The objects of the British campaign in Mes opotamia were to secure the neutrality of the Arabs, to safeguard British interests in the Per sian Gulf, to protect the oilfields and generally to maintain British authority in the East. We left the British force established at Kurna, 120 miles from the sea, awaiting reinforcements. These arrived in April 1915 and General Nixon took supreme command. The Turks lay on both sides of Basra, preparing for a new at tack. During January 1915 fighting had devel oped north of Mezera with a force of 5,000 Turks, and early in March an enemy army of 12,000 was located near Ahwaz on the Kanm, where a small British garrison was stationed to guard the oil pipe-line. A reconnoitring expe dition of 1,000 fell in with the enemy and was compelled to retire with considerable loss. It bec.ame apparent that strong forces of Turks and Arabs were gradually forming a circle around the whole of the territory in British oc cupation. On 12 April the Turks made a de termined attack on Shaiba, southeast of Basra, to recapture the latter place. By next day the enemy had gained a position north of the Brit ish front, from which they were dislodged by a bayonet charge. On the 14th the British stormed the enemy's trenches to the south, four miles distant, and drove the whole force, at least 15,000 strong, into headlong retreat, cap turing a mass of war material and prisoners, the former including automobiles and river boats. The fighting calmed down toward the end of April, but at the close of May the Turks again becatne active north of Kurna. Early in the morning of the 31st a British force surprised them, shelled and stormed their positions, and on 1 June the Turks fled in haste on steamers and boats, leaving their camps behind them. A British flotilla gave chase, captured some heav ily laden lighters and sank one of the steamers. On 3 June the British took Amara, a military station on the Tigris 75 miles due north of Kurna. The ejected garrison of Amara under Nureddin Pasha withdrew some 150 miles far ther up the Tigris to Kut-el-Amara, whence a river channel called the Shaft-el-Hai runs due south to Naseriyeh on the Euphrates, 100 miles northwest of Basra. This channel could be used by the Turks to attack the British rear at Basra, and it became imperative for the British to secure Nasariyeh and the river line thence back to Basra before advancing to Kut. In. July 1915 a British expedition under General Gorringe crossed the marshes from Kurna due west about 70 miles to Nasariyeh, where they found the Turks strongly entrenched on both sides of the river. Gunboats had meanwhile steamed up the Euphrates frotirBasra. A com bined land and water attack soon dislodged the enemy (25 .July 1915), who retreated up the Shatt-el-Hai toward Kut-el-Amara, which now became the next objective on the way to Bag dad. Early in August the British advanced on Kut-el-Amara, an undertalcing that began with a victory and ended in disaster.
It must be explained here that the Mesopo tamia campaign was carried on under the direc tion of the government of India. It was that government which had secretly dispatched front Bombay the first Anglo-Indian force to the Per sian Gulf early in October 1914 in the event of Turkey throwing in her lot with Germany. The general objects aimed at have been described. In three weelcs' operations Basra, the key to Mesopotamia, had fallen to the British at a small cost In view of this success the ecre tary of State for India (in London) gave his consent for the expedition to push on to Kurna. Though the force had meanwhile been doubled, it had only been provided with less than half its proper scale of medical equipment and the river transport was not sufficient for its require ments. General Nixon, the commander, was in structed (a) to retain complete control of the lower portion of Mesopotamia, comprising the Basra vilayet; (b) so far as possible to secure the safety of the oilfields; and (c) to submit a plan (I) for the effective occupation of the Basra vilayet; (2) for a subsequent advance to Bagdad. After much correspondence between India and England, the Secretary of State (Lord Crewe) sanctioned successively the ad Meanwhile, General Townshend was leading his division up the Tigris toward Kut He found the enemy, nearly 10,000 strong, waiting for him on a six-mile front on both banks of the river some seven miles below Kut. Gen eral Townshend's expedition consisted of about 11,000 Anglo-Indian troops and a few hundreds of British Territorials from Egypt The enemy positions were strongly entrenched and the,river blocked by booms. Three brigades under Townshend were led by Generals Fry, Hogh ton and Delamain. On 27 Sept 1915 the Brit ish made a feint attack on the Turkish right; Fry and Hoghton crossed the left bank of the Ti gris over pontoon bridges, the former attacking vance to Amara, to Nasariydi and to Kut-el Amara, or Kut, but no farther. The very day after the taking of Basra, 23 Nov. 1914, the
Indian goventment's political agent in Mesopo tamia, Sir Percy Cox, forwarded to India, after consultation with General Barrett, a rea soned proposal for such an advance, which was sent on to Lord Crewe in London, who, how ever, was not prepared to sanction it 6for the present? In accordance with his instructions, clause (c), General Nixon submitted a plan for an advance on Bagdad, which was forwarded to Sitnla (India) on 30 Aug. 1915, but it was not connnunicated to the viceroy (Lord Har dinge) or the Secretary of •State; and the com mander-in-chief in India, Gen. Sir Beauchamp Duff, wrote on the plan, 6Unless we can get bacic troops from France, Egypt, or elsewhere, I fear that Bagdad, invaluable as its capture woula be, is out of the question?) the Turkish centre the next day, while the latter with his own and Delamein's brigade made a wide detour around some marshes and fell upon the Turkish flank. In a few hours that flank was crumpled up; fighting was carried on un der a scorching sun; the British troops were parched for want of water and fatigued with 30 hours' marching and fighting. The Turks gave way and began to retire upon Bagdad, fol lowed by British cavalry and the river flotilla. A remarkable feature of the battle was the com parative ease with which so strong a position could have been carried with a little over 400 casualties on the attacking side. In two days Townshend held Kut, and the enemy was nearly 100 miles away by the end of the month. On 3 October, when Townshend was pursuing the TurIcs and had almost reached Azizie, 50 miles north of Kut, General Nixon wired to London, 61 consider I am strong enough to open road to Bagdad, and with this iriteittion I propose to concentrate at Azizie.° It seethed the general's idea was that ccmtained in the plan he had sent to India, namely, that he would follow the disorganized Turks into Bagdad. But, ovring to unsuitable and insufficient trans port facilities, Townshend was unable to over take and again defeat the Turks before they had time to reorganize in a new position at Ctesi plion. On realizing his inability to continue, he wished to return to Kut, but General Nixon still pressed his proposal on the government and ordered him to concentrate at Azizie. Mr. Aus ten Chamberlain had meanwhile (27 May) sue. ceeded Lord Crewe at the India Office and had followed the latter's cautious policy with re gard to the Mesopotamian campaign. He im mediately telegraphed to the viceroy that it was °imperative to stop the further advance of Gen eral Nixon's force.° Orders to this effect were sent to Nixon on 5 October, and the advance on Bagdad was, therefore, apparently abandoned. But a cabinet meeting in London on the 4th, the day before Chamberlain's wire, considered that cif forces available are sufficient to take and bold Bagdad, political reasons were thought to make its occupation desirable.* On the 8th Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed to India, cThe Cabi net are so impressed with great political and military advantages of occupation of Bagdad that every effort will be made by us to supply the force that is necessary. We do not wish to attempt it with insufficient forces.° In reply to a question as to what reinforcements he would need, Nixon gave his opinion that his present force would suffice to take Bagdad, but that he would require another division and one cavalry regiment to occupy the place perma nently. He also asked for more river craft. The general staff at the War Office decided that Nixon should have two more divisions, which would take sonic two months to reach him. Some cavalry, infantry and artillery w ere st nt up to Townshend, though by no means suffi cient for the attempt. In a dispatch to the viceroy on 21 October, Mr. Chamberlain added a warning that some 60,000 Turks might be concentrated at Bagdad by January, though only about 10,000 were in that district at the time. To this the viceroy responded that ((the right policy was to take the risk.* On 23 Octo ber the fiat went forth from London, clf Nixon is satisfied that the force he has is sufficient, he may march on Bagdad.° Unfortunately, the warning about the possible Turlrish concentra tion was not forwarded to General Nixon, be cause the telegram containing it was marked cprivate,0 and he was left in the dark on this most important point. On receiving his in structions to advance, General Townshend pro,! tested— an exceptionally rare step for a sol dier to talce. As subsequent events proved, both he and the cautious statesmerr at home were in the right; the government acted on what proved to be the nustaken advice of the eicperts. Far more important than additional troops was the question of transport, and that, it appears, was point overlooked by the mili tary authorities— the possibility of rapidly moving the proposed large reinforcements up river from Basra to Bagdad, a distance of BOO miles.