We have as yet left out of account what prob ably many would regard as the most distinctive feature of morality—the consciousness of obi i pa I ion . Thus, it is alleged, however erratic from our point of view modes of conduct approved in foreign lands and in past ages may lie, some defi nite course of conduct has always been regarded As binding. The fact of the obligation of some act or another, it is asserted, is, and has always been, recognized by every human being. There is the of imperativeness, so the contention tuns, in all human consciousness; this constitutes the framework of morality. The content, the matter, of morality varies indefinitely; the fora( is immutable. Some such thought as this con trolled the mind of Socrates in his attempt to dis prove the doctrine of relativity (q.v.), as applied by the Sophists (q.v.) to the ethical life. Plato at times hypostatized this immutable essence of morality into the eternal "form of the good." Aristotle, doing justice to another type of moral experience, found morality to consist in certain obligations imposed by the desire to secure cer tain ends. Christian theology, following Saint Paul. construes it as God's law of righteousness— "that which may be known of God" and "is mani fest even in the Gentiles, for God manifested it unto them" (Rom. i.). "For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law are a law unto themselves; which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their con science also being witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another" (Rom. ii. 14. 15). Ethical intuition ism (q.v.) takes its cue from traditional theol ogy, and finds a 'faculty' of conscience in every man; a faculty which may become atrophied in those who stiff-neekedly refuse to give it play, but which is an always present element in the original equipment of faculties possessed by every man. Ethical rationalists (see RATIONALISM), of whom Rant is the great protagonist, ascribe to pure reason an invariable mandatory activity, which operates in every rational being to the production of a recognized obligation to do certain things and to leave certain things undone, just because this doing and this leaving undone is pure reasonableness. In Rant this demand of pure reason is formulated in the principle, "Act only on that maxim whereby thou eaust at the same time will that it should become a universal law." This he calls the "one categorical impera tive." This "law contains no conditions restrict ing it;" it "is objectively necessary in itself without reference to any purpose." It has its seat and origin completely a priori (q.v.) in the reason, and that, moreover, in the commonest reason just as truly as in that which is in the highest degree speculative: "it is just the purity of" its "origin that makes" it "worthy to serve as our supreme practical principle." "There is no genuine supreme principle of morality but" this which rests "simply on pure reason, inde pendent of all experience." Hedonism (q.v.) roots the universal, unvarying form of morality in the desire of every sentient being to secure pleasure. In what Professor Sidg•ick calls the psyehologieal form of hedonism, the view is held that the occasion of every act he exercises, every human being is led to pursue that line of which, aeeo•ding to his view of the case, taken by him at the moment, will ho in the high est degree contributory to his own hap piness" (Bentham). In the ethical form of hedonism it is conceded that "men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be the less valuable; and this no less when the choice is two bodily pleasures than when it is between bodily and mental." lint while men thus do choose the less valuable pleasure, "it may be questioned whether any one who has remained equally. susceptible to both (gasses of pleasure ever knowingly and calmly preferred the low•r."' Ilappiness is "the rational purpose of human life and action" (.1. S. :MM. The happiness which reason prescribes as the proper end of life may be conceived as one's own lumpiness (ego. istic ethical hedonism), or it may be the happi ness of all sentient creatures (universalistic ethi cal hedonism). But however narrowly or broad l• conceived, reason is said to demand an effort to secure it and thus to impose an obligation. Perfectionists claim that what is demanded is not happiness, but the full. harmonious develop ment of one's nature and of the nature of one's fellows, until we all attain unto the stature of the perfect man. Certain evolutionists consider the supreme end which imposes obligation to con sist in improvement of 'the social tissue' ( Leslie Stephen). In all these views it will he seen there is an insistence upon the fact that ob ligatoriness is an essential mark of morality. Though they differ widely as to the source of obligation, they all agree that coextensive with morality is the phenomenon of obligation. On
the other hand, we find some writers who main tain that obligation is only an accident of moral ity. Herbert Spencer, in his Data of Ethics, comes to the "conclusion, which will be to most very startling, that the sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory and will diminish as fast as moralization increases." "With complete adaptation to the social state, that element in the moral consciousness which is expressed by the word obligation will disappear. The higher actions, required for the harmonious carrying on of life, will be as much matters of course as are these lower actions which the simple desires prompt. In their proper times and places and proportions, the moral sentiments will guide men just as spontaneously and adequately as now do the sensations." Among the poets this view is by no means rare.
These two opposing interpretations of morality —the one that regards the consciousness of obli gation as indispensable to morality. and the one that regards it as a transitory feature which will be outlived—are each in part true and in part false. The facts warrant us in saying that it is not necessary to the morality of an act that the agents should regard it as obligatory. Of actions which, except upon some preconceived theory, no one would hesitate to pronounce moral, a large proportion is spontaneous or habitual. A cup of cold water. even when not given "in the name of a disciple." or of the• giver's or the recipient's "pleasure," or of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," or of "the social 'tissue," or of somebody's "perfec tion." or of "the moral sense." or of "a uni versal law of Nature." may yet change hands in an unquestionably moral act. What is required to make the gift moral is that it should be made by a moral agent—i.e. by one who is ca pable of the consciousness of obligation. and that it should not be regarded by him as a contraven tion of moral obligation. Not the presence of the of moral obligation, but the ab settee of the consciousness of disloyalty to a moral obligation and the ability of the agent to feel an obligation, are universal features of moral conduct. Even the uneasy consciousness of dis loyalty to a traditionally recognized moral obli gation is compatible with morality, provided the agent has come to recognize an obligation superior to the traditional; for his habitual reverence for the old law and the knowledge that he is draw ing on himself the opprobrium of its adherents may fill him with vague misgivings at the very time when his conduct is prompted by fealty to the new order. He acts against the feeling, while acting in harmony with the knowledge, of moral obligation. Such action, instead of being im moral, or even non-moral, is a supreme instance of moral heroism. But when the path of duty has been worn smooth by habit, the wayfarer thereon is none the less moral because for the most part he forgets the manner of path he is treading. In the soldier who has been, through severe discipline, habituated to obedience, the sense of coerciveness has disappeared. The sol dier may no longer he explicitly conscious that some other person exacts of him a certain mode of behavior. In general, he may no longer exact this of himself. It has become his nature to do this, and that is all there is to it. But often, again, that is not all. There come times when his nature does not prompt him without hesitation. Then the question arises, 'What ought I to do?' This need not mean. 'What must I do to escape the guardhouse?' There may no longer be a consciousness of subordination to some external authority, in the sense of some person or some organization that actually demands compliance with certain rules. And vet there is not the sense of freedom to do anything one may like. Something still ought to be done and something ought not to be done. If. however, habit should have altogether become blind second nature, if the agent should have outlived the ability to think in terms of obligation, his action would have lost that one distinguishing mark which differentiates morality from what appears to be the non-benevolent cooperative beneficence of ants. If morality is to be a term having any specific meaning, it must be saved from applica tion to a condition of affairs in which an idea of obligation is never present any more than are "the evils of at a time when a healthy appetite is being satisfied by a meal" (Spencer). Our conclusion, therefore, is that acts not recog nized as obligatory may be moral if performed by beings capable, on due occasion, of recogniz ing them as obligatory.
But what is the consciousness of obligation? In how many forms does the consciousness of obligation appear? What gives rise to these various forms? How does moral obligation differ from other obligations? All these questions dc mand answer in a systematic- ethical discussion.