character. His mistake was very costly. This
6th Army, as it was called, numbered 100,000 on 5 September, and was led by Genera? Maun oury, one of the best French commanders.
It was 1 September that von Kluck veered eastward at Senlis. He crossed the Mame at Meaux and arrived at Coulommiers, 12 miles south of the river. The other German armies had kept touch on the east and stood, in gen eral, from 12 to 15 miles to the south of the Marne. The order, west to east, was von Klucic, von Billow, von Hausen, the Duke of Wfirttetn berg, whose lines ran across the river at Vitry le Francois, and the crown prince, whose lines turned northward to the west of Verdun. South of them stood in order the British, Franchet d'Esperey who had superseded Lan zerac, Foch, with his new army, De Lang* de Cary, and Sarrail who had superseded Ruffey and faced the crown prince, looking north westerly. Matmoury was within the fortlfiell area around Paris, and faced eastward.
On 3' September Joffre learned that von Kluck was trending eastward. Divining the purpose, and also seeing the opportunity it gave him, he decided that he must strike before the Gerinan concentration became effective. A blow against the German flank at this moment would fall as a disconcerting surprise, and if the whole French force struck at the moment the German commander-in-chief would not hare time to rearrange his line of battle.
The defenses of Paris itself were entrusted to General GalBeni, Oil old matt, but one of the best men among the older officers of France. He it was who discovered von Klucles east ward movement and told Joffre of it Next day the two men had a conference in Paris and a plan of attack was prepared. Von Kludc had left one corps, about 40,000 men, north of the Marne to protect his communications. It was proposed that Maunoury should fall on this force, sweep it back beyond the Ourcq River, cut von Kluck's communications and attack him in the rear. To enable him to achieve success it was necessary for General French to de liver a simultaneons attack on von Klucles ad vanced corps and thus hold them in their tracks south of the river, so they could not be sent to meet Maunoury. To carry out the plan it was arranged to reinforce Maunoury with troops from the city of Paris.
These arrangements made, Joffre and Galli eni visited General French and told him what was expected of him. French replied that he needed 48 hours tit get his army in condition for attack, an interval which would lrave en abled the Germans to proceed so far with their concentration that the plan would not have been feasible. Joffre had no authority over General Frenth and left him to co-operate to the best of his ability. It seems that General French was too much aggrieved over recent mishaps to attempt a hazardous movement in depend ence upon the French in another great manceu vre. Slow in action and hard to convince, he was not the man for the situation in which he fotmd himself. His removal from the chief command later on was partly due to the belief that he did not & all he could have done in the battle now beginning.