During a pause on the Isonzo the 1st Army in the Trentino made a swift attack in the mountains between the Adige and the Brenta. After driving the enemy up the,Tonale Pass on 10 June, the Italian infantry carried the Ag nello Pass on the frontier line due north of Asiago and captnred nearly the whole of Monte Ortigara east of Cimi Undici. On the 16th Italian troops advanced over the glaciers of Adamello, northwest of Lake Garda, and cap tured a stronglrfortified position 11,000 feet high on Corno Cavento.
An acute political crisis convulsed Rome during this ptnod, centring round the national war aims as they affected Italian claims in the Adriatic and in Albania. Italian troops had in June occupied Yaninat formerly a part of Al bania, but at this time mcluded m Greek Epirus. The object of the occupation was to assist the Allies in Macedonia, but the Greek government, still under pro-German .predominance, made a strong protest. The various questions were dis cussed in a 10-days' secret session of the Ital ian chamber. The Boselli Cabinet survived that crisis, but its position was precarious; there was a general feeling that it had failed in en ergy and foresight. Albania was declared by Italy an independent country under her protec tion, 3 June 1917.
To return to the Isonzo. By the end of May 1917 the Italian offensive had prospered, though scarcely up to the expectations of its promoters. A halt for rest was called on the 30th, when the weather broke and the battle had virtually died away. Prisoners to the number of over 15,000 had been taken, some 20 guns and a large stock of war material. Between Kostanjevitza and the sea the Italian tine had been advanced up to two and a half mites on a five-mile front; the Timavo was crossed and some obstructive marshes successfully passed, while a footing had been obtained on the slopes of Herrnada. But the heights around Kostanjevitza in the north and Hermada with its tunneled rocics still stood firm: thy two pivots of the Austrian line had not been shattered. Uneasiness prevailed among the Austrian High Command at the Italian suc cesses. A council of war was held at Laibach, from which an urgent summons for help was sent to Berlin. Men and guns were sent from the stagnant Russian front, but they arrived too late to influence the result of the battle. How ever, a great Austrian counterstroke was de cided upon. It opened on 1 June with a severe bombardment of the ridge of Fajti Hrib and in fantry attacks at Tivoli and the southern crest of Vodice. The fire grew in intensity and on 4 June the Austrians made an attempt to storrn Fajti Hrib with picked troops that won a foot ing inside the Italian positions. The Italians
charged, recovered the ground and annihilated the storming party. The enemy was checked, but the Italian new line was badly placed, and a few days later (5 June) the outposts were driven in and the right wing was forced back front the slopes of Hermada. A lull fell on the scene; the counterstrokes had cost the Austro Germans 24,000 prisoners and nearly 80,000 killed and wounded. The Italians now stood at the gates of Trieste — the edge of Hermada in the south and of the Bainsizza Plateau in the north, the key to San Gabriele and San Daniele in the Ternovanerwald. During the last days of August and the first week in September the Italian position on the Bainsizza was highly critical on account of imperfect communications. Fresh enemy battalions and batteries were con stantly arriving from disintegrated Russia. If the Austrians had now been able to attack the isolated force on the Bainsizza before it could prepare its trenches, there would have been every chance of success.
Great preparations were in progress on the Italian side for an assault in force on San Ga briele and the Bainsizza position. In that direc tion and over the Carso lay a possibility of breaking the Austrian resistance. Batteries and troops were requested from the French and Flanders fronts, but there the Allies were al ready cortunitted to extensive operations and could spare no infantry till those operations had been carried out On purely military grounds the French and British commands were obliged to refuse the Italian request; the centre of gravity lay on the Western Front, and any de feat that might have been inflicted upon Aus tria in the field would not have struck any de cisive blow at the power of the principal antag onist, Germany; while any weakening of the 'Western Front by withdrawing troops for op erations elsewhere was not unlikely to court dis aster. Italy was thus perforce left to her own resources and had to do the best she could with the material at hand. Russia was gradually dropping out of the war and a mighty German effort was to be expected on the Western Front The Papal Peace Note, which contained the phrase, "useless slaughter," was utilized by the "defeatist" sections to convey the impression among the Italian people that their propaganda was supported by the Holy See. Industrial troubles were spreading in big Italian cities; the government was vacillating and unpopular ; the land was full of pacifist talk and an insidi ous peace campaign was sowing discontent among the troops. A speedy victory in the field was imperative.