The promise must be made to the party in interest or his agent, in order to toll the statute ; Spangler v. Spangler, 122 Pa. 358, 15 AtI. 436, 9 Am. St. Rep. 114 ; as an ac knowledgment to a third person and not in tended to be communicated to the creditor will not suffice; Cunkle v. Heald, 6 Mackey (D. C.) 485.
A new promise to pay the principal only does not except the interest from the opera tion of the statute ; Graham v. Keys, 29 Pa. 189. Nor does an agreement to refer take the claim out of the statute ; Broddie v. Johnson, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 464; nor the in sertion, by an insolvent debtor, of an out lawed claim, in a schedule of his creditors required by, law ; Christy v. Flemington, 10 Pa. 129, 49 Am. Dec. 590 ; Roscoe v. Hale, 7 Gray (Mass.) 274 (but not so in Louisiana ; Morgan's Ex'rs v. Metayer, 14 La. Ann. 612); Woodbridge v. Allen, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 470; nor an agreement not to take advantage of the statute; Hodgdon v. Chase, 29 Me. 47; Maitland v. Wilcox, 17 Pa. 232 ; Stockett v. Sasscer, 8 Md. 374; Sutton v. Burruss, 9 Leigh (Va.) 381, 33 Am. Dec. 246. If such an agreement were valid, it might be made Part of the contract, and thus the object of the law would be defeated ; Hodgdon v. Chase, 32 Me. 169. Nor will a devise of property to pay debts exempt debts upon which the statute has run prior to the tes tator's death ; Carrington v. Manning's Heirs, 13 Ala. 611; Agnew's Adm'x v. Fetterman's ExPx, 4 Pa. 56, 45 Am. Dec. 671; Tazewell's Ex'r v. Whittle's Adm'r, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 329 ; Bloodgood v. Bruen, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 427.
Nor, in general, will any statement of it debt, made officially, in pursuance of special legal requirement, or with another purpose than to recognize it as an existing debt; 12 E. L. & Eq. 191; Wellman v. Southard, 30 Me. 425 ; Bradford v. Spyker's Adm'r, 32 Ala. 134. Nor will a deed of assignment made by the debtor for the payment of cer tain debts, and of his debts generally, and a partial payment by the assignor to a cred itor ; Reed v. Johnson, 1 R. I. 81; 6 E. L. & Eq. 520 ; nor the entry of a debt in an un signed schedule of the debtor's liabilities, made for his own use; Wellman v. Southard, 30 Me. 425 ; nor an undelivered mortgage to secure a debt against which the statute has run, though duly executed, acknowledged and recorded; Merriam v. Leonard, 6 Cush.
(Mass.) 151. But if the mortgage be deliv ered, it will be a sufficient acknowledgment to exempt the debt secured thereby from the operation of the statute ; Balch v. Onion, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 559; Merrills v. Swift, 18 Conn. 257, 46 Am. Dec. 315 ; Grayson v. Tay lor, 14 Tex. 672. And so will the answer to a bill in chancery which expressly sets forth the existence of such a debt ; Bloodgood v. Bruen, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 427; Allender v. Vestry of Trinity Church, 3 Gill (Md.) 166. An acknowledgment by a mortgagor to a stranger of the existence of the debt secured by the mortgage, without an express promise to pay the debt, will not prevent the bar of the statute; Biddel v. Brizzolara, 64 Cal. 354, 30 Pac. 609.
A mere request by a defendant not to sue will not prevent him from taking advantage of the statute later ; Brown v. R. Co., 147 N. C. 217, 60 S. E. 985; and giving a note for interest upon a prior note already barred by the statute does not relive it; Kleis v. McGrath, 127 Ia. 459, 103 N. W. 371, 69 L. R. A. 260, 109 Am. St. Rep. 396. The bar of the statute is not removed on a quantum merwit for services where a legacy recites that it is given in consideration for such services, such legacy being a mere bounty and not an acknowledgment of a debt; Mc Neal v. Pierce, 73 Ohio 7, 75 N. E. 938, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1117, 112 Am. St. Rep. 695, 4 Ann. Cas. 71. Under a statute requiring a new promise to be in writing it was held that where a receiver of a bank orally prom ises a creditor that he would not plead the statute if the creditor would refrain from bringing suit, it would prevent the running of the statute of limitation since the defend ant was estopped from pleading it ; Bridges v. Stephens, 132 Mo. 524, 34 S. W. 555.
If there is any thing said to repel the in ference of a promise, or inconsistent there with, the statute will not be avoided ; Moore v. Bank, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 86, 8 L: Ed. 329; Thayer v. Mills, 14 Me. 300. A promise to pay is implied from an acknowledgment of a debt as an existing debt ; Custy v. Donlan, 159 Mass. 245, 34 N. E. 360, 38 Am. St. Rep. 419 ; but it is held that a mere acknowl edgment is insufficient ; Wood v. Merrietta, 69 Kan. 748, 71 Pac. 579; Lambert v. Doyle. 117 Ga. 81, 43 S. E. 416.