General Townshend had at his disposal about 15,000 men by this time,•but practically no re• serves to support. him, the remainder of the troops in the country being required to guard the %nes of communication, which were 290 miles from Kut to Basm, and would be pro 1 td to 500 miles if the expedition advanced to d. Besides this, his men were physi cally debilitated by- their previous strenuous fighting in the hot months, and Isis British bat talions were 30 per cent below strength. About one-third of the force were white.soldiers, Brit ish regulare and territorials; the rest were In dia= troops. A motley collection of paddle steamers, sloops and flat-bottomed punts formed the flotilla that was to accompany the expedition. British aeroplanes reported that the enemy was falling back on Ctesiphon, his last defense south of Bagdad. Although govern meat sanction to the sc.heme was given on 23 October, Townshend did not actually move for ward till the middle of November, a delay of six weeks, due to insufficiency of the river transport for the movement of supplies. More over, it was uncertain when the promised rein forcements of two divisions from Europe would arrive at Basra, from whence their trans port to the front must take weeks or even months. Speed was the prerequisite to success; Townshend was aware that if he could not fore stall the enemy the latter would most probably forestall him. During the concentration sup plies and transport animals had been sent up. Throughout the period of preparation fre quent skirmishes occurred with the Turks, who had pushed out advanced detachments to within seven miles from Azizie, where the bulk of the British troops had arrived by 23 October.
On 11 Nov. 1915 Townshend's cavalry bri gade and one infantry brigade advanced from Azizie and occupied Kutunie (14 miles) with out opposition, and by the 18th his whole force was concentrated here, together with his river flotilla. The advance was continued on the 19th, moving by both banks of the river ; after offering slight opposition the Turks fell back toward Ctesiphon, their stronghold. The Brit ish force on the left bank of thc Tigris reached 1.ajj on the 20th; that on the right bank and the boats arrived the following day, when both land forces combined on the left bank. The Turkish force at Lajj was attacked on the same day and driven out. It was evident that the Turks did not intend to offer any determined resistance, being content to let the British stretch their line of communications and tire themselves out until they should arrive at Ctesi phon, where the Turkish position was en trenched on both sides of the river. With the least possible delay Townshend pushed on to his goal, for he had learned only on the 17th that 30,000 Turks were on the march down from Anatolia, which would augment the enemy to more than 40,000. To meet this force there were barely 25,000 British troops in all Mesopotamia, including lines of communica tions. Already at Lajj the aeroplane scouts had reported, "they are coming on in thousands." For months the Turks had been constructing their defenses, consisting of an extensive sys tem of entrenchments forming tvvo main posi tions. The first line on the right bank ex tended from the river for three miles to the southwest, with the second line about five miles farther upstream. A continuous line of trendkos and redoubts stretched for six miles on the left bank, with a second line two miles to the rear, running parallel with the first for three miles, and then turning northward for another three miles to the Diala River. Be tween the two extremities of the first and sec ond lines on this side the Turks had formed up a straight line of reserves against a flank at tack, thus forming practically a square, with the Tigris as the right flank. A mile behind the second line a. pontoon bridge across the Tigris ccinnected the kft wing with the right on the other bank, while the Dials was bridged at two points near its junction with the Tigris, and these crossings were conunanded by entrench ments. According to reports Nureddin Pasha, the Turkish conunander, had over 13,000 regu lar troops and 38 guns; against these, plus a formidable position, Townehend had only some 11,000 effectives available. But the majority of the enemy were troops that had already been defeated several times in Mesopotamia. More over before the battle, General Townshend was not informed of the proximity of Turkish rein forcements— apart from the 30,000 referred to above— whose arrival on the scene was to change his victory into defeat The Turk has a fine reputation as a fighter; up to this stage of the Mesopotamian campaign.the Turks had been
driven back from one position to another so long as they. retained a large proportion of Arab troops in their ranks. These were rather a source of embarrassment, for they hated the Turks, who never cared to learn their lan guage or understand them, .and as a subject race they were stirred by no feelings of patriot ism — a virtue which is replaced by tribal ad hesion and religious fraternity. But on the other hand, as time went on and the proportion of Arab troops diminished, the stouter Turks took their place, and the Turkish army in Meso potamia became a very efficient machine of devoted soldiers. Heavy reinforce ments of this type arrived at the battle in the nick of time.
In a night march from Lajj, General Town shend with his force covered the nine miles to Ctesiphon on 21-22 Nov. 1915 and attacked the Turkish position on the left banlc at die centre and on the northeast flank., round which the cavalry was thrown to hinder a possible retire ment. A severe fight developed and lasted from dawn throughout the day. Early in the morn ing bodies of enemy troops were observed mov ing northward, giving the impression that they were retreating from Ctesiphon. The British cavalry attacked that flank which vras apparently in retreat, when it wheeled into line and made a stand that revealed an overwhelming force. On the front the British pressed on, stormed the first line, captured eight guns and estab lished thetnselves in the trendes. They were subjected to fierce counter-attacks by fresh re serves. Townshend's men penetrated to the second line and captured those trenches as well, but the enemy continued to pour reserves into the field and forced the British to abandon the advanced positions shortly before nightfall and retire to the first-line trenches. In the con flict the captured guns changed hands several time& The British casualties were heavy, and the 23d was mainly devoted to collecting the dead and wounded. The Turks also lost heav ily; the battlefield was covered with lcilled and wounded and mimy of the trenches were choked with their dead. Those troops which had held the front line werepractically annihilated. More reserves came up and attacked the British in their captured trenches during the whole night of the 23-24 Ncrvember, but these were repulsed with heavy loss. In the first day's battle the British took 1,300 prisoners. On the 24th the wounded and prisoners were removed from Ctesiphon to Lajj, where the flotilla was banked in, being unable to advance, owing to the Turkish batteries on the right bank. Be ycmd artillery action there was little activity on that day. Townshend still held the enetny's front line, but it became increasingly apparent that he was hopelessly outnumbered. Matters looked threatening on the 25th; large enemy columns were advancing down die left bank and also in land, as if to turn the British right flank, while hostile cavalry menaced the rear. To make things worse, Tovrnshend was short of sup plies; he had lost over 4,000 men in killed and wounded; his air force had suffered a series of accidents during the battle; several of his ma chines had been obliged to descend within the enemy's lines; his men were worn out, and he had no reserves to draw upon. Furthermore, he was nine miles from his nearest base at Lajj. In these circumstances he perforce de cided to avoid another engagement and with drew to Lajj during the night of the 25th. He remained here during the 26th, but the position was most unfavorable for defense, so he with drew unmolested back to Azizie in the night of 27-28 November. Engagements were fought with advanced Turkish cavalry near Kutunie on 29 November and on the 30th at Umm at-Tubal, about 25 miles below Kut, where the river ship ping was in difficulties in shallow water. The British continued their retreat upon Kut. fight ing rearguard actions without intertnission. On 1 Deniber the whole Turkish force attac.ked at Umm at-Tubal, but was repulsed after a se vere fight, during which Townshend took ad vantage of a successful counter-attack by his c.av against a column attenzpting to en velollis right flank, to brealc off the fight and retire by echelons of brigades. He reached Kut with the exhausted remnant of his troops on 3 Deceinber. Thus ended the Pyrrhic victory of Ctesiphon, in which the British lost about 700 killed and 3,800 wotuided— a loss of over 30 per cent.