The political situation in Italy deserves a pa.ss.ing notice. On 10 June 1916 the Salandra nunistry. was defeated, having lost touch with the nation, and was succeeded by a cabinet formed on national lines by the veteran states man, Signor Boselli.(q.v.), who retained Baron Sonnino in the foreign office. The new minis try was strengthened by the accession of Signor Bissolati, the Socialist reformist leader, who was the head of an advanced section clamoring for a more vigorous prosecution of the war and especially demanding -war with Germany, which followed, as already stated, avo months later. During the aututnn and early winter the ex treme Socialists endeavored to bring about peace negotiations, for which German agents were assiduously working. They were strongly opposed by Signor Bissolati, who declared in the Chamber (13 Oct. 1916) that any state har boring thoughts of peace at that time would be guilty of an act of treason. ((The germ of war,* he said, ecan only be killed by.destroying Aus tria as a state, and by depnving Germany of every illusion of predominance?) Almost alone among the Allies, Italy had an avowed anti war and pro-German party to deal with. A mo tion in favor of immediate peace enoneered by a Jew of German extraction in the Chamber at the end of November was defeated by a majority of 293 to 47 votes, on which occasion the pre mier declared, eWe seek not the peace of a day, but the. peace of new centuries?) During the first quarter of 1917 little oc curred on the Austro-Italian front beyond oc casional raids and counter-raids, though intense activity prevailed behind the lines. The Aus trians had constructed some 2,000 miles of mili tary roads since the previous sununer between the Adige and Cadore. There was every indi cation that the Central Powers were meditating an offensive as soon as weather permitted, and it was the Allies' policy that Italy should strilce first. Though as yet no unity of command ex isted among the Allies, there was considerable more unity in the higher staff work than was generally supposed. General Robertson of the British army and General Foch's chief of staff, General Weygand, visited the Italian coin !waxier in March to discuss plans. Italy had meanwhile raised and trained new regiments, increased her guns and output of munitions and greatly strengthened her aerial arm. An Austro-German offensive was daily expected during March. and April; it was tfiought that another attempt would be made to put Italy out of the war altogether by a renewed drive throwh the Trentino. Between December and Mar, the. Italians had carried out extensive defen4e -works t'he Trentino, despite a se vere winter in the high mountains. But the ex pected attack was not, as we shall see, launched till the autunm. The Italian plan was to en ,gage the enemy on the whole Isonzo line frorn Tolmino to the sea by an intense artillery en gagement in order to keep him in doubt as to where the infantry were to be employed. By simultapeonsly showing vigorous actwity in the !Trentino the -enemy would be held off in that 'quarter. Cadorna's intention WiS tostrilce hard with his left on the Isonzo against the heights from -Santo to the north of Playa, and then, .when the enemy had concentrated his reserves : there, to deliver his main attack on the southern Carso toward Hermada. Artillery preparation began on 12 May, assisted by heavy British guns; by the morning of the 14th it had grown to immense fury; demonstrations were made at different points on a front of nearly 20 miles.
• The Austrian first-line trenches were blown out of existence by the cannonade; infantry raids • met little opposition from the dazed and shat tered Austnans. French batteries had also ar rived in the zone of Gorizia and the middle Isonzo„. had the unity of front been complete 'at that time, there might also have been some French and British divisions on the spot to take part in the drive on Bainsizza and thus have prevented the disaster that was to follow. But the German divisions came instead, while practically the whole of Austria's effective strength, some 960 battalions, were facing the Italians. Some 6,000 guns, mainly heavy and medium calibre, held a superiority of 25 per cent over the Italian artillery effectives. Al ready in June 1915 the Italians had forced their way across the Isonzo and secured a precari ous bridgehead at Playa. For two years they had held this position and extended it to in clude the hamlet of Zagora, a mile down the stream, on the lower slopes of Monte Kulc. It was this position which became the base for the offensive of May 1917. There had been uninterrupted fighting in this sector, but neither side could dislodge the other. Here the Aus trian trenches were only a few yards above those of the Italians on the precipitous sides of Kuk; there was only room for one set of barbed-wire entanglements to serve as a de fense for both sides. This remarkably close
proximity existed for nearly two years. An other wealcness of the bridgehead position was the fact that only one narrow road ran down from Verhoylje Pass to Playa bottom, and it was overlooked at a distance of less than a mile by the Austrian artillery on Monte Kul( Every thing that could-not be carried down to Playa by mules through the forest tracks had to be transported in full sight of the enemy down the exposed road. A second roadway had been constructed and was opened a few days before the offensive began in May 1917. The term 4bridgeheado implies control of that end of the bridge— in this case a permanent one—which is nearest to the enemy.
In the morning of 14 May a pontoon was thrcnvn across the river opposite Zagora, a lit tle farther downstream. The main effott -was directed on a five-mile front between Salcano, northwest of Gorizia, and Playa. Infantry ad vanced by the two bridges and stormed a hill east of Playa and the northern spur of Monte Kuk; Zagomita (an Austrian fortress) fell to one Italian brigade, while a Campobasso regi ment struggled up the slopes of Monte Santo. By nightfall the Austrian second line, 800 feet above the stream, held up the attack. Two bat talions of Berntglieri and Alpini surprised the enemy in the dark and forced a passage of the ,riyer near Bodrez, between Playa and Tohnino. where they organized a bridgehead and held tir ground. The attack was renewed all along the line at dawn; the northern and south ern summits of Mcrnte Kuk were captured; on Monte Santo the Italians were obliged to with draw; the result of the day's fighting gave the Italians the western gate of the Bainsizza Plateau, also Monte Vodice, and a wide range of observation over the enemy's communica tions for the front on San Gabriele. During the assault on Hill 174 north of Tivoli bybottte Italians, the Austrian batteries heavily barded the city of Gorizia from their hill posi tions and seriously damaged many of its build ings. On the first two days of the battle the Italians toolc over 3,000 prisoners, a mountain battery and 30 machine guns. The Austrians launched fierce counterattacks on succeeding days against Kuk, Vodice and the Central Carso position, but failed to dislodge the victors. Fresh Austrian batteries had been rushed from the Russian front and placed in position on the Carso; these were now shifted again to the north of Gorizia. The battle raged fiercely till 22 May, not only on tbe Isonzo, but in the Adige Valley and between Asiago and the Val Sugana, particularly around the Tooth of Pasubio, a rodc tower of the peak which was the key of the Italian line west of Asiago. The visa)! troop of Bersaglieri and Alpini which had L .-fsed the Isonzo at Bodrez was withdrawn on the 18th. Their little bridge had quickly been shattered and they were left on the ene my's side of the river with hundreds of pris oners and the stream behind them. On 23 May the 3d Italian Army under the Duke of Aosta struck on the Carso : The second act of the drama began. For 10 hours every available gun sprayed a torrent of fire, and in the afternoon the Italian infantry went forward. The enemy lines, cut in the solid rock of the plateau, were broken from Kostanjevitza (or Castagnavizza on the hill road to Trieste) to the sea. Jami ano and its surrounding hills on the road far ther south were also taken in the first day's bat tle, which yielded over 9,000 prisoners. Some 130 military and naval aircraft harassed the Austrians from the rear, while a squadron of British monitors bombarded the Austrian flank along the coast. VVhile the left wing of the Duke of Aosta's force carried out a demonstra tion from Volkovniak southward, tbe centre and right led the main attack, storming the Aus trian trenches south of the Kostanjevitza-Hndi Log road, and swept beyond Lukatic. Jamiano, Bagni and a number of low hills west of the mouth of the Timavo were carried by the bayo net. Deceived by the feint beyond Gorizia, the Austrians were completely talcen by surprise; despite the most determined counterattacics, they lost both their first and second positions the first day. By 26 May the Italians had reached the foot of Herrnada, a natural fortress 1,000 feet high, guarding the road to Trieste. The Austrians put up a brave defense and counterattacked at many points; they man aged to recapture a hill east of Gorizia, but lost it a few hours later. One effect of the Italian advance was to free Monfalcone from its daily bombardment by the guns of Hermada, for al though that fortress had not been captured, its chief batteries were now diverted in other direc tions.