The attack opened on 18 Aug. 1917 with a violent artillery preparation along the whole line from Tolmino to the sea — the so-called °Ju lian front." General Cadorna's intention was to test or "feel" the enemy's front by general at tacks to find a weak spot; once that was found, the attack could be pressed hard with the ob ject of seizing one or other of the three key positions — the Austrian bridgehead at Tol rnino; Monte San Gabriele; and Hermada, spread over a line of 30 miles. During the night of the 18th the Italians constructed 14 bndges over the Isonzo and began crossing the river from Playa northward to Santa Lucia.
Their first rush on the 19th carried the front Austrian trenches the whole length from Playa down to the sea (25 miles). The main attack was delivered in the Carso Plateau heights, where alinost half of Austria's fighting strength was concentrated, composed mamly of Ruth enes, Poles, Czechs, Slovenes and Serbo Croats. Facing this force was the Italian 3d Army under the Duke of Aosta, while General Capello directed the 2d Army against Bainsizza. General Cadorna soon discovered the weak spot in the enemy's defense: it lay on the heights of the Middle Isonzo— the key position of Monte San Gabriele. A furious battle raged for over two weeks round that tnoun tain and on the Bainsizza Plateau. Monte Santo was captured by the Italians on 2/ Au gust; two days later the main centre of the battle shifted beyond Santo to the higher peaks of the Bainsizza Plateau; on a front of 12 miles the Italians had advanced about four miles. The Austrians under Gen. Borojevich von Bojna stubbornly contested their progress. San Gabriele fell to the Italians on 4 September; the fierce bombardment had reduced its de fenses to a "gruesome slaughter-house." There was less progress on the Carso front, where General Diaz captured the village of Selo; and in the Hermada region the Italians recovered some lost ground. Austrian counterattacks were beaten off and nearly the whole of the ground was held. From the beginning of the offensive the Italians had taken over 30,000 prisoners, while the enemy claimed 6,000. The Italian success had been considerable, but the collapse of Russia had prevented a decisive vic tory. Both sides settled down exhausted on the ground where they found themselves; from the Italian point of view, the situation appeared to be secure. It will be noted that all the battles on the Julian front were comparatively short ones, the explanation being that on such diffi cult terrain the human machine cannot long bear the strain demanded.
In the midst of imagined security, when not a few on the Italian side believed that the year's operations were nearly over on their front, there fell, like the proverbial bolt from the blue, that tremendous cataclysm which almost ruined Italy and the Alhed cause. It was lcnovm that German troops had arrived to rein force the Austrians, but the enemy's new strength had been underestimated; and besides, there were dark forces at work far. behind the
battle-line. The Italian Parliament met on 16 Oct 1917. Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War had assured the country that the Julian front was quite safe. The official Socialist party had wekomed the Papal Peace Note and demanded that "This winter no one must be in the trenches." Scarcity of food and domestic mismanagement were charges laid upon the government's shoulders. The premier was an old man of 80 and other mmisters had ex hibited little firmness in handling domestic mal contents. The soldiers at the front also had their grievances; general lack of education arnong the rank and file presented an ideal soil for the sowing of tares by Socialist and Bol shevik propagandists. The specious argument, "What are we fighting for? Let's go home," proved an irresistibk fascination Lor many war-weary but nevertheless patriotic soldiers. Nor is this spirit to be wondered at when the severe hardships they suffered are taken into consideration. The Russian army had given the example of throwing away their arms and refusing to fight.
The night of 23-24 October was dark and foggy on the Caporetto, where stood the 2d Italian Army under General Capello, who at the time lay sick with fever. A violent bom bardment from the Austrian side broke out during the night; in the storm of shells were some emitting a new kind of poison gas. In the morning of the 24th Cadorna realized what was coming. .Before the Alpini guarding the pass leading down from the Caporetto had recovered from the• surprise of the fierce but very. short bombardment, the German infantry, pounng down the pass at an extraordinary speed, were among them. The Italians were bayonetted in hundreds and the remainder of the troops at thjs point fled in panic. At Tolmino, farther south, whence the Austrians had never been driven from the west banlc of the Isonzo, they brolce through the Italian lines at the first rush. The left and right of the line held, but the defenses being ruptured at Tolmino and Caporetto, the whole 16-mile sector from Piece° to Tolmino collapsed in 24 hours. Here ensued, not a retreat, but a dis astrous rout; hundreds of guns and great quantities of stores were abandoned to the enemy. In the afternoon the enemy was across the river attacking the reserve lines; by the evening he was on the slopes west of the Isonzo. The struggle and retreat continued uninterruptedly throughout the 25th and 26th; on the 27th the German com mander, von Below, entered the Italian city of Cividale. In Rome the Boselli Cabinet fell on the 25th; the first news of the disaster arrived next day, while Signor Orlando was engaged in forming a new govemment. In 12 hours the Italians had lost the Bainsizza; it had cost 20 days' hard fighting to capture it. The Austro German avalanche increased in velocity on the 27th, and the only hope now left for the Italians was a possible stand on the Tagliamento, the Piave, or,-as a last resort, the Adige, involving a considerable sacrifice of home territory.