In the neighborhood of Mount Ararat the frontiers of Russia, Turkey and Persia meet. Here the limits of Persia form a salient stretch ing into Transcaucasia, a corner which had fre quently been the scene of Russo-Turkish con flicts. The subsidiary' Russian operations in this region during November 1914, already re ferred to, died away toward the early part of January 1915. Meanwhile, a greater struggle had developed in Transcaucasia and on the Ar menian frontier. Three reinforced Turkish army corps had been concentrated at Erzerum during October 1914 under the command of Hassan Izzet Pasha. On the outbreak of hos tilities Enver Pasha, accompanied by a German staff, took charge of the operations. He had altogether about 150,000 men; opposed to these was a Russian army under General Vorontzov composed of about 100.000 men. A weird con glomeration of races, cree,ls and languages ex ists in Caucasia, wilere -ome 70 dialects are current and where Turk and Russ had been at grips for centuries; indeed it is doubtful if that region ever enjoyed any long spell of peace since Noah's ark settled on Ararat. To reach the theatre of war the Russians had to traverse difficult mountains, passes and river beds. The movement now to be described was— to Rus sia— rather a secondary operation; prudence advised a defensive until the severe winter was over. This, however, was not the plan of Enver Pasha, who had formulated an ambitious and skilful campaign to be carried out at once. The great fortresses of Kars and Erzerum, situ ated about 50 miles on each side of the fron tier and consequently 100 miles apart, were the concentration bases respectively of Russia and Turkey in Asia. Enver Pasha's plan was to en tice the Russians over the boundary from Sari kamish and to hold them while his left centre executed a wide enveloping movement against Sarikamish, and his left made a circuit to at tack Kars in the rear, a form of strategy based on Gerrnan principles copied from Napo leon. The success of such a movement, how ever, depended entirely upon an accurate time table, according to which the participating bodies of troops could arrive at their specified objectives at the correct moment. Considering that the Turks would have to perform their evolutions across such obstacles as snow-clad mountains, through passes and over rivers, the chances of the scheme working satisfactonly were remote. The Russians fulfilled the first part of the Turco-Germas expectations during the first half of November 1914 by crossing the frontier from the neighborhood of Sarikamish and occupying Koprikeui on the 20th. They were thus well on the road to Erzerum. The llth Turkish corps was detached to do the Molding') part; the 10th corps was sent from north of Koprilceui to cut the road between Sarikamish and Kars; the 9th corps was to swing round between the 1Dth and llth; while the 1st corps, which had been landed at Treb izond on the Black Sea, was to strilce at Arda han and move on ICars via Alexandropol.
So far things looked promising and the Turks attacked on 14 Dec. 1914. Kopniceui was cleared of the Russians, who were driven badc some 10 miles to Khorasan; the 9th and 10th corps had struggled through severe weather and reached the road between Sari kamish and Kars by Christmas Day; the 1st corps had struck inland up the Choruk Valley across a pass 8,000 feet high during a blizzard and now looked down upon Ardahan. But the hardships endured by the three traveling corps had worn the men out, and when they arrived at their appointed. destinations they were half starved and short of guns and ammunition. General Vorontzov fell upon the 10th corps (28 December) and defeated it in a fierce four days' battle; he next turned upon the now iso lated 9th corps and almost annihilated it; the Turkish general, Iskan Pasha, surrendered vitith his staff (including German officers) after a gallant resistance. Duly, according to sched ule, the 1st sorps entered Ardahan on 1 Jan. 1915 exhausted. Two days later they were driven out again back to the Choruk Valley, in which direction the remnants of the flying .10th corps were also speeding. Meanwhile the llth corps drove the Russians back from Khorasan and Vorontzov was obliged to recall his troops pursuing the 10th corps and throw them into battle against the Ilth. This latter was also crushed after a three days' fight in deep snow, and by 17 Jan. 1915 it was retreating to Erze rum. The Russian right cleared the Chorulc Valley; Turkish transports escorted by war ships attempting to land troops and provisions at Trebizond were sunk by a Russian Black Sea squadron and the warships, Breslau and Hamidieh, were chased back to the Bosporus.
Thus ended the Turkish project in failure after three weeks of heroic struggle amid high mountains and deep snowdrifts, with a loss estimated at over 60,000 men. For a time, at least, Russia was secure from attack in the Caucasus.
The third item in the Turkish progrant fared no better than the two preceding. A suc cessful attack on Egypt could only be carried out by one of two means— by sea or across the Sinai Peninsula. The requisite command of the sea being absent, the only alternative was the land approach. Yet here certain difficulties stood in the way: to reach the canal involved crossing a waterless desert of some 100 miles. Three routes were possible, namely, along the coast from Syria, 120 miles, without water; the southern road, from the head of the Gulf of Akabah, at the head of the Red Sea, 150 miles, equally without water; and through the centre of the peninsula, where there was no road at all. Another serious problem would present itself if and when any one of the three routes had been successfully negotiated by an army. The Suez Canal, which would have to be crossed before a direct attack could be made on Egypt, pos sessed a virtue not usually associated with canals—it could accommodate the greatest bat tleships armed with the heaviest guns. The hope of a general uprising among the natives, however, seemed to outweigh this obstacle in the Turco-Gertnan view, and an attack on the canal was duly decided upon and prepared for. Politically the Sinai Peninsula is part of Egypt and has an eastern frontier line drawn almost straight from Rafa near the Mediterranean in a southeasterly direction down to the Gulf of Akabah, leading to the Red Sea. On the north ern coast, some 30 miles west of Rafa, an An glo- tian post was established in normal timAgge garnson of which was withdrawn in October 1914, when it was reported that a band of 2,000 Bedouins was marching on Egypt. Be yond a skirmish between the Ilikanir Camel Corps at Katiyeh, 26 tniles northeast of El Kantara, nothing happened on the peninsula till the end of January 1915, when small advanced parties of the enemy crossed by the north ern route and were driven back at various points. British airmen had the region well un der observation, so that a surprise was hardly possible. But these isolated attacks were merely feints to cover the advance of the main force destined to reconquer Egypt. On 2 Feb. 1915 the van of the Turkish army reached the covering sand dunes on the east of the canal on a front facing Ismailia. litre they deployed and waited till dark. Though stealthily carried out, these manceuvres had not passed unobserved by the British on the opposite bank at Toussoum. The Turks now attempted to launch a number of pontoons which they had carried across the desert with them, as well as rafts made of empty petroleum cans. Those engaged in this proceeding were simply mowed down with ma chine guns and their primitive floating apparatus were riddled with bullets and sunk as soon as they appeared. They brought some artillery into action during the night and early next morning the battle had extended from Ismailia to the Great Bitter Lake, a frotit of, roughly, 12 miles. Three British gunboats, an armed trans port and two French guardships took part in the fray, heavily shelling the enemy positions. Turkish fire fell off early in the afternoon; two columns of Indian troops were thrown across the canal and quickly cleared the sand hills, tak ing 600 prisoners. The rest of the Turkish army were in retreat, dragging their guns with them, leaving 400 dead on the ground. What happened to the shattered host of originally 12,000 men, with a waterless march of 120 miles before them, has not been told. By 8 Feb: they were more than 20 miles away from the canal, and on the 12th a big force of them was annihilated at Tor, near Mount Sinai. A Brit ish warship botnbarded the fort and govern ment buildings at Akabah and another British vessel took possession of the Turkish fort at She& Said, at the southwestern corner of Ara bia. The war had begun disastrously for the Turks. They had fought everywhere with their oldtime valor; badly led and worse equipped, they vainly starved and suffered like heroes. No further attempt was made on Egypt during 1915, but in July an unsuccessful effort was made to readi Aden.