ETHICS (Gk. rd ifh/C4, ethika, or hui ethike, ethical science, from ithn, ethos, cus tom, habit). The science of morality. There has been much discussion as to whether it is really a science or not rather a branch of philosophy. The present article is written in the belief that ethics is as independent a science as economics or political theory. Many arguments have been adduced to prove that scientific ethics is impos sible; but they are not in themselves convincing, and even if they were more plausible they would not convince any one who had before him the accomplished fact of a scientific ethics. Such we have in the treatises of Stephen, Alexander, and Wundt, to mention only a few recent authors.
In the definition given above the subject mat ter of ethics is stated to be morality. It is im portant to notice that ethics does not presume to construct morality out of whole cloth. Like any other science, it deals with actual phenomena that exist before the science comes into being. If there were no such thing as morality in the world, if men had not a consciousness of obliga lion, did not feel the attractive power of moral ideals, and did not find satisfaction in the reali zation of these ideals, ethics would not be, any more than mineralogy would be in a non-mineral world. But since morality is as indubitable a fact as crystallization, it piques curiosity to the comprehension of it. Among the questions that arise are the following: What is morality? Is it explicable as a result of evolution? When thoroughly understood in its fundamental fea tures and in its historical development, is it seen to be a reasonable fact, or is it a prejudice to be outgrown or an infantile way of looking at the world, to lie put away with many other childish things when once we arrive at the age of discre tion? If it is something of permanent value, is there any way in which its value may be en hanced? it is necessary to be on our guard when we come to ask what morality is. The question is often confused with that other question—What ought morality to be? This latter question, however, cannot be reasonably answered till the former is answered, any more than the question what ought a healthy man to be can be answered till we know what actual health really is. The morality of a certain man, or of a certain people, or of a certain time, is itself amenable to a higher standard of morality only in a sense that actual empirical healthfulness is amenable to a higher standard, idealized from experienced health. But what is that standard? Ilere we
come to a point concerning which there is a fundamental difference of opinion. Some any the standard is God's will (theological voluntarism) ; some that it is pure reason (rationalism) ; some that it is pleasure, either of the individual or of a community of individuals (hedonism, egoistic and universalistic) ; sbme that it is perfect bio logical adaptation to the environment (hiolo gism) ; some that it is perfection, variously de fined, of the individual or of the race (perfec tionism). In view of this difference of opinion, it seems impossible to answer off-hand the ques tion what morality ought to be. But the ques tion what morality is and has been is more hope ful. Although the moral consciousness is any thing but simple, still it is open to study and description.
In the first place, the form or type of moral consciousness we are best acquainted with is one that is capable of appreciating an antagonism between two or more motives. If there were never a competing desire standing out against the safe course always adopted, or, to use the language of religious experience, if there were no temptations, there would he no morality such as we know of. This feature will be discussed below.
The second characteristic of mature moral con sciousness is that without the capacity for self consciousness it could not exist. The motives in the moral consciousness are not merely desires for this and that object, hut desires which may he considered by the agent. as indicating his own character. The significance of this feature of morality can be brought out better by comparing the consciousness of a presumably non-moral be ing with that of a moral being. A cat may desire a warm berth on a bed, and may be averse to the whipping that comes to her when caught on the bed. Now, of course, we know nothing infallibly about a cat's thoughts, hut for the present argu ment such knowledge is not necessary. It is only necessary to know that if we knew that the cat did not think of herself as we do of ourselves; if we knew that before acting she could not present to herself an idea of herself as acting in one way, and then an idea of herself as acting in the other way, we should not treat her as a moral being. lf, on the other hand, we knew the contrary, we should be tempted to take a different moral atti tude toward her.