The rather easy advance of the Italians dur ing the first few months made it appear as though the Central Powers were willin* to let Italy seize the particular territory which she wanted from Austria, a quite logical conclusion, since, if Germany and Austria were defeated, Italy would *et that territory anyway; whereas, in the opposite case, Italy would lose the con quered lands again at the peace table. While the Italians maintained a more or less defensive attitude on the Trentino front, it was against the Isonzo line that their main efforts were concentrated. In that direction lay the road to Trieste, and Gorizia was the key to the situation, for it stood in the way of any real advance across the Carso (German, Karst) Plateau. Gorizia, furthermore, was a formid able entrenched camp defended by 200,000 men, and its flanking positions showed a width of over 60 miles. A steady pressure was kept .up during the winter along the whole line; Italian gains were made at several points, some thou sands of prisoners were taken, and 25 Austro Hungarian divisions kept employed. At the end of November contimious rains flooded the country and thick fogs paralyzed the action of artillery. But the Italians dominated the Isonzo from the northwest of Gorizia, so that the bridge-head at that place could no longer .be used as a starting point for an offenstve action by the Austrians. By the end of the year the Italians had taken 30,000 prisoners., five guns, 65 machine-guns, many bomb-throwing.mortars, thousands of rifles and much ammunition.
No outstanding events occurred on the Aus tro-Italian front during the first quarter of 1916. With the advent of spring hundreds of thousands of laborers began to arrive on the scene and were put to work under the engineers. This anny of brawny if unskilled labor repre sented the annual emigration from Italy to other countries. Under engineer supervision they built roads, light railways, barracics, bridges; they bored trenches out of the solid rocks, scooped underground galleries of im mense size and number, and constructed an elaborate system of aerial railways from pealc to peak along the mountain chains. Steam rollers and camions soon rumbled along the roads which some weeks before had been im passable for mud. Almost from the beginning of hostilities the Austrians had retired behind the Isonzo gorge, on the course of the river above Monte Sabotino. For two years this remained the general position, the Italians occupying the western bank of the gorge, the ridge of Monte Planina and Monte Corada.
Hostilities were resumed about the middle of March 1916 in the hill country. In the previous November a bold spar called the Col di Lana had been captured west of the Falzarego Pass by Italian troops under Col. Peppino Garibaldi, but the summit could not be held while the Austrians retained their foothold on the northern slopes. After three months of strenuous labor the Italians had cut a tunnel from which to blast the enemy from his position. Before the end the Austrians grew suspicious and began counter-mining, but in the wrong direction. On the night of 17 April 1916 the mine was sprung by the Italians, and what IA as left of the Austrian position was carried by the bayonet. The explosion formed a crater 150 feet wide and 50 feet deep. On 27 March the Austrians attacked in force the heights northwest of Gorizia, and with such effect that the Italian centre was driven in. The position was, however, restored next day by a counterattack and the enemy effort was not renewed here. During April some daring exploits were carried out by the Alpini on the great Adamello Glacier to the northwest of Lake Garda, where 300 Alpini left the Rifugio Garibaldi on skis, climbed the glacier by night in an Arctic snowstorm 10,000 feet above the sea, and drove the Austrians from the rocics in the early morning. On the 29th 2,000 Alpini followed the same route and dislodged the enemy from the main crest, thereby gaining a position on the flank of the Austrian lines in the Val Giudicaria. Throughout the winter the Austrians had heavily strengthened that part of the Trentino sector between the Val Lagarina and Val Sugana, and had brought powerful batteries to the Folgaria and Lavarone plateaus southwest of the city of Trent. The Italians,
though aware of the concentration, anticipated no more than a local attack. This sector was under the command of the archduke Charles, afterward Austrian emperor, who was preparing here one of the major offensives of the. war.
Between the two vals above mentioned, through which the Brenta and Adige rivers respectively flow, lies a comparatively small area with a frontage of less than 30 miles, where the Austrians had collected some 2,400 heavy guns, including 40 12-inch 'Skoda howitzers, and several German naval guns. About 350,000 men were here concentrated to tnalce a deter mined attempt to break the Italian line at this point and force a passage through the Alpine pealcs to the Venetian plain. While the Italians were devoting all their thoughts and energies to preparations for a new offensive against Gorizia and Trieste, the Austrians gave them a nasty surprise where they least expected any thrg to happen. It is probable that Austria wished to forestall the very offensive the Ital ians were planning, for on 14 May a violent bombardment from the Austrian side blasted a gap in the Italian front lines, which had to fall back in the centre. Austnan infantry were thrown forward on the 17th; the Italian moun taineers put up a series of gallant fights, but they were outmanned and outgunned. By the 18th they had lost valuable ground and many prisoners. A fierce resistance at' the southern end of the sector, at the Passo di Buole, how ever, saved the important strategical position at Monte Pasubio and prevented the crumpling up of the defenses and a probable Austrian dash through to the plains. On the 20th General Cadorna decided to withdraw his centre to a position well in the rear, a movement that was completed in good order by the 24th; but the Austrian rush did not permit the preparation of new defenses. By the 25th the Austrians were attacking Pasubio and Coni Zugna; and on the • 27th they were south of Galmarara, a tributary of the Assa on the left. Next day they occupied a mountain north of Asiago and the Italians evacuated that town. Two days later the Aus trians had driven a wedge between Pasubio and Arsiero along the river Posina still farther to the south. Eastward of Arsiero a terrific on slaught on Monte Cengio gained that position also for the enemy. General Cadorna had meanwhile brought up his reserves (the 5th Army.) to assemble in and around Vicenza and prepared for his counterstroke. The greatest danger at the end of May was in the Astico valley, where the Austrians had captured the rock summits of Pria Fora and Cimone, and were pouring through Arsiero down the valley itself actually on the level of the great plain. The Italians had been driven far back behind their prepared lines and had no trenches nor fastnesses in which to make a stand; they fought the invaders hand to hand and by des perate fighting thrust them baciF over the preci pices of Pria Fora. These actions saved Italy in the early days of June 1916. Arsiero was abandoned, and on 1 June an Austrian army order informed the troops that only one moun tain stood between them and the .Venetian plain. Within three days the Austrians w.ere only 18 miles from Vicenza and the trunk line. On 7 June Cadorna announced that the enemy offensive had been checked. The new army had been equipped with guns and on the 12th a counter-offensive began in the Val Lagarina and on the Posina-Astico front. On the 13th a violent struggle raged around the last Itahan position south of the Posina; the defenders lost 70 per cent of their men, and from the 15th to the 17th the Genoese troops on Monte Pau repulsed what proved to be the last of the great Austrian attacks. In the latter half of June the crisis passed; the Italians recoyered ground on the Asiago Plateau, while a timely diversion was furnished by the Russian victory in the Bukovina and the great British offensive on the Somme in France. What advantage Austria had gained on the Italian front she had more than lost on her own territory in Galicia. General Cadorna now began to dis patch men and guns back to the Isonzo front, m preparation for the great attack on Gorizia. Here we may leave them for a short space while we trace the activities of the Italian navy.