The peace strength of the Turkish army was about 17,000 officers and 250,000 men, which could be raised to something like 800,000 if the necessary equipment could be provided. The soldier's pay was 25 cents a month and their families received an allowance of $1.20 per month. Enver Pasha was made commander-in chief and the German military mission under Liman von Sanders constituted the general staff. During the mobilization a process of °requisitioning') was resorted to under govern ment auspices, which consisted of officials enter ing stores and dwellings and seizing anything that captivated their fancy, giving in return some worthless paper °receipts.° Much of the stuff thus collected was sold again and re stolen by officials. A few of those plundered who had influence enough were fortunate in receiving at least a percentage of the value of their goods; by far the bulk— or its proceeds — went into official pockets, while the government appropriated the remainder. Ostensibly for mili tary purposes, the officers °even carried off women's silk stockings, corsets and baby slip pers') (Ambassador Morgenthau). In the 15 divisions of the regular Turlcish army raised to war strength there were some 300,000 men of all arms; this number was to be augmented by 10 more divisions. Though orders were later issued to raise the total to 50 divisions, it is doubtful if the Turks ever had more than 500,000 men in the field at any time during the war.
Her geographical position prevented Turkey from being of any direct assistance to Ger many, for the interests of the latter lay in Europe. 13ulgaria, Greece and Rumania were still at peace, hence there could be no attempt op the part of Turkey to regain possession of Thrace. Consequently, there was no room for an offensive in Europe nor any need of a de fensive. Italy being also neutral at the time, a descent upon Tripoli was equally out of the question. But Turkey was in a position to strike a useful blow against Russia in Trans caucasia which would divert troops from the Eastern Front; and against Great Britain in the Sinai Peninsula in an attack on the Suez Canal. This latter raove, it was expected, would pre cipitate the long-fomented uprising .of the Egyptians aad compel England to keep in Egypt the troops which were there in training— Aus tralians and Indians —and also, perhaps, to send further reinforcements from her slender reserve at home. The attempt, if successful, would cut the short route to India and might help along the uprising expected in that direc tion. Thus practically all that Turkey had to fear in the way of an attack was in the Dar danelles, the entrance to which had been strongly fortified by heavy Krupp and Austrian Skoda guns. But already in September 1914 the Brit ish government in India knew that Turkish agitators were at work on the northwest frontier preaching a jehad or holy war against the white infidels. Hence neither England nor Russia was talcen by surprise when Turkey was swept into the maelstrom of war. The Turkish — or rather Gertnan— plan was to strike against the Russians in the Caucasu.s and. cut off access to the oilfields; to send an expedition to Eg.ypt; and to seize Basra near the head of the Persian Gulf, where the works and pipe lines of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company— the liquid fuel store of the British navy — were sit uated. This oil concern, it may be mentioned, was formed in 1909 with the. object of working a concession granted in 1901 to a Mr. W. K D'Arcy for 60 years, with the exclusive rights to work petroleum deposits throughout the Persian Empire except in the provinces of Azerbaijan, Ghilan, Mazendaran, Asdrabad and Khorasan. In 1914, before the war, the British government had contracted with the company for the supply of oil-fuel for the navy. The total share capital amounted to $20,000,000; of this stun the government subscribed $11,000,000, thus con trolling the majority of votes in the company.
The element of surprise, from which the Turks and their allies hoped so much, proved a failure, for already on 2 November a British warship attacked Alcaba, at the head of the Red Sea, and a combined French and British squad ren bombarded the Dardanelles forts, which latter was not only a fruitless proceeding, but also served to put the Turks on their guard. Meanwhile, even before the declaration of war, two other items of preparedness for what they knew was coming had been brought about by Russia and Great Britain. A Russian column had crossed the Turkish frontier from the extreme northwest corner of Persia, and occupied Bay azid, near Mount Ararat, while other columns entered Kurdistan from the east in a movement upon Van. Yet more Russian troops were crossing the frontier from Erivan; they took the town of Kara Kilisse, but were held up by the Turks from penetrating farther into the country. The British were likewise ready in the Persian Gulf. The government of India
had s'ent a force to Bahrein Island in the gulf under Brigadier-General Delamain, and on 7 Nov. 1914 this force, composed of British and Indian troops, arrived at Fao, where a' Turk ish fort defended the entrance of the Shatt-el Arab, the estuary which unites the Tigris and Euphrates. Between those two rivers lies the land called Mesopotamia. Already in September the Turks had dispatched troops southward from Bagdad to prevent a hostile landing on the gulf ; by a forced march these had reached Basra about the same day that the British were disembarking men at Saniyeh, on the Turkish bank of the estuary, the other (eastern) bank being Persian territory. Here the British pre pared an entrenched camp and waited for the rest of the force to arrive. A skirmish with the Turks from 13asra occurred on 11 Novem ber; on the 13th General Barrett came up with the remainder of the Indian contingent. The main Turkish artny was reported on the 17th to be advancing in force from Basra, when General Barrett dedded to attack at once, a particular incentive being the fact that there were Europeans in Basra whose lives might de pend on the timely arrival of the British. Ac cordingly, the whole force moved out and reached Sahain, which was found to he de serted. British gunboats accompanied the ex pedition, steaming slowly up the Shatt-el-Arab on the right of the marching troops. After passing .Mohammerah, where the Karun also empties itself into the estuary, though from the opposite side, the Turkish army was found posted at Sahil, nine miles from. Sahain, with its left resting on the estuary and its right, where the artillery was concentrated, hidden in groves of date palms. Muddy open ground lay between the opposing forces. The weight of the British attadc was thrown against the Turkish left, where the gunboats were able to assist by enfilading the enemy's trenches; the right was to be held while the left was turned away from the river and in cidentally from the Basra route. The British troops had to advance in the open before a heavy fire which was badly directed and caused little harm. 13efore the attackers could reach the front line the Turks broke and fled, with the British in close pursuit The British casu alties were only 38 killed and some 350 wounded, while the Turks in their retreat lost over 1,000 men. The road to Basra now lay open. Part of the British force was placed on two river steamers headed for Basra, with gunboats steaming ahead. The rest of the troops were sent after the flying Turks so far as the diffi cult ground permitted. Below Basra the Turks had sunk three steamers in the fairway to pre vent the passage of the oncoming British. A Turkish battery posted to cover the barrier was quickly silenced and the obstructions speedily blown out of the water. The expedition, both on land and water, pushed rapidly ahead and entered Basra, which the Turks had evacuated, on 22 Nov. 1914. The desert column entered shortly after. The Turkish customs-house had been set on fire, the only building in the place which would have been capable of holding the military stores. So far, however, as lack of ma terials permitted, a base camp was prepared and set in order. On 3 December an Anglo Indian detachment was sent to Kurna, where part of the retreating Turks had established themselves. Three gunboats, two armed launches and an armed yacht conveyed the troops, who were put ashore four miles below Kurna, on the western bank of the Tigris, while the gunboats went ahead to reconnoitre. They found the enemy strongly posted with batteries covering the navigable channel, some 50 miles above Basra. The gunboats shelled Kurna and the troops advanced under heavy fire. C,olonel Frazer, who commanded, finally led his men back to the camp four miles away and sent a message to Basra for reinforcements, reporting the enemy too strongly situated. Gen eral Fry arrived with more troops and on 7 December the British captured Mezera, on the opposite bank, and drove the Turks across to Kurna. Next day a rear attack on Kurna was decided on. By a circuitous route the British had reached north of the city and prepared to attack. The same night, however, before the battle had even begun, the Turks asked for terms. Unconditional surrender was demanded, and the next day (9 November) the Turlcish garrison laid down its arms. The British took 1,500 men and nine guns. The advance to this stage had covered 120 miles from the gulf ; Kurna and Mezera, respectively on the western and caste' banks of the Tigris, were converted into entrenched camps. A wide re gion had now to be protet ved and General Bar rett had perforce to mark time until further re inforcements — then on the way—should ar rive from India. The first Turco-German project had failed.